Lessons From Kosovo:

The KFOR Experience

Larry Wentz
Contributing Editor

CCRP

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The KFOR Experience

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CCRP
Publication
Series

A B C D E

1

SLOVENIA
Celie

HUNGARY
Nagykanizsa Kaposvár Kiskunhal Szeged Hódmezővásárhely

PANNONIAN BASIN

Varaždín Zagreb Bjelovar Pécs Subotica Arad Timișoara ROMANIA
Karlovac Sisak CROATIA Sombor Kikinda B A N A T Deva Hunedoary

2

Bihać Prijedor Vukovar Vojvodina Novi Sad Zrenjanin Vršac Petroseni
TRANSYLVANIAN ALPS
Banja Luka Republika Srpska Slavonski Brod Ruma Danube Brčko Drobeta-Turnu Severin
Kljuc Doboj Bijeljina Sabac Belgrade Smederevo
BOSNIA AND Tuzla Valjevo YUGOSLAVIA
Kninski HERZEGOVINA Zenica Subotica Kragujevac Užice Serbia Bor Vidin Calafat

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Sarajevo Pale Sibenik Mostar DINARIC ALPS Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Goražde Foča Republika Srpska Pljevlja Novi Pazar Kraljevo Paraćin Niš BALKAN MTS
Split Ploče Neum Dabrovnik CROATIA Nikšić Montenegro Ivangrad Peć Kosovska Mitrovica Kosovo Pristina Leskovac BULG
Podgorica Bar Prizren Gnjilane Urosevac Kumanovo Kyustendil
Shkodër Kukës Tetovo Skopje Titov Veles Stip
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Adriatic Sea
Barletta Bari
ITALY
Shëngjin Peshkopi Debar Gostivar Prilep Serrica
Tirana Durrës Elbasan Ohrid Bitola Florina Edessa Thessaloniki
ALBANIA Lushnjë Berat Korçë Kastoria Véroia Katerini
PINDUS MTS GREECE

Republic boundary
Autonomous province boundary
Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) (Dayton agreement line)

Scale 1:3,550,000
Lambert Conformal Conic Projection, standard parallels 40 N and 56 N

Brindisi Lecce Otranto Strait of Otranto Corfu Sarandë Igoumenitsa Ioannina Lárisa

5

A B C D E F G H I J K L M

42° 30'

Dečani — Ranić — Vlaški Drenovac — Lipljan — Kufce e Epërme Gorne Kusce — Dobrcane — Perovciar — **1**
Tropoje — Junik — Jablanica Kraljme — Mališevo — Krajmirovce — Krajište — Brasaljce — Gnjilane — Kufce Momesti Silovo Ilsovo — Kmetovce Malsevo — Outpost Sapper — Dobrosin

Bajram Curri — Dakovica — Ratkovac — Orahovac — Blace — Štimlje — Uroševac (Ferizaj) — Cernica Cernica — Klkot Klakot Lovce Mogille Mogila — Vrbof Vrbov — Legra — Presevo Valley — Biljača — **2**
Erenik — Zrze — Suva Reka — Modijane — Recak Racak — Požoranje — Kamp Bondsteel — Vitina Binćea — Sasare — Presevo
Paci — Rogovo — V. Krusa — Mušutište — Grebno — Gatnje — Korpila Korbuli — Miratovac

Liqeni i Fierzës — Damjane — Pirane — Koriša — Brod — Vrbestica — Strpce Brezovice Savce — Kacanik — Podgorc Podgorce — Vaksince — Tabanovce — **3**
Krumë — Zur — Hoča Zagradska — Mušnikovo — Blace — Slupčane

ALBANIA — Brodosavce — G. Lubinje — Tearce — Kumanovo — **4**
Dukagjin — Kukes — Dragas — Šipkovica — Dračevo — **5**
Kalimash — Brod — Golema-Rečica — Zelino — Skopje — 42° 00'

Restelica — Vrapčiste — Titov Veles — **6**
Brodec — Gostivar — Čajle — THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA — **7**
Zirovnica

21° 00' — 20° 30'

SERBIA
MONTENEGRO
Kosovska Mitrovica
Pec Pristina
KOSOVO
Urosevac
Djakovica
ALBANIA Prizren Kumanovo
Skopje
MACEDONIA

0 10 20 30 40 50 km
0 10 20 30 mi

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CHAPTER XV

Introduction

Larry Wentz

The Untold Story

The men and women who devote their time and effort to saving and protecting the lives of others rarely get the public recognition they deserve. The sacrifices they make, the hardships they endure, and particularly the outstanding work they do on the behalf of the United States all over the world, are all part of a great untold story. That is the story I want to help tell, the story of the peacekeepers.

As the former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammerskold once said, "Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it." These operations are not glamorous and do not command the same long-term media attention as warfighting operations, even though many times they are just as dangerous. In peace operations, the story begins when the media arrives, which in most cases is before the military operation begins. The arrival of CNN's Christiane Amanpour often signals the beginning of important events and the rest of the media will not be far behind. The peace operation story effectively ends when the media goes home, although the operation itself may continue for years.

The NATO-led Kosovo ground operation, Operation Joint Guardian, is such a case. The suffering and injustices leading up to the military intervention received plenty of media coverage. Active media coverage continued throughout the military entry and initial force deployments and continued up to the time of stabilization—reduced violence, disarming of the KLA, and the return of many Kosovar Albanian refugees. At that point, most of the media went home. As a result, the real story of the day-to-day experiences of the troops on the ground received little attention. There were exceptions when special events, such as Thanksgiving and Christmas, got some limited coverage.

Unfortunate events, such as the accidental shooting of a 6-year-old Kosovar-Albanian boy by a U.S. soldier, received intensive (albeit brief) media attention.

These chapters of Section 5 attempt to tell a part of this untold story by sharing my experiences in Kosovo. I worked for 6 weeks with a dedicated workforce of U.S. military personnel, civilians, and contractors, as well as our multinational partners. All of these people and organizations were trying to protect and restore a devastated land. The observations and shortfalls presented herein are not meant as criticism. Everyone with whom I came into contact worked hard to make a difference in this most difficult and complex environment. Exposing some of the day-to-day challenges they had to overcome in order to make a difference will hopefully serve to educate others and better prepare those who may participate in future peacekeeping operations. The experiences in some cases represent lessons revisited while others are lessons yet to be learned. Every day was new and brought a new set of opportunities and challenges.

Luck of the Draw

It was bright and sunny on May 26, 2000, when Major Dan Cecil, U.S. Air Force, and I boarded the U.S. Army Black Hawk at the commercial airport in Skopje, Macedonia. Major Cecil, my military escort, was a member of the European Command (EUCOM), J6 Joint Operations Center. We had arrived in Skpoje just a few minutes earlier after a two-and-a-half hour flight from Stuttgart Army Airfield, Germany. Mr. Ed Robley, Multinational Brigade-East (MNB(E)) Joint Visitor Bureau, met us for the half-hour chopper ride to the VIP pad at Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo (Figure 1). As the chopper approached the pad, we got our first glimpse of the dust that would be part of our daily life during our time at Bondsteel. The temperature upon my arrival was in the high 90s and remained unchanged for most of my stay.

Figure 1. Author's Arrival at Camp Bondsteel May 26, 2000

The visit could not have occurred at a more fortuitous time. It was nearly a year into Operation Joint Guardian. EUROCORP was in its early phase of its control at Kosovo Force (KFOR) headquarters. The Task Force Falcon (TFF) U.S. 1st Infantry Division was preparing to transfer authority (TOA) to the 1st Armored Division. The atmosphere was one of high operations tempo (OPTEMPO). There was a likelihood of hostilities erupting. Preparation for the TOA was well underway with new troops showing up at Camp Bondsteel every day. Massive local celebrations were being planned by the Kosovar Albanians for June 12th to honor the first anniversary of the liberation of Kosovo by the UCK and the arrival of KFOR forces. KFOR was concerned that these celebrations might not be peaceful. Roadside monuments bearing the UCK symbol and Albanian flag started to appear in early June to honor those who died in the fight for freedom against the Serbian military. In some cases, the U.S. flag was also flown alongside the Albanian flag.

BG Croom, U.S. Air Force, EUCOM J6, was the European theater sponsor of my visit. Lt. Col. Earl Matthews, U.S. Air Force, facilitated things at the EUCOM level. The commander of MNB(E) and TFF, BG

Sanchez, U.S. Army, his Chief of Staff, COL Al Landry, U.S. Army, and MAJ Peter Jones, U.S. Army, of the G3 plans shop sponsored the in-country visit and opened the doors necessary to make this a successful "quick look" into the lives of the soldiers on the ground, the day-to-day operation of TFF, the challenges they faced, and the ways in which they made a difference. There was a mutually beneficial situation in my helping them with their after action review (AAR) and them helping me get access to information to tell the TFF story. 2LT Brendan Corbett, U.S. Army, of G3 plans was our in-country escort and responsible for coordination of activities.

Opportunity to Get Some Firsthand Experience

During the 6-week period of my stay in Kosovo, I was given the opportunity to observe firsthand the day-to-day headquarters and intelligence operations of TFF and to participate in field operations within the area of responsibility of MNB(E), including visits to some of the non-U.S. force elements supporting the task force. LTC Hogg, U.S. Army, and LTC Greco, U.S. Army, were instrumental in facilitating my participation in TFF operations and intelligence activities. Many officers facilitated my excursions from Camp Bondsteel:

- LTC Beard, U.S. Army Reserve, provided me numerous opportunities to participate with his civil affairs teams working in Gnjilane, Kamenica, Vitina, Kacanik and Strpce.

- MAJ Rangle, U.S. Army Reserve, arranged for me to accompany his PSYOP teams on visits to a PSYOP funded radio station in the Serbian village of Silovo, as well as to the villages of Bilince, Lovce, Gronja Stubla, Vrnez Letnica, and Zegra.

- CPT Davis, U.S. Army Reserve, took me along on a PSYOP team visit to the Serbian village of Susice to distribute some clothing and toys for children of the village.

- LTC Kokinda, U.S. Army, organized tours and briefings of the U.S. communications operations on Camps Bondsteel and Montieth and a Black Hawk helicopter aerial tour of the MNB(E) sector with visits to U.S. communications sites at the Polish, Greek and Russian camps.

- MAJ Lin Crawford, U.S. Army, organized a visit to see a "CONOPS" package deployment at a counter infiltration operations outpost called "Eagle's Nest" near the Serbian border in the town of Plavica and the "Rock" communications facility on Camp Bondsteel.

- MAJ Brown, U.S. Army, invited me to participate in TFF Information Operations cell activities and the weekly KFOR-sponsored IO working group meetings.

- MAJ Allen, U.S. Army Reserve, organized visits with the public affairs team and participation in a Public Information Officers' working group meeting sponsored by KFOR.

- MAJ Irby, U.S. Army, facilitated visits to KFOR headquarters, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Pristina.

- Captain Barwikowski, U.S. Army, facilitated visits with the Special Forces team, the MPs, 1-187 IN, and the UNMIK police in Vitina.

- 1LT Vitello, U.S. Army, made arrangements for me to accompany the combat camera team on several missions, one of which provided me the opportunity to observe a Medical Civil Action Program (MEDCAP) team in action in the Serbian village of Kmetovce.

- Warrant Officer Battagua, Italian Carabinieri, invited me to go along with them to Vrnez to look for smuggling routes.

- Checkpoint Sapper overlooking the Presovo valley and the village of Dobrosin were visited several times with civil affairs, public affairs and combat camera teams.

As an outside observer, it was impossible for me to acquire the same depth of knowledge of the operation as that of those stationed at Camp Bondsteel. The men and women I spoke to had to carry out missions every day for six months. My observations were only cursory, but gathered from soldiers at many levels of the task force. The findings and observations presented herein will hopefully provide insights to the

breadth and depth of peace support operations activities, some of the issues they needed to deal with and the difficulties of adapting traditional structures to new missions and technologies. No two operations were ever really quite the same so new lessons were learned every day. There were some similarities to Bosnia, but there were also many differences that made Kosovo a new adventure for those who participated.

Task Force Falcon Background

There were U.S. forces already in Macedonia supporting the U.N.-sanctioned operation Task Force Able Sentry, which monitored the Serbian border. NATO deployed the Allied Command Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in February 1999 in anticipation of achieving a cease-fire agreement. Task Force Falcon was activated on February 4, 1999. It was initially envisioned to be a reinforcement brigade to serve as the U.S. component of a NATO-led Kosovo Force whose mission would be to conduct peacekeeping operations in Kosovo to support the Rambouillet Peace Accords. The 1st Infantry Division (the Big Red One) was earmarked for this mission and began training in March 1999 while diplomatic discussions continued. Failure to achieve a diplomatic agreement with Milosevic resulted in NATO initiating the air campaign Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999. Both NATO and U.S. forces were in Macedonia as NATO prosecuted the air war to force Milosevic to capitulate. In April, Task Force Hawk deployed to Tirana for possible use in conducting deep strike operations in support of the air war. The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed to Fier, Albania near the end of April to provide physical security for Camp Hope, a Kosovar refugee camp managed by the U.S. Air Force. In early June, an agreement with Belgrade was achieved to permit the unopposed entry of KFOR into Kosovo under the Military Technical Agreement in support of UNSCR 1244.

The 1st Infantry Division Commander called upon the 2nd Brigade, 1st ID, to immediately deploy, under the command of BG Craddock, U.S. Army. Elements of U.S. Task Force Hawk were relocated from Albania to Macedonia within hours of the Serbian acceptance of the terms to end the bombing. The 26th MEU was ordered to turn over the security mission to the U.S. Air Force and immediately proceed to Macedonia to support peace operations in Kosovo. The U.S.S. Kearsarge transported

the Marines from Albania to Greece. They then traveled by convoy to Macedonia and the KFOR staging area near the Kosovar border. As a result, the U.S. enabling force led by the 2nd Brigade Combat Team included not only U.S. Army forces but also the 26th MEU.

On June 12, 1999, the U.S. element of the KFOR force entered the war-torn province of Kosovo by land and air. U.S. Army paratroopers successfully staged an air assault and raised the American flag on a hill near Urosevac (the future site for Camp Bondsteel) and awaited the arrival of the initial land entry force led by BG Craddock. The following day, Task Force Falcon established its headquarters at Camp Bondsteel on the hilly land a few miles west of Urosevac. A few days later, the 26th MEU occupied the city of Gnjilane and the surrounding area. The MEU established its presence as a force with authority, power and conviction. As the Marines put it, "We came to win, others came not to lose." In early July, the Marines were replaced by U.S. Army elements. The U.S. entry force quickly grew into the Multinational Brigade East, which was composed of forces from eight nations: Greece, Jordan, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.

When the peacekeepers first entered Kosovo in June, thousands of Albanians were feared dead and more than a million people had been driven from their homes. The government and all civil services had collapsed. Pristina, the capital city, was deserted. There were no border guards. Merely securing the borders proved an enormous task as KFOR units and Kosovar refugees flooded into the province.

On August 12, 1999, BG Craig Peterson, U.S. Army, assumed command of MNB(E)/TFF. Violence and lawlessness decreased as winter approached but did not cease entirely as ethnically motivated troubles continued. In October 1999, MNB(E) repositioned forces along ethnic fault lines. Gradually violence began to decrease.

On December 10, 1999, BG Rick Sanchez, U.S. Army, assumed command of MNB(E)/TFF and the 3rd Brigade, 1st ID, assumed the TFF mission. During the winter months, MNB(E) continued to expand its presence throughout the U.S. sector. They also began to prepare for possible increases in ethnic violence and insurgency activities. This new focus expanded the MNB(E) mission beyond purely peace support operations and introduced expanded-boundary security and counter-insurgency operations.

In January and February of 2000, MNB(E) began to see nascent insurgent activity along the Kosovo-Serbia border and an increase in ethnic violence, particularly in the French sector and Mitrovica. From February 19 to 24, 2000, TFF elements were sent to MNB(N) to support KFOR efforts to quell ethnic violence and tensions in the divided city of Mitrovica.

Throughout the spring, MNB(E) continued to demonstrate and foster multinational support and interoperability during Operation Dynamic Response 2000. This coordinated effort was frequently needed to combat violent civil disturbances. Two major crowd control actions in Serbian dominated towns occurred. One on March 1, 2000, in Gornje Kusce was the result of soldiers arresting a weapons violator during a routine house search operation. The other happened on April 4, 2000, in Sevce where another weapons violator was arrested. These events required MPs to use riot gear and K9 dog team. The commander at the disturbance in Gornje Kusce requested permission to use non-lethal weapons, but was denied. However, non-lethal weapons were permitted at Sevce. Nineteen TFF personnel were injured during the Sevce riot. On March 15, MNB(E) elements attacked multiple sites along 28 kilometers of enemy territory to seize weapons and ammunition. This operation communicated KFOR's and MNB(E)'s determination to preserve the peace in Kosovo to the civilian population.

On June 20, 1st ID relinquished TFF leadership to the 1st Armored Division. BG Randal Tieszen, U.S. Army, took command. The transfer of authority was shortly followed by a new series of civil disturbances. On June 23, approximately 800 Serbs attacked and vandalized the UNMIK office at Strcpe. They were angry at KFOR's failure to locate an elderly man missing from the mountain village Susice. At the end of June, there were demonstrations and riots in Kamenica, a grenade detonated at a Serbian home in Cernica, and an explosion destroyed a Serbian Orthodox Church in Podgoce. In response, sanctions were placed on Serbians in Strpce and Albanians in Kamenica.

BG Tieszen remained in Kosovo less than two months. BG Dennis Hardy, U.S. Army, took command of TFF at the end of July 2000.

CHAPTER XVI

The Kosovo Environment

Larry Wentz

Land of Contrasts

Kosovo was a land of contrasts in terms of freedom of movement, social customs, politics and religion, views of the future, and modes of transportation. Albanians enjoyed a freedom of movement they had not experienced in years, whereas Serbs, who used to have important jobs and were free to move anywhere in the country, now lived as prisoners in their own villages. Country people lived much as their ancestors did centuries ago, working small farms by hand and living in homes made of mud and stone without running water. In the cities, people showed a higher level of sophistication, especially youths. Many traveled and lived in other countries, were exposed to foreign movies and television, and enjoyed western-style dress and modern conveniences. Young women dressed very well, albeit in a sexy style, with long flowing hair. Tight clothes were popular among both young men and women. They were a handsome and attractive people. The older generation, and those in rural areas where TV and movies had not created a new sense of style, still dressed in more traditional clothing. Many women were overweight and wore long skirts with aprons and kerchiefs. In contrast, the men were usually thinner and dressed in wool pants with black jackets. Many of the Albanian men wore the traditional Muslim skullcap. The younger men did not wear them.

The contrasts extended to almost every part of society. Transportation ranged from horse drawn carts to cars. Some restaurants served traditional foods while others offered western meals such as hamburgers. Cafes served juice, Turkish coffee, Makiato, and cappuccino. Markets provided produce and livestock as well as electronics and western clothing.

The Violence Continues

After nearly a year of KFOR presence, the country was still very dangerous. There were constant reminders that Kosovo was still a war zone. KFOR convoys and armored vehicles were on every road, and soldiers could be seen guarding checkpoints and churches, or patrolling the villages and countryside. All soldiers in MNB(E) wore flack vests and Kevlar helmets and carried automatic weapons. This was not necessarily the case in other sectors where soldiers, such as those from the UK, did not always wear flack vests and Kevlar helmets while on street patrol.

Although things appeared to be better in the Albanian dominated areas, Kosovo was still a relatively dangerous place and caution needed be exercised daily. Multiple shadow organizations formed to fill power vacuums and began to exercise control through actions such as illegal taxation. Organized crime was well entrenched and active in prostitution, drugs, and the slave trade. Public safety and rule of law, or the lack thereof, was still a problem and even cattle rustling plagued Kosovo. Land mines continued to be a danger everywhere despite KFOR and UNMIK efforts to clear them.

Not all Kosovars enjoyed freedom of movement, a feeling of security, or prosperity, despite the progress that had been made. People in the Serbian enclaves continued to be prisoners in their own country. Romas were mistreated and many lived in crowded refugee camps. Violent incidents continued. Grenades were thrown into groups of Serbian vendors. Crowds of Serbs were shot at with AK-47s. Such incidents killed or seriously injured Serbs and retribution actions were taken— primarily against innocent Albanian civilians.

The majority of the educated and experienced civil servants in Kosovo before the war were Serbs who fled as the bombing started, and never returned. Much of the Albanian leadership went underground or left Kosovo after Milosevic's speech at the Field of Blackbirds in Kosovo Polje in 1989. Many believe this speech ignited the current Balkan war. Those that stayed formed a shadow government to help the Albanian majority that was openly discriminated against during this period. Those Albanians that left Kosovo provided hard currency and resources from the U.S. and western Europe, as well as fueled the desire to break away from the Serbian government. As a result, numerous leaders emerged

in the Albanian sector, each with their own power base. Some centered on clan relationships, some developed around the UCK and war experiences, and others centered on economic relationships. It was impossible to tell who spoke for the Albanian majority because of this fragmentation in their society. One thing that was clear, however, was the Albanian position on Kosovo—to support the international presence because it provided the resources for the continuing efforts towards independence. The Serbian position was equally clear—to oppose Kosovar independence and denounce the international presence as a base of support for Kosovar independence. As long as the fundamental question of Kosovo's status remained undecided, there would be at best a complete freeze on Albanian and Serbian political interaction; and at worst, a continuation of violence. Since the Kosovar Albanians continued to see the Serbian minority as an obstruction to their goal of complete freedom, it was thought by many that any success achieved in maintaining a safe and secure environment for the Serbs would likely be short lived.

The roots of hatred run deep. The centuries-old animosity between the Serbs and Albanians that incited the ethnic cleansing during the war was still apparent. During the war, Serbs burned Albanian homes, but in the aftermath, the Albanians revisited those crimes upon the Serbs tenfold. Returning Albanians claimed (without authority) abandoned Serbian homes and property by painting their names on the buildings. Former Serbian property was confiscated and houses were being built on those properties. Without a civil administration there were no laws for the protection of property or codes of building construction. Most records of ownership also disappeared. Albanian and Serbian children were still taught to hate one another. Serbian children would be seen flashing the VJ (Yugoslavian Army) victory sign with their forefingers and thumb (Figure 1) at KFOR soldiers.

Figure 1. Serb Children

Before the war, there were parallel, but unequal, health and education systems in Kosovo. Serbian doctors were better trained and worked in hospitals and clinics, which provided services to all ethnic groups. Albanian doctors were forced to work in second-class facilities. After the war began, many Serbian doctors fled to Serbia and never returned. As result, there was a shortage of medical professionals. Those Serbian doctors who remained in Kosovo were victims of shootings outside the hospitals, so they would not venture out into the countryside to treat villagers in remote locations. Many people in rural areas were left completely without medical care of any kind. Efforts by the international community to encourage the Serbian doctors to treat these people failed.

Many Albanian houses flew the flag of Albania. This apparently served two purposes. It demonstrated patriotism and informed zealots that the house was Albanian and should not be burned down or claimed. Young Albanians frequently hung a large Albanian flag attached to a pole out of the car window and drove at high speeds through Serbian villages to intimidate them. There were UCK monuments erected within sight of Serbian enclaves. Such a monument (Figure 2) was erected at the multi-

ethnic market area of Kamenica and faced the Serbian enclave that bordered the market. Patriotism also led to the changes in the identity of many towns. On the main roads, signs for villages and towns that were spelled in both Serbian and Albanian had slashes of paint blocking out the Serbian spellings. Towns with Serbian names were given Albanian names. Ironically, the scene was reminiscent of Brussels, Belgium (the home of NATO headquarters) and the surrounding area where signs can be found in French and Flemish. In the French areas the Flemish will be crossed out and vice versa. Silent support of the UCK continued in Kosovo. Roadside cigarette vendors and shop owners used the Lucky Strike cigarette carton as a symbol of support. The Lucky Strike logo from a distance looks like the UCK symbol. These cartons were displayed in shop windows and kiosks (Figure 3). Roadside vendors also sold UCK patches and flags and UCK pendants hung from the visor of car owners who were supporters.

Figure 2. UCK Monument in Kamenica

Figure 3. Lucky Strike Carton

During the air war, NATO was dedicated to freeing the Albanians from Serbian ethnic cleansing. Now the efforts of NATO and KFOR shifted to protecting the minority Serbian population. KFOR soldiers guarded the entrances and exits to many Serbian towns. Tanks and barbed wire fences stood in front of Serbian Orthodox churches. KFOR soldiers escorted Serbian children to and from school. They also escorted Serbian convoys (Figure 4) back to Serbia, or elsewhere for medical treatment and shopping. These efforts required huge expenditures of time and money. Without them, though, even more Serbs probably would have been killed.

Figure 4. KFOR Serbian Convoy Escort

Early TFF efforts focused on monitoring and verifying withdrawal of VJ/MUP (Ministry of Interior Police) forces in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement. Later they monitored the demilitarization and transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The withdrawal of the VJ/MUP forces was successful. The next challenge facing TFF was the KLA, which attempted to establish itself as a viable military force. In a major incident, the Marines had to capture and disarm a heavily armed company of KLA soldiers (116 men and women). The eventual transformation of the KLA into a civilian emergency organization, the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), was considered one of the major KFOR and UNMIK successes. Nightly explosions and routine exchanges of gunfire with unidentified hostile forces were the norm during the summer of 1999. KFOR was establishing a safe and secure environment while simultaneously establishing law and order, providing emergency humanitarian assistance, and supporting UNMIK and other agencies' efforts to help prepare the Kosovo residents and returning refugees for the coming winter.

The countryside where Serbs had coexisted peacefully with their Albanian neighbors for years seemed quiet enough, but hostile ethnic Albanian communities generally surrounded the Serbian villages or enclaves within an Albanian village. It was easy to identify the Serbian villages and homes by the KFOR soldiers who guarded them. It was

unsafe for Serbs to go far beyond the boundaries of their enclaves and villages. Attempts to travel to cities such as Gnjilane to shop or for medical care could result in being beaten, robbed or possibly even killed. U.S. MEDCAPs frequented the Serbian enclaves and villages, such as the town of Kmetovce near Gnjilane (which was half Serbian and half Albanian) to bring medical assistance to them. The major medical problems seemed to be lower backaches, diabetes, high blood pressure and arthritis.

A rare example of a somewhat peaceful coexistence was Kamenica, where Serbs and Romas lived in enclaves in a town dominated by Albanians, but mixed on the streets in town. Every Friday they congregated at the local market where each ethnic group had its own section of the market area, the largest belonging to the Albanians. Living in fear was not restricted to Serbs. In the MNB(E) sector a number of Albanian villages, such as, Bilince and Lovce, were located in the mountains along the Serbian border and the villagers lived in constant fear. Serbian atrocities had been committed there during the war and these villagers lived in fear of returning VJ and MUP. While accompanying a tactical PSYOP team visit to Bilince, several of the villagers expressed great concern to us about this. Although they felt safe and secure with KFOR protecting them, they said they would leave if KFOR left. The villagers explained that when the Serbian families had left the village, they had taken revenge and burned the homes they had vacated.

Drive-by shootings of Serbs were on the rise in the MNB(E) sector. Kosovar Albanian intimidation of Serbian communities and the destruction of Serbian churches were becoming more frequent. Sometimes these shootings and church bombings took place within sight of the protecting KFOR troops. The Serbian propaganda machine worked overtime to discredit UNMIK and KFOR. They were challenging the validity of UNSCR 1244 after the first year. They were promoting the return of the VJ and MUP to Kosovo to protect the Kosovar Serbs. From Serbia's point of view, KFOR could no longer guarantee protection. There were also heightened concerns about activities in the Presevo valley that bordered the U.S. sector and Serbia. The possibility existed that former UCK/KLA (the UCPMB) and Serbian forces (VJ and MUP) would begin fighting again. Organized crime, insurgency, and smuggling activities on MNB(E) borders were on the rise as well. This was a dangerous, but exciting time to be in Kosovo.

The Landscape of Kosovo

To some, the general impression of the Balkans was of images of wretched refugees, bombed out buildings, and ethnic violence. There were also perceptions by some that U.S. forces lived in luxury in garrisons such as Camps Bondsteel and Montieth and only went out during the daytime hours in heavily protected convoys. These are, after all, typical of the images portrayed by the media in print and on television. There was a wealth of stories of ethnic hatred that I read and heard about but did not fully appreciate until I witnessed it firsthand. The damage from the initial war and the resulting backlash was evident all over the country.

Scenes of destruction and desolation were everywhere. Paramilitary forces were still operating. Minefields, destroyed equipment, and burned-out homes cluttered the landscape. The initial NATO and U.S. planning did not adequately anticipate the enormity of the operation. Simply entering the country proved difficult. Further complicating the situation was the fact that the main supply route was also the only safe route for all local traffic and the "stay-in-place" refugee campaign had not worked. There was a massive flood of refugees returning to Kosovo earlier than expected. As a result, returning Albanian refugees crowded the roads along with KFOR, U.N., contractor, and humanitarian assistance vehicles. Some contractors were already in Kosovo and met KFOR soldiers as they crossed the border.

The local civil government was dysfunctional, so the civil administration duties of the police and firefighters had to be temporarily assumed by the military. The military also confronted criminal elements. The VJ/MUP were not defeated on the battlefield so it was not clear whether they intended to comply fully with the MTA. The departing VJ and MUP forces were accompanied by fleeing Kosovar Serb civilians (a new wave of ethnic cleansing) and followed closely by arriving KFOR ground forces. This was done to forestall a power vacuum in the cities and countryside where attacks and reprisals by Kosovar Serbs and Albanians needed to be kept in check. The threat of KFOR military force kept the situation from getting out of hand.

The justice system was in disarray at the outset, but after a year UNMIK had begun to make some progress by hiring Albanian (and a few Serbian) judges and prosecutors. The international community started to help

fund the re-establishment of a functioning judicial system, including court buildings, penal facilities and equipment. There continued to be one major problem in spite of these efforts: the perception that Albanian judicial personnel were subjected to outside pressures and would administer the law in a biased fashion against other ethnic groups. The introduction of the international judges and prosecutors was UNMIK's attempt to address these fears and eliminate partial rulings. Without a functioning and impartial legal system, nobody feared accountability. Individuals arrested and taken into custody by UNMIK or KFOR were often released after several days because the legal system couldn't process them. As a result, criminals, including those who committed murder, were walking in and out of detention facilities, such as the one on Camp Bondsteel in MNB(E).

Although KFOR was attempting to reduce crime and violence, they could not serve as a civilian police force. UNMIK was responsible for providing a civilian police force, however they were short-staffed and faced many difficulties in acquiring the personnel they needed. Recruits for UNMIK Police positions came from candidate nominations by countries around the world, however, in spite of clearly stated qualification requirements by UNMIK, many of the candidates were not qualified or prepared for the job. Some recruits were unable to speak English; others could not drive. The UNMIK police force was poorly supplied and carried inferior weapons to those of the criminals and gangs, which had grenades and automatic weapons.

Driving in Kosovo was a nightmare. People were more likely to be injured or killed on the road than by a sniper or act of violence. The roads were in terrible shape. Drivers would swerve to avoid potholes without worrying about oncoming traffic. UNMIK and KFOR were making road repairs but this had the unintended consequence of enabling drivers to travel at more dangerous speeds. There were no driving tests or licenses; most cars did not have license plates and drivers ignored internationally accepted rules of the road. Many UNMIK, OSCE, KFOR and international aid workers adopted Kosovo driving habits as well, adding more chaos to the highways with tanks, trucks and buses, Humvees, Jeeps, and Land Cruisers.

Traditional souvenir stands lined the roads where flags and patches of the KLA, UCK and UCPMP, music CDs, DVDs, cigarettes, and local folk art could be purchased. In fact, some of the major cottage industries of

the area were CD/DVD stores and cigarette stands along the roads and sidewalk such as those found lining the streets in cities like Pristina and Gnjilane. U.S. soldiers were not allowed to purchase such items while outside of the base camps. Other local cottage industries that sprouted up were cafés, car washes and gas stations. They were everywhere in large numbers. Some cafés were nothing more than an umbrella and a plastic table and chairs, while others had a more traditional European sidewalk arrangement. The car wash could be as simple as a flat area along the side of the road with a sign and a portable power washer connected to a power and water source. Many felt that the gas stations were most likely fronts for organized crime elements. Most gas stations were new and quite modern. There were more than 10 stations on a less than 30 km stretch of road between Urosevac (MNB(E)/TFF headquarters) and Pristina (KFOR and UNMIK headquarters) and several more were under construction in June of 2000. The limited traffic along this route hardly justified the number of stations being constructed.

Land mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) continued to be a danger everywhere in spite of UNMIK and KFOR efforts to mark and clear mine fields (Figure 5). The danger increased significantly with the arrival of the spring and summer months. Farmers ventured into their fields and herders took their animals into areas not grazed upon since the war. Children played in potentially dangerous places. Many of these people and their livestock became victims. Farmers who found mines in their fields dug them up and place them along the roadside for KFOR troops to collect. Most mines detonated when stepped on and incidents of children and others being killed were commonplace. Children were seen playing with unexploded munitions such as cluster bombs and in one incident, a child was killed and another seriously injured when the cluster bomb they were playing with exploded. On the other hand, vineyards in the mountains went unattended and were not watered because the owners were afraid to venture into the fields. KFOR soldiers were constantly reminded not to go off the main roads and mine awareness was a major KFOR information campaign subject. UNMIK and KFOR mine awareness posters could be seen everywhere, as well as displays of deactivated mines (Figure 6).

Figure 5. Cluster Bombs

Figure 6. U.N. Mine Awareness Display

One shock was the extent of the trash that littered the roadsides and streets of populated areas. As the German soldiers told me jokingly during a visit to MNB(S) headquarters in Prizern, "It's plastic to the left, garbage to the right and metal on top." The debris of war littered the

countryside, villages, and cities of Kosovo. Although not quite as pervasive as in Bosnia, there were still numerous bombed out factories, government buildings, businesses, and homes. Gutted vehicles and land mines were everywhere. The region's ancient power plant failed daily and water failures (electric pumps) were experienced in the major cities of Pristina, Urosevac, and Gnjilane. Although sanitation services such as garbage collection were restarted before my visit, piles of garbage continued to be seen everywhere. Air pollution was high, mainly from car exhaust fumes. Without a functioning government, there were no means to enforce things such as sanitation and pollution controls.

Kosovo was a beautiful country that had been ravaged by war. The mountain villages were collections of tiny houses with red tiled roofs, which probably looked just as they had centuries ago. Most homes had no indoor plumbing, necessitating outhouses near every home. Water was obtained from springs and wells, however the departing Serbians had fouled many wells by throwing animal carcasses into the water. Villages that relied on streams suffered the pollution effects of rusting cars, dead animals, and general refuse.

There were roaming packs of stray dogs, abandoned by owners whose homes had been destroyed during or after the war, which became a problem—hungry and fighting for food, attacks on humans increased, as did the danger of rabies. U.S. civil affairs, in conjunction with the TFF veterinarian, ordered cages from local vendors and after obtaining medications, the cages were baited to lure the wild animals. Local veterinarians, trained by the TFF vet, euthanized the dogs and properly disposed of the carcasses, thus helping to relieve the problem.

In the countryside and villages, almost every yard included a barn for the family's animals. Solitary shepherds tended small flocks of sheep, goats and cows. They followed behind as the animals grazed the unfenced mountainside pastures. Their only companion was usually a dog. Typically children and old men performed this task but occasionally I saw a woman tending a single cow. I also saw old men with one or two cows grazing along the major roadsides.

The Kosovar women cooked, cleaned and raised babies. They washed the family's clothes by hand. They also helped the men weed the crops. It was not unusual to see women in the fields from early morning until the evening. I saw the men cutting the grass by hand and drying it in stacks for hay to feed their animals in the coming winter. A tiny field

that would take minutes or hours to cut with modern farm equipment would take days to scythe by hand. I frequently saw people working the crops by hand and using horses and cattle to pull plows and wagons. This was attributed mainly to the fact that many of the farmers lost their tractors and other equipment to the Serbs as spoils of war, or they were stolen or destroyed.

All over Kosovo, children seemed to be enchanted with the American soldier. They followed the U.S. soldiers everywhere in the towns and villages. If a helicopter flew over they would run to the highest point in the village and wave. As Humvees drove along the roads, children of all ages would run out. Groups of children along the roads would wave and frequently try to give the passing soldiers "high fives," a practice that was quite dangerous. Sometimes the soldiers would throw candy to the children as they passed and there would be a scramble to pick it up, sometimes extremely close to the passing military vehicles. The fascination was even greater in smaller villages. There were usually few people around upon arrival in a small village, but within minutes children swarmed out and surrounded the Humvees. They would pester the soldiers, many times tugging at the weapons they were carrying. A tragic incident occurred in a schoolyard in Vitina when a child was killed while he tugged at a KFOR soldier's weapon. The children were eager to practice their limited English. Often they would shout, "Hello." The soldiers would answer with, "Miredita" (Albanian for "Good Day"). Carrying a camera was also a sure way to attract the children. They loved to have their pictures taken (Figure 7). Children in the villages would swarm around the combat camera soldiers, posing for pictures, and just acting curious about the sophisticated camera equipment they used (Figure 8). Often the PSYOP and civil affairs soldiers would take pictures of the kids and then take copies back to them a few days or weeks later. The kids would carry the pictures around with them and show them to the soldiers when they returned to the village.

Figure 7. Children of Kosovo

Figure 8. Combat Camera

Schools were back in session and I saw the young Albanian children walking along the streets to and from school. They had not been able to attend school freely under Serbian rule, and many Albanian school classes had been held in over-crowded private homes, warehouses, basements and mosques. During the Serbian reign, the makeshift school facilities lacked proper teaching equipment (some painted black rectangles on the wall to serve as a chalkboard) and textbooks.

After the liberation, Albanian teenagers could be seen hanging around the centers of the towns and villages where there were market areas, cafés or grocery stores. In contrast, Serbian children were escorted to and from school by KFOR soldiers and stayed at home when not in school. In Serbian enclaves, children could be seen playing. Many of the Serbian children were taught in homes and storefront schools in the Serbian enclaves. Others attended public schools that were shared between Albanian and Serbian students, one ethnic group using the school in the morning and the other in the afternoon. The inside of a schoolhouse was very basic—several small classrooms, battered tables and chairs, and wood stoves (Figure 9). There were no computers and many rooms didn't even have a blackboard. In some school classrooms and halls there were pictures of a UCK hero, others had cartoon murals painted on some walls, and still others simply had dull green, cream or gray walls in dire need of being repainted. The floors were wooden, and they too were in need of repair.

Figure 9. Typical School Room

A Unique History and Culture

There were a number of historic and religious sites in Kosovo that, unfortunately, many U.S. soldiers did not get the opportunity to see or visit. One important religious site in MNB(E) sector was the historic church in the village of Letnica where Mother Teresa found her calling. Another historic site that many KFOR soldiers saw from afar while driving along the main highway in Polje, was the ancient battlefield referred to as the "Field of Blackbirds" near Pristina. Both sites were worth a visit. Fortunately during my visit I was able to see both. The following discussion of these two sites of interest was derived in part from SGT Martinez's article on the "Madonna of the Black Mountain" in Task Force Falcon's newsletter *Falcon Flier*. It reported on a visit by the U.S. 142nd Engineers and CPT Monika Bilka's article on "The Monument" in NATO's newsletter *KFOR Online* and *Letter from Kosovo* by SFC Jonathan Crane, U.S. Air Force, TFF public affairs office.

Figure 10. The Black Madonna

The church in the village of Letnica, Kosovo contains the Madonna of the Black Mountains. This church is unique for two reasons. First, it is

one of only a few churches in the world to have a black Madonna on the altar (Figure 10). Second, it was the church where Mother Teresa found her calling. The plain white church with twin steeples sat on top of a small hill near the center of the village and could be seen in the distance as we approached Letnica. The village itself was almost a ghost town and there were only a few people to be seen. At the base of the hill there was a traffic circle that looked like it had served as a parking lot for the church in the past. There was also a bus stop and kiosk but they did not look like they were used anymore. It was a short walk from the rusting bus stop up a steep cobblestone path to the church. Approaching the church, I could tell that it was different. Most of the religious shrines in war torn Kosovo had KFOR guards protecting the Christian and Moslem places of worship because of ethnic strife. Oddly, the church in Letnica had no guards. During the conflict in Kosovo, the Catholic Serbians and the Muslim Albanians both respected the church known as Gospa Letnika, the Madonna of the Black Mountains, as a holy place and inflicted no damage on the church or its surroundings.

The interior of the church was striking and the religious artistry of the temple was awe-inspiring. The black Madonna was significant because the Madonna seldom commands the altar. A crucifix dominates the altar in most Catholic churches. While this church had crucifixes in it, a statue of the Virgin Mary holding the Baby Jesus stood above the altar. Another significant difference was the color of the statue. When entering a Catholic church in the United States, all the icons of Jesus, Mary, and the saints are white. The church in Letnica, where all the parishioners were white, had a black Madonna. Mother Teresa was born there and after leaving the village she would come back to visit. It was on one of these visits that she felt her calling into the ministry of Christ.

Figure 11. Field of Blackbirds Monument

*Those who are Serbian and have a Serbian heart
and do not come to battle for Kosovo will not
have children, neither male nor female, crops or
wine. They will be damned until they die.*

These words, taken from the ancient stone walls of the monument close to Pristina, captured the continual conflict between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians (Figure 11). Some 600 years ago on the high plains of northern Kosovo two armies met, Serbian and Turkish. Only one army survived. The defeated lay where they fell, to be consumed by crows, and the place became known as the "Field of Blackbirds." The historic battle about 600 years ago reminds us of the crucial significance of the KFOR presence today.

The first glance into the hall of the monument from the squeaking door revealed damage due to some sort of explosion. The first steps were missing and the rusty steel construction was exposed. Some sandbags functioned as the lowest steps. I carefully crossed the floor to the stairs. The steel railing beside the narrow staircase was hardly ever to

be trusted. On my cautious way up, close against the gray spotted stone wall, heavy plates with Serbian inscriptions caught my eye as they appeared from the darkness. Deep, narrow windows from the opposite walls provided just enough light to read the plates, but they were written in Cyrillic. The Norwegian soldiers guarding the monument provided a placard to visiting KFOR soldiers to read that had English translations of the inscriptions. A spectacular view of the countryside appeared before me as I emerged from the darkened staircase and approached the tall stone wall surrounding the top of the monument. The view became even more spectacular as the sun set over Kosovo Polje and the wind howled around the monument. As the day turned into night, the red sky illuminated the inscription plate telling the story about the historic battle in 1389, when 135,000 soldiers met on this very battlefield to fight for Kosovo. The fight was not yet over.

A Slow Return to Peace

The commander of KFOR (COMKFOR), German General Klaus Reinhardt, in an end of tour article for the summer 2000 edition of the *NATO Review*, stated, "Today, many Kosovars have returned to their homes. The streets of Pristina are filled with buses and cars, and crowded with people who feel safe to go out. Bars, restaurants, and shops have reopened and markets and street stalls are thriving in many areas. Newspaper stands carry uncensored local newspapers, as well as international publications. Radio stations are free to broadcast what people want to hear. Many Kosovars are enjoying freedoms denied them for years." Pristina was, however, still a city with a split personality: chic teenagers flirted on the sidewalks while younger children roller-bladed in the central plaza. However, barely a day went by without news of another shooting, an ethnic flare-up, or a political crisis. COMKFOR also acknowledged that it was KFOR's continuing responsibility to maintain a safe environment in which all the communities of Kosovo—the Serbian, Bosnian, Roma, and Turkish minorities, as well as the Albanians—could begin to rebuild their lives.

UNMIK had a less optimistic view of the security situation. They reminded everyone of the security reality in their year-end report to the U.N. Secretary General. The document noted that the general security situation in Kosovo had not changed significantly. Members of minority communities continued to be victims of intimidation, assaults and threats

throughout Kosovo. In particular, UNMIK felt the upsurge in localized violence, where the attacks had been almost exclusively against Kosovar Serbs. UNMIK police crime analysts estimated that about two-thirds of the serious crimes committed were inter-ethnic and directed mostly against Kosovar Serbs. Eighty percent of the arson cases were identifiable as ethnic crimes. Metrovica continued to be a flash point for ethnic violence. In spite of continued violence against the Serbian minority and a general lack of proactive international leadership, resources and funding, steady progress was made by UNMIK and KFOR to tame the Kosovo crisis. The challenge for the future would be to summon international wisdom and political will to stay the course. This meant making the necessary resources and funding available to restore freedom, public safety, and rule of law.

In spite of the renewal of some transportation services, the opening of some shops, and the appearance of people going to work every day, unemployment was over 90 percent. From discussions with local Albanians, I learned that most of their money came from relatives and family members working in the United States and western Europe who sent money back to family members in Kosovo. The absence of a functioning economy and transportation system meant that almost everything had to be shipped in by truck. This was very visible at the Blace border crossing between the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Kosovo where trucks could be seen lined up for miles in both directions waiting for hours and sometimes days to cross the border.

The Americans were quite popular with the Albanians. Graffiti was a popular way of expressing Albanian patriotic fervor. KFOR-USA, NATO, "THANK YOU AMERICA," U.S. ARMY, and U.S. MARINES were common on walls as well as "USA-KLA." Pictures of President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright were said to hang in some Albanian homes. Posters with President Clinton, Ambassador Walker (Kosovo Verification Mission) and General Clark (Supreme Allied Commander Europe) were pasted on walls and buildings in Gnjilane in preparation for a locally sponsored KFOR anniversary celebration held in June. American KFOR soldiers were greeted with a thumbs-up.

Other KFOR contingents were not as highly regarded as the Americans. Russians were hated the most, followed closely by the French. The Russians and French were given extremely challenging KFOR assignments in light of their poor public relations. The Russians

guarded road crossings on the frontier with Serbia and the French were tasked with maintaining law and order in the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica. The U.S. and British were also given challenging assignments in that their sectors contained the largest population of Serbs in a mixed Albanian and Serbian environment—there was no de facto partitioning as was the case in Bosnia. With movement around Kosovo under tight KFOR control, fake ID cards, uniforms, and markings on vehicles became more common as dissidents on both sides tried to work their way around the countryside. Sightings of persons dressed in VJ and MUP uniforms near Albanian villages were reported, as well as persons dressed in UCK/KLA uniforms near remote Serbian villages. There were both Serbian and Albanian kidnappings and killing of shepherds and others, usually old men, in the mountainous areas.

The 4,000 UNMIK police were not enough to address the needs of nearly 2 million civilians. There was also a need to focus on local policing that could deal more effectively with hate crimes and local needs. UNMIK created and started to recruit, train, and staff a local police force, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The process moved slowly and lacked sufficient resources, but about a third of the planned 4,000-man local police force was on the streets working with UNMIK police.

In spite of many problems, the efforts of the international community seemed to be effective and living conditions were generally improving. New homes were being built and damaged ones repaired. The power plant, telecommunications and water services were being repaired, food supplies were showing more variety, and restaurants were opening. Even Coca-Cola and ice cream could be purchased from local kiosks, stores and roadside stands. It should not be forgotten that most of the people of Kosovo were friendly, both Albanian and Serbian, even though some Serbian villagers continued to give hostile stares. Troublemakers were a minority.

CHAPTER XVII

Peacekeeper Quality of Life

Larry Wentz

Camp Bondsteel

Early on, senior U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and Army leadership began to consider improving the quality of life of U.S. peacekeepers in Kosovo. In contrast to the Bosnia peacekeeping mission where troops lived in tents for many months before moving into hardened structures, the DoD and U.S. Army decided to erect three base camps from the start. The U.S. Army built two base camps in Kosovo and one in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In Kosovo, the 9th Engineer Battalion, working with contractor Brown and Root, was charged with building two base camps for a total of 7,000 troops by October 1, 1999—ensure that housing was built for soldiers before the winter set in.

At the height of the operation, there were about 1,000 expatriates hired by Brown and Root along with more than 7,000 Albanian local nationals and about 1,700 military engineers. From July through October, construction at both camps continued around the clock. A major obstacle was the discovery of a 36-inch natural-gas pipeline under Camp Bondsteel—it was easier to redesign the camp around the pipeline than to dig it up. More than 17 km of fence (10 km around the perimeter of Bondsteel alone) was constructed. Lumber for the SEAhuts came mainly from Austria. The construction required a quarter-million 2x4s, almost 200 tons of nails, and more than 100 miles of electrical cable. Some half-million cubic yards of earth were moved on Bondsteel alone and the battalion reconnoitered more than 320 kilometers of roads. In less than ninety days, more than 700,000 cubic feet of living space had been built—equal to a subdivision of some 355 houses.

The "Grand Dame," Camp Bondsteel (Figure 1) was the home of headquarters Task Force Falcon of Multinational Brigade East near Urosevac. Establishment of Camp Bondsteel sent a strong signal to the factions and local populace that KFOR, MNB(E), and the U.S. were planning to stay. The second largest camp, also an engineering marvel, was Camp Montieth (Figure 2), located on what used to be a VJ military base near Gnjilane. The U.S. camps were named after Medal of Honor recipients, Army SSG James L. Bondsteel, honored for heroism in Vietnam, and Army 1LT Jimmie W. Montieth, honored for heroism in France during World War II. The third base, Camp Able Sentry (CAS) served as the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) for Receiving, Staging and Onward Moving (RSO) U.S. forces and the entry point for all support supplies and equipment bound for KFOR. CAS was collocated with the Skopje civilian airport in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In spite of the large base camps, roughly 3,000 of the more than 9,000 soldiers of MNB(E) lived in forty satellite camps within the 2,300 square kilometer American zone. Buildings such as factories, hotels and old government buildings typically served to house the tactical operations centers and soldier living quarters at the satellite camps. Some soldiers at remote outposts, such as Sapper, lived in tents.

Figure 1. Camp Bondsteel

Figure 2. Camp Montieth

Camp Montieth was an old Yugoslav Army barracks that was still largely intact after the war. However, either retreating forces or locals had damaged and looted the buildings so it took several weeks to make them usable again. For force protection reasons, many of the original buildings were abandoned and most of the camp was built in an adjoining field. More than 75 Southeast Asia huts (SEAhuts), along with support structures, were built to accommodate about 2,000 troops.

Camp Bondsteel was considered to be the largest base camp construction effort since Vietnam. Set atop high ground that escaped the fog, the massive Army-built camp sprawled across 1,000 acres of wheat fields. Rows SEAhuts appeared at Camp Bondsteel, and Camp Montieth. The SEAhuts (Figure 3) were single-story wooden structures that were first used in southeast Asia and more recently in Bosnia. The military redesigned the SEAhuts specifically for Kosovo. Each wooden structure had the ability to accommodate a male and female latrine (toilet, shower and hot and cold water) and up to five rooms (16 by 32—the size of a medium, general purpose tent) housing up to six service members each or 30 soldiers per SEAhut. Where possible, men and women were housed in separate SEAhuts. The rooms had a small window, emergency lighting, smoke detectors, electrical outlets, heat,

air conditioning, telephones, beds, storage cabinets, and refrigerators. For entertainment, soldiers brought their own CD players, radios, TVs, VCRs and even satellite TV. The SEAhuts had aluminum roofs, plain white painted interior walls (plasterboard for fire resistance), simple plywood floors, and brown exterior walls. Interspersed among the SEAhuts were sandbag bunkers and HESCO force protection barriers separating the various offices and living areas.

Figure 3. SEAhuts

Due to the total absence of civilian sewage-treatment facilities in Kosovo, early efforts focused on building sewage lagoons and wastewater treatment plants in order to not foul the local watersheds. Wells were the primary source of water for Bondsteel and water was piped into the huts from huge holding bags filled from these wells. For drinking purposes, bottled water was provided and available everywhere throughout the camp. In fact, because of dehydration concerns during the summer months, ice packed coolers with bottled water and other drinks were part of the survival package taken along when traveling off base.

Following the initial construction phase, Camp Bondsteel continued to expand every day. When the sun came up over Bondsteel, the sounds of earthmovers and construction crews filled the air. During the day, a constant swarm of Apache and Black Hawk helicopters passed overhead. MEDEVAC helicopters were seen both day and night, mainly bringing local victims of landmine explosions, gunshot wounds and traffic accidents to the Bondsteel hospital. Columns of Humvees and

armored personnel carriers continuously churned through the dirt tracks that were the major roadways and streets of the camp. During dry periods this created many dust clouds, but when it rained the tracks quickly turned into rivers of mud. The dust and mud kept the local hire cleaning crews busy with daily cleanings of the SEAhuts and office areas. At the entrance to offices and SEAhuts there were water tubs and brushes for cleaning boots. The dust also created problems for the computer disk drives and keyboards.

At night it was quiet except for the helicopters setting off or returning from patrols or QRF actions. Sometimes the quiet of the evening was also broken by the sound of a visiting rock band entertaining the troops at the theater or a "Bright Star" demonstration (shooting off flares). The Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) unit entertained themselves day and night by detonating confiscated munitions, and these detonations sent shock waves through the buildings.

On Bondsteel, there were more than 350 buildings including over 175 SEAhuts, a hospital, a detention facility, a Post Exchange (PX), a post office, a theater, chapels, fitness centers, two huge mess halls, drop off laundry service, a cappuccino and espresso bar, and even a Burger King. Contact with the outside world was available through daily *Stars and Stripes* newspapers, a local AFN radio station, and a TV in the mess hall that carried AFN TV news and American TV shows. Commercial TV satellite dishes were also seen spread throughout the SEAhut area. They could be purchased from the PX as well as all sorts of electronics, magazines, books, clothes, food, candy, personal hygiene items, writing materials, and other supplies. By the end of June, an athletic field was also under construction near the north dining facility. Camp Bondsteel made every attempt to provide the troops with a slice of Americana.

The dining facility (referred to as the DFAC), served over 20,000 meals a day for soldiers and a large number of civilian contractors. They were always open. Three major meals were served daily and in the off hours there was a counter that served both hot and cold meals and drinks. A variety of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) were also available anytime of the day or night. Boxes of powdered and plain donuts were available for the taking and every morning after breakfast several staff would bring a box or two of donuts back to the G3 plans shop. Ice cream was also available any time of the day or night. There were two freezers, one

at each end of the DFAC so after a long day, soldiers could go to the dining hall and pick up a cone or Popsicle. Microwave popcorn was also available and although alcoholic beverages were not allowed there was an alcohol free beer, Buckler, which was available at the dining facility. Frequently, late in the evening Saturday night, the G3 plans shop would set up their own movie theater that consisted of playing a DVD movie on a laptop computer and projecting it on the wall of the plans shop.

The dining facilities were staffed by local hires and operated by the contractor Brown and Root who also provided other base services in support of Task Force Falcon. The DFAC food was judged some of the best food in Kosovo and was a major attraction for those living outside of Camp Bondsteel or visiting Kosovo. The AAFES-run PX had a good reputation as well. There was also a large motor pool, fuel storage bay, helicopter flight line, weather operations center, and ammunition holding area. Special Operation Command had its own fenced off and force protected compound on Bondsteel. SEAhuts accommodated offices and billeting areas for the MPs, public affairs, combat camera and their production facilities, civil affairs, and psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, including the PSYOP product development and production center. These base camps functioned as cities, employing a mayor and support elements dedicated to the management of the base itself.

The tactical operations center (TOC) and MNB(E) headquarters offices were located on a hill overlooking all of Bondsteel. The Ops Center stood next to a wooden superstructure supporting satellite dishes and antennas. Fencing and force protection barriers, as well as armed guards, protected the complex. This area also housed various intelligence offices and their support elements. The TOC and intelligence complex were active 24 hours a day.

Almost every corner of Bondsteel was brightly lit with orange streetlights. Stadium lights pointed outward, starkly illuminating the landscape for a few hundred yards beyond the guard towers and barbed-wire fences that surrounded the base. The guard towers were manned continuously by soldiers who pulled long and often boring shifts watching for anything out of the ordinary in their sector. The boredom was broken frequently by radio checks and visits by the sergeant of the guard.

Military guards armed with automatic weapons tightly controlled access to the base camps. These guards closely checked everyone's ID card and inspected every vehicle attempting to enter. Such inspections included opening vehicle doors and trunks, inspecting the interior, and the use of mirrors to search under the vehicles. The access roads had cement barriers organized in an obstacle course fashion to control traffic flow while other gates and barriers blocked unauthorized access. For local nationals working on base, there was a special access area where all were searched before entering (they were checked when they left as well).

Soldiers carried their weapons with them at all times, even to the dining facility. When outside the base, weapons were kept loaded and ready at all times. Upon re-entering the base, soldiers unloaded and cleared their weapons in the discharge area.

Quality of Life

Kosovo was not luxury living for the U.S. military. Over a third of the forces in MNB(E) lived off the major base camps. Camp Bondsteel served mainly as the MNB(E)/TFF headquarters and as the logistical and administrative support base for TFF. The quality of life on the large bases was certainly better than that experienced by the soldiers who lived off the major base camps, but life was still not up to the standards of their home bases in the U.S. and Germany, especially regarding freedom of movement off base. Soldiers on Camps Bondsteel and Montieth were restricted to the bases and not allowed to go into town or fraternize with the locals except for duty missions that required travel into the countryside. Even so, eating in local restaurants or purchasing things from the local shops were prohibited. Without a civil administration to enforce health and sanitation laws, eating and drinking in local establishments was a health hazard. There were concerns linking dairy products and hepatitis. Some U.S. soldiers spent their entire six-month assignment in Kosovo on base at Camp Bondsteel.

Special Forces teams lived in "safe houses" in towns where they were deployed. They were one of the few elements that were allowed to walk around without a flack vest and helmet and could also eat and drink at the cafés. The Polish contingent in Strpce occupied a ski chalet and the 1-187 Infantry soldiers covering the Vitina area occupied a factory near

Vitina. A platoon temporarily guarding the town of Letnica lived in the former nun quarters of a church. The "Eagles Nest," which housed a platoon conducting anti-infiltration operations on the Serbian border, occupied a local stage theater (the Ops-Intel Center was the ticket booth). The U.S. communications and intelligence teams supporting the Russian 13th Tactical Group in Kamenica occupied some rooms in a local government building that were part of the Russian compound, and many of those manning outposts, such as Sapper which overlooked the Presevo valley, lived in tents. There were also small tent cities on Camp Bondsteel (Figure 4) and Camp Able Sentry that were used for temporary quarters for housing additional troops during the command transfers and unit rotations. Camp Montieth also erected large aluminum buildings that served as storage areas. The temporary billeting provided little privacy with wall-to-wall cots and personal belongings stored between them (Figure 5).

Figure 4. Camp Bondsteel

Figure 5. Camp Montieth

There was a need to consider ways to provide soldiers on Camps Bondsteel and Montieth with opportunities to go outside the wire under controlled conditions. Many of the soldiers in support positions on Bondsteel often went for weeks without leaving the base while others never left at all during their tour of duty. There was an escorted bus service that operated daily between Camp Bondsteel and Camp Montieth and this offered an opportunity for some soldiers to go off of the base and see a little of the countryside. There was a fighter management pass program initiated by V Corps and 1AD commander that offered a 4 day pass to Lake Ohrid in the Former Republic of Macedonia to give TFF members a well deserved break. There were some limited visits to historic sites but these were the exception and not part of an organized program of R&R activities.

Morale

There were generally three types of problems the commanders experienced with their troops while deployed. For the first one-third of the deployment, there were few discipline-related problems because the mission was new and exciting. The major source of problems during this phase was that troops missed their families. Other problems ranged from financial issues to children to loneliness. Most family problems got sorted out by in the second-third of the deployment, but problems

with older children or teenagers tended to resurface, driven by resentment at being asked to carry the responsibilities of the absent parent. Soldiers also tended to lose focus and become complacent even if they were in dangerous areas. They were performing the same duties over and over again. Typical of Americans, they wanted to see measurable progress and when they didn't see the progress they expected, their frustration increased. In the final third of the deployment, everyone wanted to go home and their families were anxious to see them. Although the soldiers were focused on the mission, there was a tendency to rush through things and safety became a major concern.

During a round table discussion conducted with the MNB(E) headquarters staff, the G1 stated he was experiencing a high re-enlistment rate. In Kosovo, re-enlistment bonuses were tax-free. On the other hand, the chaplain stated that he was experiencing one of the most severe morale problems he had ever encountered. The chaplain said he had soldiers lined up every day outside his office to speak to him. Apparently the problems were with the younger troops, some who volunteered or wanted to go to Kosovo as a way to save some money. For many of the young soldiers, this was their first separation from home. They and their loved ones were having problems dealing with the loneliness and handling family problems from afar. Interestingly, a contributing factor was the great military communications system that allowed daily e-mail and voice contact with family and loved ones. On the surface, it appeared to be a good thing for morale but it turned out that this was a key source of the problems of the young soldiers. It was discovered that 60 percent of the soldiers used e-mail daily and 20 percent several times a week. Issues that would have been normally sorted out at home or with the help of family support groups at the home station were being discussed daily via e-mail and the telephone. Small problems suddenly became big ones—an unintended consequence of Information Age communication.

A study of soldier morale conducted by Professor Charlie Moskos of Northwestern University in the fall of 2000 found that morale was substantially higher at the beginning of the tour than at the end. It was also higher for soldiers in the field such as the civil affairs, PSYOP, MPs, and maneuver units. The lowest morale was with the logistics and administration soldiers who were located on the major camps doing routine work. Also suffering low morale were those pulling stationary

guard duty. These were soldiers who had more idle time than those who went outside the camp every day.

Training

Although improvements were constantly being made to help better prepare new U.S. units for deployment to Kosovo, opportunities remained to improve training. Relevant in-country Operations-Intelligence databases and archives were maturing, but a lot of work was still required to improve the archiving processes and transfers to new units. Mission Rehearsal Exercises (MREs) were improving and were considered a good training vehicle for preparing the brigade and battalion levels for deployment. However, it was felt that the MREs needed to put more emphasis on exercising the field units—battalions, their companies, and platoons—and providing a more realistic depiction of the environment they would face on the ground, including cultural and social situation awareness. Combat support units such as PSYOP and civil affairs would benefit from participating in MREs as well.

There were no standard operating procedures established for conducting multinational operations. Therefore, the U.S. units employed new procedures to integrate the multinational commanders into their battle rhythm and treated them as subordinate commanders. Weekly coordination meetings were held with units where intelligence was exchanged and joint patrols were discussed. The meetings were rotated through the various headquarters of the TFF multinational units.

Battalions were asked to do their own Individual Readiness Training (IRT). The Combat Replacement Center (CRC) training was felt to be too Bosnia-oriented and not focused enough on Kosovo. This training implied that Bosnia and Kosovo were similar when in fact they were very different. The sharing of lessons from earlier Kosovo deployments was problematic. There was a need for a single point of contact to go to for information on Kosovo before deploying. Soldiers were interested in learning more about the country and its people and culture. The KFOR Handbook (DoD-2630-011-99, July 1999) was inadequate and out of date. It focused too much on military aspects and not enough on the nonmilitary things the soldiers needed to know in order to deal with the local religious and civil leaders. Increased leader reconnaissance activities provided more in-country hands-on visits. These visits served

to better prepare the incoming leaders by allowing them to see firsthand the terrain, people, and real-world problems they would have to deal with when they took command.

In spite of good soldier training, there was a need for additional training to prepare U.S. units for peace operations. Combat arms units were called upon to execute a set of tasks that were not normally associated with their Mission Essential Task List (METL). For example, tank crews in Kosovo dismounted and operated as infantry. MPs quickly found themselves becoming investigators. Although quite versed in MP procedures, many lacked the basic fundamentals of police investigation and time had to be taken to train them to ask the right questions at the right time, to protect and share "police information," and to collect information from non-police elements. Crowd control and use of non-lethal weapons were important skills and assets that required additional training and equipment once in country. Urban combat techniques needed to be incorporated into pre-deployment training. Virtually every soldier that patrolled needed to be trained and drilled on room entry techniques, house clearance operations and other related combat activities. Civil-military operations (CMO) needed to be incorporated into the military training and education programs. Soldiers learned how to conduct town meetings and developed negotiation and conflict resolution skills on the ground after deployment. Information operations, a new concept for maneuver units, demanded new training and education.

Maneuver units coordinated their operations with MPs and UNMIK police, however there were still overlaps with them, as well as with civil affairs and civil-military operations activities. U.S. units also coordinated with the various multinational units in Kosovo, requiring adaptations to foreign tactics and procedures. They carried out joint patrols and coordination meetings and exchanged intelligence.

Young sergeants, E-5s and E-6s, interacted daily with all kinds of people and had to make quick decisions in the field, which had the potential for immense strategic political implications. The politics of Kosovo and actions on the ground went well beyond the geographic boundaries of the province, sometimes having global implications. This was the age of what was frequently referred to as the "Strategic Corporal." It was, therefore, important to make sure that the young soldiers understood their commander's intent because they played significant roles in executing it. The young soldiers participated in local leader

meetings to help get local people to come together and resolve conflicts between Albanians and Serbs. The techniques of negotiation and dealing with unfriendly people needed to be taught to the lowest operational levels within MNB(E). The majority of contact with the local population occurred at the platoon and squad level. The stress of these situations had the potential to drive soldiers into dehumanizing the population that they were trying to protect in order to make it easier to cope with, especially when the use of force was necessary. This required constant military leadership attention to make sure soldiers did not act simply as shepherds over a flock of animals. Resolving conflicts and issues, meeting and talking with the local population daily, and delivering messages to their target audiences without seeming overbearing or intrusive was clearly an art requiring a great deal of practice. At "the rubber meets the road" level, these skills were generally acquired while executing the military mission.

Young soldiers in their late teens and early twenties patrolled the streets of villages day and night and in all weather conditions. In the summertime, temperatures could exceed 100°F at mid-day and in full battle gear this was hot and tiring. Dehydration was a constant concern and soldiers were reminded to drink lots of water. Under these conditions, soldiers on patrol had to take breaks every couple of hours. In discussions with these young soldiers, none were heard to complain about the situation they were placed in. They simply did their job and did it well.

The transfer of authority and replacements in place (RIP) process had to be carefully managed. TFF staff had to be adapted to the new commander. In-coming and out-going officers met constantly to insure that the new staff fully understood their new duties. They underwent an eight-day transfer period. Four days were spent instructing the new staff, and four days were spent overseeing that they could successfully execute their duties. There were a number of officers that, for different reasons, only spent a few weeks or months in Kosovo, and therefore, the transfer of authority for them and their job was less satisfactory. The short duration of many of their the assignments required soldiers to learn on their feet, and many did not have the opportunity to go into the countryside to learn about the issues and the people. For example, the USAREUR LNO rotated about once a month and while I was at Camp Bondsteel, he only had a few opportunities to travel off base to see some forward deployed U.S. and multination units and meet some

of the local people. His time was mainly spent working command level actions between U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) and TFF.

In spite of the carefully managed transfer process, there was still a spooling up period after the new team assumed control of operations. Not only were they adapting to the environment, but they were also working with each other for the first time. Regardless of how well the transfer was executed, local belligerents carried out various attacks to test the new arrivals during its first weeks in Kosovo.

American Red Cross

The American Red Cross Armed Forces Emergency Services organization has a long history of providing service to America's soldiers in times of war and other conflicts such as the peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Red Cross workers provided humanitarian assistance to U.S. service members by conducting emergency communication and social welfare activities. Canteen services, such as free coffee and donuts, reading material, movies, stationary for writing home, and toiletry items were provided as well. Beyond the canteen services, the primary mission of emergency communications made it an essential part of any military action. Red Cross emergency messages informed military members of illness or death of immediate family members as well as other family emergencies or events such as the birth of one of their children. Bill Wright, the Red Cross team leader for the MNB(E), noted that MNB(E) averaged about 30 emergency messages a week.

In a discussion with Camp Bondsteel Red Cross worker Ms O'Brien, she explained that the Red Cross in MNB(E) consisted of a team of five (three at Camp Bondsteel and two at Camp Montieth). There were three team rotations per year. The Camp Bondsteel canteen was always open. They provided emergency communications services for the military and civilians. CAS was supported out of Bondsteel and visits were also made to the sectors where troops were deployed. Communications only handled emergency messages for immediate family members. The messages usually came from one of the Red Cross chapters in the U.S. or Europe. If an immediate family member was ill or had a critical emergency they would contact the nearest Red Cross Chapter to send a message to the soldier or civilian in the field. The Red Cross used e-mail for sending

such messages. There were toll-free numbers for family members in the U.S. to call for assistance. The military sponsored billeting and other support services for the Red Cross workers on Camp Bondsteel and Brown and Root provided other support services such as bottled water and coffee. The military also gave the Red Cross access to the non-classified Internet protocol router network (NIPRNET), DSN and long distance commercial service for use under special circumstances.

Red Cross workers delivered emergency messages to soldiers from their families, as well as providing them with books and magazines. They were proactive in their attempts to support the soldiers, and provided movies, newspapers, and food in addition to other services. They even held monthly parties for everyone who had had a birthday.

CHAPTER XVIII

Coalition Command Arrangements

Larry Wentz

The Threat

Keeping the peace in Multinational Brigade East was a complex endeavor that encompassed a diverse variety of missions. The brigade's soldiers patrolled through cities and villages across 2,300 square kilometers of mountains and plains. The variations in ethnicity were equally dramatic. Ninety-one percent of the population of Kosovo (1.8 million) was Albanian. Seven percent were Serbian, and about half of them lived in the MNB(E) region. While few towns were comprised exclusively of one ethnic group, some communities could include several different groups. One of the best examples was Gnjilane, a town of nearly 70,000 people representing a mixture of Albanians, Serbs, Romas, and Turks.

As the summer of 2000 approached, crime and ethnic violence were on the rise and unexploded ordnance, such as mines and cluster bombs, posed serious concerns for the farmers working in the fields and children playing outside. Additionally, MNB(E)'s area of responsibility included borders with Serbia and the Former Republic of Macedonia, and these borders presented smuggling and counterinsurgency challenges. There were also asymmetric threats such as organized crime that needed to be dealt with.

A Complex Mission

Some units, such as civil affairs, had a substantially expanded mission in support of peace operations. The commander of TFF viewed civil affairs, PSYOP, and the communicators as combat multipliers in peace support operations. Civil affairs soldiers were out every day working

with UNMIK to help set up local governments and restore electricity, water and telephone service. They also worked with other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to provide humanitarian assistance and rebuild the civil infrastructure to improve the local quality of life. Soldiers were seen escorting Serbian children to and from school, delivering food, or checking on the welfare of the Serbs. In the U.S. sector, there were more than 30 churches and 25 schools under the watchful eye of the soldiers of MNB(E).

Many saw UNMIK as only capable of doing one thing at a time. When the international community and UNMIK were unable to provide services, KFOR soldiers were needed to fill gaps, requiring them to carry out duties that were beyond the scope of their mission and for which the soldiers were not necessarily trained to do. MNB(E) conducted civil military operations consistent with its mission and provided assistance to UNMIK. UNMIK established regional and municipal administrators, and although this gave them a significant presence at the provincial level, by June 2000 only 40 percent of the UNMIK regional and municipal positions were filled within the MNB(E) sector. MNB(E) only had three of the seven municipal boards functioning within its sector.

In the spring of 2000, the UNHCR was in the process of closing down its operation, having successfully housed and provided support for Kosovars during the winter months. UNMIK civil administration was in the process of picking up most of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) responsibilities. UNMIK efforts to establish a functioning civil administration were being met with considerable resistance due to the ethnic conflicts between Albanians and Serbs, as well as the infighting between Albanian political parties. Furthermore, although many of the local leaders had positions on issues, they lacked a plan for implementing their ideas. MNB(E) served as the test location for civil registration and almost 50 percent of the eligible population was registered a month before the end of the registration period. Unfortunately, the Serbs continued to boycott the process and there was concern about the success of the October municipal elections. There was also some concern about OSCE's ability to provide resources for the voting process.

The European Union (EU) economic reconstruction efforts were almost non-existent in MNB(E) sector. Most of the previous reconstruction

had been privately funded by families living in Europe and the U.S. and through some U.S. DoD humanitarian assistance funds. MNB(E) was able to get about $50K of EU money for two Village Employment and Rehabilitation Program (VERP) projects that targeted both Albanians and Serbs, and thirty-five additional VERP project requests were submitted to the EU for funding consideration. Funding was also being pursued through the U.S. Department of State (DoS) refugee coordination office in Pristina to support economic revitalization initiatives and MNB(E) continued to seek partnerships with other international and non-governmental organizations in support of its civil military operations.

The lack of a civil-military operations plan to coordinate, prioritize and synchronize activities between UNMIK, KFOR and the MNBs hampered CMO activities in the MNB(E) sector in particular. There were no agreed measures of effectiveness to help prioritize resource allocation or to measure progress and success of missions.

The mission of MNB(E) was four-fold:

1. To monitor, verify, and enforce as necessary the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement in order to create a safe and secure environment;

2. To provide humanitarian assistance in support of the UNHCR efforts;

3. To enforce basic law and order until this function is fully transferred to the appropriate, designated agency; and

4. To establish and support resumption of core civil functions. This included the establishment of information operations centers (to facilitate the flow of information to the populace), rebuilding schools and providing assistance to numerous humanitarian aid projects.

In June 2000, there were concerns about the future of UNMIK. The U.N. employee and UNMIK police contracts were about to expire. The lack of a legitimate civil infrastructure had created opportunities for "shadow organizations" to fill local power vacuums. Kosovo's transition from a socialist to a market-based economic system was incomplete. UNMIK, KFOR and NGOs were employing locals as well as distributing

assistance to communities, and although this was a source of money, it also had the unintended consequence of supporting local power bases. These power bases and shadow organizations, coupled with a network of former-UCK, were controlling municipalities and villages.

The EU reconstruction programs scheduled to begin in July would be a major focus of UNMIK's future activities, but there was concern about whether these programs would get off the ground because the EU had suffered chronic shortfalls in money and staff in Kosovo. International financial support for Kosovo had not been very forthcoming due to the lack of clarity of the final sovereignty status of Kosovo. Neither the International Monetary Fund (IMF) nor the World Bank could carry out their traditional functions in Kosovo because they could not obtain the necessary "sovereign loan agreements." The return of Serbian IDPs (internally displaced persons) and Albanian refugees as well as the municipal elections were concerns in terms of the potential for renewed ethnic violence.

Challenging Command Arrangements

NATO Article V provides the NATO commander the military imperative and political importance necessary to accomplish the mission. Under non-Article V operations, such as the peace support operation in the Kosovo, this was not necessarily the case. Inadequate consideration was given to the likely operational impact of the inevitable national constraints and influences. The KFOR C2 relationships lacked specificity and were complex. Contributing to the confusion were the inadequate definitions of the Cold War derived NATO C2 states of command—operations command (OPCOM), operations control (OPCON), tactical command (TACOM), and tactical control (TACON). They were vague, leaving the nations to interpret them as they wished. This perhaps is one of the most important areas to be addressed before NATO conducts another peace support operation.

Unity of command was not achieved in the multinational KFOR operation—the NATO commander lacked the necessary leverage and control, and nations reserved the right to dictate how, where, and when their contributing forces would be employed and deployed. An attempt was made to at least achieve unity of effort—agreement and common understanding of the objectives and the desired end-state of the operation.

Even here there were significant challenges to overcome. Although KFOR established some broad objectives, the desired end-state was not politically defined. There was no UNMIK strategic plan and supporting KFOR campaign plan at the outset. The NATO military planning process was cumbersome and oriented towards Cold War defensive operations and not well suited for providing the strategic guidance needed for dynamic peace support operations. The North Atlantic Council approved operations plan for KFOR did not arrive until some forty days after KFOR arrived in Kosovo. Since there was little effective NATO and U.N. collaborative planning before entering Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR did not have a clear understanding of the responsibilities, needs, and the projected duration of the operation. Communications interfaces to facilitate information sharing between the deployed NATO and national military networks and the in country networks used by UNMIK and the NGOs were also lacking. There was also an inadequate integration of the KFOR and MNB communications and intelligence capabilities to facilitate collaboration, coordination and situation awareness information sharing. This caused frustrations, disconnects and misunderstandings that led to the ad hoc establishment of a cottage industry of liaison officers and KFOR-sponsored working groups to help bridge the communications and information sharing gap.

The KFOR operation presented the U.S. forces (particularly the U.S. Army) with some interesting command arrangement challenges. They found themselves in both a support and lead role. As the lead nation for MNB(E), the U.S. commander reported to commander KFOR, a non-U.S. military officer with a multinational command staff. As commander MNB(E), he found itself in both a joint and combined operations situation. The U.S. Army was the lead service element, but there were members of the other U.S. service elements. For example, at the outset there were U.S. Navy Seabees and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit. The Air Force provided an Air Liaison staff and ran the weather forecasting operation. The U.S. element of MNB(E), referred to as Task Force Falcon, was built around a U.S. Army brigade with U.S. augmentations from the First Infantry Division, National and European theatre level intelligence organizations, and supporting military organizations such as aviation, engineers, signal, MPs, medical, Special Operations Forces, civil affairs, and PSYOP.

The commander of the intermediate staging base at Camp Able Sentry, Macedonia reported to the TFF commander. There were three non-U.S.

battalions (Russian, Polish and Greek) and several other non-U.S. troop committing nations military personnel assigned to MNB(E). The non-U.S. battalions were responsible for their own MNB(E) sectors and the commanders reported to the MNB(E) commander. This meant there would be situations where non-U.S. elements would be reporting to U.S. commanders and there would also be situations where U.S. units would be reporting to non-U.S. commanders. For example, U.S. units sent to support a riot in Strpce came under control of the Polish battalion commander.

As a complex multinational brigade, there were doctrinal, procedural, and linguistic challenges introduced that required time for the U.S. brigade elements to adjust to operationally. Language alone was a major challenge. Although English was the language of KFOR operations, English was not spoken by all multinational troops participating. Few Russians troops supporting MNB(E) spoke English. EUROCORPS provided the commander of KFOR and a number of staff officers that filled key KFOR headquarters positions. The language of operations for EUROCORPS was French. Although pre-deployment training included use of English, some EUROCORPS officers were not fluent in English and there were occasional miscommunications. In spite of these challenges, the KFOR and MNB(E) command and control processes worked.

Although MNB(E) was a combined operation, the headquarters was staffed solely with U.S. soldiers. The non-U.S. forces assigned to MNB(E) provided liaisons to the tactical operations center and the commanders of the non-U.S. units attended the Battle Update Briefings (BUB). They could not, however, attend the commander's morning intelligence briefing since it was a special access U.S.-only briefing. However, the evening BUB provided a KFOR-releasable Secret level intelligence briefing that they attended. In addition to the non-U.S. force liaisons at the TOC, U.S. liaisons (mainly Intelligence and Special Forces) were used to provide the linkage between the U.S. elements and the non-U.S. troop contributing nations of MNB(E):

- The 13th Tactical Group (Russian);

- 501st Mechanized Infantry Battalion (Greek);

- 18th Air Assault Battalion (Polish) supported by a composite platoon from Lithuania;

- The 37th Support Company (Ukrainian); and

- A composite battalion from the United Arab Emirates (including UAE ground and Apache aviation units and two Jordanian Army platoons).

U.S. liaisons were provided to KFOR, UNMIK and the OSCE as well. There was also a small Italian Carabinieri contingent of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) assigned to MNB(E). Joint patrols and exchange and coordination meetings were held with non-U.S. units assigned to MNB(E) and with regional boundary units such as the Finish, Swedish, and British units of MNB(C). German, Austrian and Dutch units were OPCONed to TFF for a short period of time and U.S. units were temporarily deployed out of sector to Mitrovica to help the French with riot control.

The NATO coalition command arrangements were extremely confusing. There was no diagram that detailed the multinational command arrangements and tied the KFOR, MNB and non-NATO troop committing nations together. The five multinational brigade commanders reported to COMKFOR, who reported through the NATO chain of command to the North Atlantic Council. However, the brigade commanders and COMKFOR also had their own national chains of command. There were multiple NATO military headquarters involved in the KFOR reporting structure including SHAPE, LANDCENT, EUROCORPS, and AFSOUTH.

The Chain of Command

Figure 1. MNB(E) Chain of Command

The confusion was not limited to the NATO chain of command. The chains of command for the U.S. and other national forces were complex as well (Figure 1). As commander MBN(E), General Sanchez was one of five regional commanders subordinate to COMKFOR, a NATO commander. He exercised NATO OPCON over all assigned NATO forces. Non-NATO nations forces assigned to MNB(E) agreed to control similar to NATO OPCON with some reservations. For example, tasking to the 13th Tactical Group had to go through the Russian LNO and required approval of the Russian Minister of Defense.

As commander USKFOR, General Sanchez was the senior U.S. commander in Kosovo and responsible to the Commander in Chief, United States European Command (CINCEUCOM) for all assigned U.S. units and for the execution of U.S.-other nation bilateral agreements. He also reported to USAREUR for Title X responsibilities for all U.S. personnel, including non-U.S. forces by agreement. As the commander of Task Force Falcon, he was commander of all U.S. units assigned to TFF. In his role of ADC(S), 1 ID(M) he was responsible to commander 1 ID(M) for supervision of all deployed 1 ID units. He was also

sometimes responsible to V Corps for other basic U.S. Army chain of command reporting. U.S. National Command Authority approval was required for the use of U.S. forces out side of the MNB(E) area of responsibility or for special missions.

Sometimes guidance would come directly from EUCOM, or the Joint Staff, or even higher levels. It was necessary to monitor TFF tasking from U.S. superiors as well as demands for lower-level support in order to maintain balance and control. Officers needed not only to understand their superior's intent, but also to be able to trust their subordinates to execute that intent. U.S. elements were attached to the task force in different ways. Some units reported to multiple commanders. U.S. elements remained attached to their parent organizations, which retained some authority over them (CA and PSYOP were OPCON to Special Operations Command Europe [SOCEUR]).

The international presence in Kosovo combined the activities of a number of U.N. and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in complex arrangements. The civil arrangements, while more complicated in structure, lacked the discipline of their military counterparts. As LTC Holshek, U.S. Army Reserve, points out in his writings on the operational art of civil-military operations, military operations focus on the use of linear structures to accomplish set objectives, whereas civilian organizations use organic, evolving structures to address ever-changing needs and goals. There were also the NGOs, who were even less structured, operated autonomously, and were unlikely to be held accountable to anyone other than their supporters for their actions.

Leaders who promoted trust and confidence and demonstrated open collaboration, cooperation, and sharing had an overwhelmingly positive impact on how well the rest of the civil-military organizations functioned together. The ability to share and cooperate was an integral part of the education and training of the participants. The civilian and military actors on the ground, including the NGOs, needed to develop a shared understanding of the political aspects and ramifications of the peace operation and the relative impacts of the actions of those who participated.

In the first-ever U.N. operation of its kind, the head of UNMIK was the Senior Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and was, therefore, the senior international civilian official in Kosovo. As such, he presided over the work of the organization. The SRSG and COMKFOR met every day, and their staffs supplied liaisons to each other. UNMIK

and KFOR established information centers throughout Kosovo as a means to facilitate collaboration, coordination and exchange of information. In spite of these measures, achieving unity of effort proved to be problematic, especially since there continued to be an absence of clarity about Kosovo's future in the international community and there was no political-military strategic plan for the operation. Further complicating the situation was the fact that there had been a chronic shortfall in money and staff to support the international civil effort.

After a year, UNMIK, in spite of its shortfalls, actually performed better than anticipated. By contrast, KFOR was struggling to avoid creating a culture of dependency, as experienced in Bosnia. To a large extent, the military was disappointed and frustrated with UNMIK, OSCE and EU performance in the areas of civil administration, institution building and economic reconstruction. After all, UNMIK success was viewed as the key to the military exit strategy and in their view, limited progress had been made in these areas over the previous year. International community shortfalls also required KFOR to shoulder more and more burdens and this served to further frustrate civil-military relationships. Sharing information with UNMIK proved to be a challenge as well; MNB(E) information was provided to UNMIK, but it was difficult to receive information in return. The UNMIK LNO provided TFF daily UNMIK reports and other UNMIK related information. He also provided daily TFF situation reports (SITREPs) to UNMIK.

The Multinational Specialized Unit

The Multinational Specialized Unit was a military police force first employed with high success in Bosnia. They were used in KFOR to combat crime and terrorism, to support KFOR civil disturbance operations, and to gather intelligence on organized crime. The MSU consisted of the Italian Carabinieri and Estonian forces. In MNB(E), the MSU team consisted of fifteen to twenty personnel with two English speakers. Warrant Officer Franco Battagua commanded the team. They were well armed with Uzis, pistols, and other weapons. They had both secure and non-secure means of communicating; however, the systems they used did not interoperate with U.S. forces communication systems. Both Serbian and Albanian interpreters were employed. Before deploying into sector, they would check in with the MNB(E) TOC to get a situation update and to let the battle captain and sector commander

know they would be in the area. On the morning I went out with them, we first visited the TOC to talk to the battle captain and multinational LNOs, and then scanned the butcher paper that was used to record daily events before departing on mission.

I was fortunate to have been invited by the commander to go on patrol with them. The purpose of the mission was to conduct an initial reconnaissance of possible drug and weapons smuggling routes and weapon storage areas. One team went to Strpce to speak with a UNMIK administrator who had asked for protection. The other team (which I accompanied) proceeded to Basici and Vrnez, which were abandoned Croatian villages. Then we headed to Letnica. These villages were very near the FYROM border, which was heavily mined.

During discussions on the way to Basici and Vrnez, the commander explained that their primary mission in Kosovo was riot control, investigations into organized crime (drugs, smuggling, enslavement and prostitution) and terrorism. The commander said they were prepared to help the task force if asked. The Carabinieri provided situation reports to the TFF G2 and G3 and worked with the battalions, but it was not always as a full task force team member. Part of the problem was that the U.S. elements had broader expectations of skills than the MSU could contribute. Therefore, there was a lack of adequate understanding on the part of U.S. elements of their true strengths and how they could be employed.

It was noted that investigative work was difficult in Kosovo since standard techniques of wiretapping, bugging rooms, infiltration of organizations, and wearing civilian clothes could not be used. They needed to rely on surveillance and informants, but it was difficult to work with informants. People of interest were under pressure not to speak to KFOR. Also, it took time to check out an informant before they could be trusted and used. Frequently, KFOR soldiers asked Carabinieri informants for information or tried to use these contacts without coordinating with the Carabinieri. De-conflicting human intelligence (HUMINT) activities in sector was difficult because nearly everyone was collecting intelligence.

As we approached the town of Basici, we stopped to talk to a shepherd. The shepherd told us while there were no mines along the road, the mountains were more dangerous. We later met up with some workers who had just returned from Italy over the mountains and they reported

that there were many mines. While driving up the hill towards Vrnez, we stopped several times so the commander could survey the area for activity. The Carabinieri were much more cautious moving into this area than the tactical PSYOP team that I had accompanied a few days earlier.

The town of Vrnez had a large church and a schoolhouse, both of which were abandoned. There was a high probability of drugs and weapons smuggling in the area. There were a number of people working in the fields, but the town was essentially empty. Since the town was abandoned, people from other areas came up to harvest the hay fields. Most of the homes had been ransacked, and doors, windows and electrical parts had been removed. The Carabinieri spoke to people who indicated some activities in the mountains near the FYROM border. The commander decided to drive to this area to see if we could find any possible evidence of smuggling activities. The remaining team members stayed behind in Vrnez.

We drove out on a road that was nearly impassable. It was steep, narrow, rocky, and muddy at points. We followed the road until we came to a point where it was too narrow, rough, and steep for the Range Rover. We stopped and the commander and I proceeded to walk up one of the trails in search of any evidence of use (Figure 2). The driver remained in the vehicle. There were track marks that looked like a small tractor, hoof marks that could have been a horse or donkey, and footprints. There was other evidence of activities such as scraped rocks, bottles, seeds, and beer cans. With the overgrowth on the narrow trails, it would be easy to conceal oneself from helicopters. We walked back to the Rover and then up another trail that was far steeper than the first and had multiple branches. Again there was evidence that someone had come along these routes. We found some trees that had been chopped down and there were trail markers painted on rocks.

Figure 2. Carabinieri Commander Looking for Evidence

We returned to the other team members in the town of Vrnez and proceeded to Letnica. When we arrived in the village square, there was already an UNMIK police car, two MP Humvees, and a few KPS personnel walking around. We decided that there were too many people to do anything useful so we returned to Camp Bondsteel. I asked the commander what he thought about Kosovo and he said he felt it was a mistake to have gotten involved. In his view, there was not any real hope for the near future.

UNMIK Police

The UNMIK police operation was significantly different from previous U.N. civilian police missions. The UNMIK police were the only law enforcement unit in Kosovo. The Security Council Resolution 1244 tasked UNMIK with two strategic goals: (1) to provide temporary law enforcement, and (2) to establish a professional, impartial and independent local police, called Kosovo Police Service. The mission of

the international police force would be completed when the local police were able to enforce law and order according to international standards.

To achieve the goals imposed by the Security Council, UNMIK police had to adjust their functions over three distinct phases of operation:

- In the first phase, KFOR would be responsible for ensuring public safety and order until UNMIK could assume that function. Until the transfer, UNMIK's civilian police would advise KFOR on policing matters and establish liaisons with local and international counterparts. UNMIK border police would advise KFOR units stationed at the border.

- In the second phase, UNMIK would take over responsibility for law and order from KFOR. The UNMIK civilian police would carry out normal police duties and would have executive law enforcement authority. UNMIK civilian police would initiate on-the-job training, advising and monitoring for local recruits. UNMIK special police units would carry out public order functions, such as crowd control and area security. The special police units would also provide support for UNMIK civilian police and protect UNMIK installations. At that time, any special police unit previously under KFOR command would be transferred to UNMIK to achieve unity of police command. The United Nations border police would ensure compliance with immigration laws and other border regulations. KFOR would continue to support UNMIK in these efforts as required.

- In the third phase, when enough properly trained local police became available, UNMIK would transfer responsibilities for law and order and border policing functions to the Kosovo Police Service. At this time, UNMIK civilian and border police would revert to training, advising and monitoring functions. UNMIK special police units might still be needed as a backup.

As of April 2000, UNMIK Police had complied with the second phase tasks and their main activities included:

- Patrolling and maintaining public order;

- Investigation of crimes;

- Preventive measures;

- Field training for the KPS;

- Collection of criminal intelligence;

- Border and immigration control; and

- Traffic control.

The international police force was under the UNMIK civil administration and was commanded by a police commissioner. He exercised operational, technical and disciplinary authority over all police personnel. The commissioner reported to the SRSG from the UNMIK police headquarters in Pristina. CIVPOL had five regional headquarters located in Pristina, Pec, Gnjilane, Prizren and Mitrovica. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the United Nations civil administration were responsible for recruiting and training police officers for the new Kosovo Police Service. UNMIK police worked very closely with the OSCE to establish a new police force in Kosovo that was organized and functioned according to internationally recognized standards of democratic policing. The police academy, called Kosovo Police Service School, was established by OSCE in order to provide initial training for the police applicants. The UNMIK police and OSCE Department of Police Education and Development cooperated in processing applicants. Upon successful completion of the KPS School, each candidate was assigned to an UNMIK police station to begin seventeen weeks of field training and an additional 80 hours of classroom work provided by OSCE police instructors.

The UNMIK police was prepared to absorb KPS into its field training. Since the initial training course was short, the field-training component was vital to achieving the goal of a viable, professional and politically independent KPS. The KPS trainees and provisional officers served as an integral part of UNMIK police until they were assessed to be sufficiently trained and capable to conduct their police duties independently. Promising trainees in the program were identified for specialized or management training. The KPS was the only functioning multi-ethnic public service institution in Kosovo. Tremendous efforts were made to ensure fair representation of all minority groups in Kosovo, including Serbs. As of July 30, 2000, over 1300 local police officers representing all of Kosovo's communities had graduated from the police school.

Figure 3. Vitina UNMIK Police Chief

While visiting the Vitina civil affairs tactical support team (TST), I had the opportunity to visit with the Vitina UNMIK police chief, Mr. Kraus, (Figure 3) a German national. I also talked with one of the U.S. Army MPs, Lt Jackson, who had worked on organized crime activities while stationed in Vitina. UNMIK police and KFOR/MNB(E) had a very good working relationship, having been collocated at the Vitina Police Station. Local residents were generally co-operative with KFOR, even though KFOR imposed a curfew due to interethnic strife and criminal acts. Although both had very good working relations with the local community, the UNMIK police felt they could have had more of a positive impact if they had been provided with more police officers and additional organization support.

Insufficient resources affected every aspect of the police. Not everyone had weapons and many that did brought their own weapons from home, including the UNMIK police chief. There were 54 officers, but only 25 handset radios. The police station had five Posts and Telecommunication Kosovo (PTK) local subscriber lines, but only one telephone. Although there was limited telephone connectivity between the offices in Vitina and Pristina, the quality was so poor that the UNMIK police office had to call a Gnjilane switchboard to call Pristina. The international maritime satellite (INMARSAT) was used for voice and fax, but it did not work well on the first floor of the station where the

duty office was located. U.N. VSAT access was being installed to give the station enhanced voice and data service including connectivity to other UNMIK police facilities in Kosovo.

The UNMIK police were confronted with several issues related to the nationalities of the officers. UNMIK did not have standard uniforms. Instead they were provided by the sponsoring nation. For example, the German police wore black and the U.S. wore blue. The only UNMIK police that the locals really want to deal with were those from the U.S. and western European countries. There was an impression that officers from Asian and African countries were more interested in being paid than in serving the community. These police officers spent a lot of time in cafés, so local Serbs didn't believe they would be an effective force to ensure their protection.

Information system support for UNMIK police was pretty basic. The Vitina police station had computers, but they were not yet linked together. The police chief brought a hub router with him to link the station computers and printers together. There was a Kosovo-wide police information database on criminals, which was kept on the UNMIK police headquarters computer in Pristina. The database was not automatically fed from the UNMIK police stations throughout Kosovo and it was not accessible electronically from remote locations. Maintaining the databases was a time consuming and error prone manual process. Municipal police station updates such as those at Vitina were put on a disk once a week and then hand carried to the Opstina level UNMIK police station (for Vitina this was Gnjilane). At the Opstina level station, the municipal inputs were integrated with other inputs from the Opstina and then hand carried to Pristina to manually update the Kosovo-wide database. The previous week's database was picked up and brought back to the Opstina level police station and then passed on to the municipal level police stations to update their databases. This meant the Vitina version of the Kosovo-wide database ran about a week behind. Once the U.N. Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT) network was fully operational there were plans to link police stations and provide means for automated database updates and remote access of the database in Pristina.

Police candidates had varying skills related to policing and attitudes about what to do. For example, the Vitina chief cited incidents where Asian and Indian police refused to arrest people because they didn't want to create a disturbance. Requisite skills included the ability to

speak English, a driver's license, and shooting skills. Nations providing candidates conducted the qualification screening, but not all candidates met these qualifications. Some could not speak English, could not drive, and there were cases where some were not even police officers.

UNMIK police provided 1 week of orientation at the Pristina indoctrination center. Many nations were sending older officers rather than younger ones. UNMIK needed experienced officers to educate the KPS and train them to be good policemen, but they also needed some younger officers to meet the policing demands on the streets. The new KPS recruits did not want to be assigned to non-European and non-U.S. UNMIK police officers. They felt they would not learn anything. The duration of national assignments varied. For Germany it was 9 months, France 6 months, and for the U.S. and the rest it was generally a year assignment.

Basic policing tools such as handcuffs, vests, and pistols were provided by most nations sending officers. There were no standard weapons and they did not have any high-powered weapons. The UNMIK police officers were out-gunned when they encountered gangs.

Vitina station had twelve police vehicles. One was the "paddy wagon" for transporting criminals and one was a "white car" so it could be used to cross the border. White U.N. vehicles facilitated border crossings. UNMIK had two specialized units for riot control—a Jordanian and Indian unit. Locals were very friendly. The Kosovars, both Serbs and Albanians, were starving for law and order.

Shadow governments under control of Serbia still existed and taxed local businesses. Although it was suspected, shop owners would not admit it for fear of having their businesses destroyed. Organized crime involved both UCK and non-UCK. Xhavit

Hassani was the most respected and feared member of the organized crime community. When he was arrested, 600 protesters showed up in the streets. Hassani had an office in a building near the UNMIK civil administration building in Vitina and he had ties to illegal taxation, drugs, arms smuggling and prostitution. It was also believed that he was sending money to the UCPMB.

While in Pristina visiting Col Mike Dziedzic, U.S. Air Force and UNMIK strategic planner, I had the opportunity to visit the UNMIK police criminal analysis team. They were building a crime database and

conducting rudimentary assessments. Col Dziedzic was trying to get NIMA to release maps to them so they could do more detailed profiling of where crimes were being committed. They were planning to do trend and link analysis as well. The analyst team was trying to convince senior UNMIK police leadership of the value of their work and gain their support for acquiring improved tools and information systems to do their job. Data reporting was primitive and prone to errors, from filling out the initial reports to the station commanders who did not necessarily review them before sending them forward to higher headquarters. Without structure, process and discipline they were suffering the GIEGO effect—garbage in equals garbage out.

The UNMIK police statistics were available on an Internet Web site at http://www.civpol.org/unmik/. Crimes were being reported more often. A likely reason for this increase in reports was the growing trust between the locals and the police force. The increased reporting was a very good indication of the development and improved abilities of the police force.

MED Falcon and MEDCAP/DENCAP

A combat support tent hospital, Medical Falcon, was set up on Camp Bondsteel and included a full emergency medical treatment section equivalent to any urban emergency room. In some cases it may have treated as many weapons related wounds and injuries from car accidents per week as an ER in the states. There were two modern, fully equipped sterile operating rooms and their surgeons were capable of performing almost any life-saving surgery. While I was there an 8-year-old girl was shot and brought to Bondsteel. Thanks to the prompt action of the U.S. Army medical team and post-operative care she survived. The intensive care unit held up to eight critical patients. The intermediate care ward held up to 20 patients. In addition to state of the art medical care, the hospital also provided veterinary, preventive medicine, optometry, dentistry, and psychiatric support.

Figure 4. Hospital in Action

Emergency medical care was provided by the Camp Bondsteel medical treatment facility to any person with the threat of loss of life, limb, or eyesight. Numerous Kosovar Serbs from even the most uncooperative, hard-line communities willingly received emergency medical treatment at Camp Bondsteel. A leading Serbian Orthodox cleric, Popa Dragan, was seriously injured in a drive-by shooting and required a series of medical treatments at Camp Bondsteel. He reported that wealthy relatives offered him the opportunity to receive medical treatment elsewhere, but he declined, as he trusted the care he was receiving at Camp Bondsteel. The former KLA leader and resurgent political celebrity Ramush Haradinaj was transported to Camp Bondsteel for medical treatment after being injured in a confrontation in MNB(W).

The MNB(E)/TFF medical personnel made house calls. This was done through routine MEDCAPs and DENCAPs that were conducted several times a week by military medics and doctors who traveled to remote areas that didn't have a medical facility. The commander responsible for the sector and towns frequently requested and scheduled medical team visits, sometimes referred to as "tailgate medicine." The sector commander and supporting civil affairs team worked with the town mayors to select sites to be visited. Visits were conducted three times

per week per sector on the average. For major medical concerns, individuals were referred to the nearest hospital. Most problems tended to be muscular-skeletal problems and skin problems, commonly rashes. Typical treatment was dispensing pain relievers. Dental personnel provided similar services and also spent time visiting schools to talk to the kids about oral hygiene and foods good for their teeth. They passed out toothbrushes, donated by companies in the states, and instructed the kids how to use them. Most young children's teeth were in extremely poor condition.

Some field commanders felt the MEDCAP program needed some fine-tuning, especially where visits were made to the same sites too often and remained there too long. In some communities, MEDCAPs were being made to communities that were already covered by U.N. funded, Serbian run clinics and by NGOs such as Medicine Sans Frontiers. There was a need for the MEDCAP leadership to conduct community assessments to determine where needs existed and then work with civil affairs to try to get NGOs to provide medical care so the KFOR resources could be used on communities still untouched by MEDCAPs. The TFF Surgeon maintained historical information on MEDCAP and DENCAP visits to support assessments and for use in future planning and targeting efforts. Sustained medical care was not a KFOR responsibility.

I was fortunate to be able to ride along with a MEDCAP team out of Camp Montieth to the Serbian side of the village Kmetovce. This particular village was visited about every other week. The clinic was set up in a small schoolhouse. One schoolroom was used as the initial screening area. People arriving to seek treatment had their vital signs and medical information taken before the patient saw a doctor. The medics, who had interpreters working with them, checked blood pressure, took temperature measurements, pulse rates, and patient information was recorded. Those who needed to see a doctor were sent to another room for examination and medication.

When the team first showed up at the schoolhouse, a few children came around the vehicles. Soon it seemed like every child in town showed up out of nowhere. Gradually the adults, mostly the elderly, began to show up. (Figure 5). The medics worked well with both the young and old. They were friendly, kind, and even though they didn't speak the language, they joked with the patients.

Figure 5. Medic Taking Temperature

The children constantly pestered us for candy, drinks, U.S. flag patches, and money. They were watching the medics and trying to peek in the rooms where the medical exams were being conducted. When we arrived, there was an old lady herding her goats in the road next to the school. Later another goat herder came by and shook my hand. There were pigs and chickens running around. Even the adults get pushy for things and are a constant challenge to deal with. Some of the young men said they had been promised fuel from an earlier visit. They asked a couple of soldiers if they could have some fuel from the cans on the back of the military vehicles and were told they could. In the meantime, the Sergeant in charge came by and stopped the action. The Serbian men were quite angry and argumentative. Some of the soldiers passed out candy and U.S. flag patches to the children, who later tried to get some soft drinks which were not given to them. As the vehicles depart, the children started spitting on them and flashing the three-finger VJ victory sign. The situation in Kosovo was volatile and could change at a moment's notice, even for humanitarian efforts such as MEDCAPs.

Camp Bondsteel Detention Facility

Because there was no functioning Kosovo civil prison system in place when KFOR and UNMIK arrived, it was necessary for KFOR to set up detention facilities. MNB(E) established a detention facility on Camp

Bondsteel. The military stressed that this was a detention facility, not a prison or a POW facility. The detainees were civilian criminals awaiting trial and sentencing. Although in some ways similar, internment operations in Kosovo were quite difficult and different than POW operations for which the MPs were trained to conduct. Long-term detainees required different handling than POWs where prisoners moved in and out quite frequently. In addition to guard towers, living areas, portable showers and toilets, the detention facility had to provide for administrative processing, interrogation, visitors, lawyers, and judges and a courtroom. A visitation program similar to that of a civilian regional correction facility was set up. It was also necessary to set up procedures for medical care and dispensing medication.

Figure 6. Detainees

The detention facility began in June 1999 as several tents surrounded by triple-stranded concertina wire to hold about 48 detainees. A year later it was a much larger facility that could hold about 130 detainees and was growing. Detainees wore bright orange jump suites (Figure 6) and MP guards and K9 teams patrolled the detention facility. Soldiers rotated between guard towers, static guard duty, and roving patrols. Early in the operation, there was essentially no penalty for breaking the law, so the average detainee stay was 72 hours. However, this changed

when the judicial system started to function. In June 2000, the facility averaged 65 detainees inside the fence on any given day and the average stay was about 110 days.

Generally speaking, the Serbs were not the ones committing the violent crimes nor were they picked up on minor crimes. Albanians, on the other hand, had a reputation for making trouble. The Serbian community misinterpreted the situation and began to believe that if they were arrested by KFOR and sent to the Camp Bondsteel detention facility, then they would never return. There was a need for the information campaign to correct this misperception by making the actual situation more clear to the Serbian community in general.

More than 1,500 detainees had been processed since the start of the Kosovo mission. The detainees displayed a similar criminal mentality to prisoners in the United States. New detainees often asked where the prisoners were beaten or executed. Once detainees realized that they would receive humane treatment, the information flow, as little as it was, ceased. Overall, the facility did not have any major problems, except for one escape attempt and some minor disturbances. Detainee status and related activities were briefed to the MNB(E)/TFF commander each morning and then again at the evening BUB. The Kosovar judicial system was improving and courts were taking an active role in facilitating the future of the detainees. Kosovar prison facilities were starting to open up to accommodate convicted criminals.

Sergeant Kasun, U.S. Army, conducted a most informative and interesting tour of the Bondsteel detention facility for me. Upon arrival at the detention facility there was a canvas-covered perimeter wire fence and guard towers that surrounded the main compound. Access to the detention facility was through a locked double gate area that one had to enter before being allowed access to the main compound. Once inside the main compound there were several fenced-in areas within another controlled access area. The operations center was located in a tent inside the main gate. This was the command and control center for the facility and where detainee information was recorded and maintained. When a detainee arrived, he or she was photographed but not finger printed. They had a finger printing capability but were missing some pieces to be able to do it at the time of my visit. Handheld Motorola radios were used for communications within the compound. Sergeant Kasun felt they did not have enough radios and also noted they were

having problems with the rechargeable batteries, which contributed to the shortage.

Inside the controlled access area of the main compound there were six separately fenced areas. In the center of each fenced in area there was a tent on a wooden platform that housed detainees. It was necessary to separate Albanians and Serbs, men and women, and adults and juveniles, as well as to provide a separate facility for disturbed or dangerous detainees. Attempts were made to try to balance the number of detainees to a maximum of ten per tent. There were some new facilities being constructed out of plywood in another series of fenced in areas that would be used for juveniles and disturbed detainees. Due to a lack of funding, the MPs were building these facilities instead of the camp contractor, Brown and Root. The MPs also built the guard towers and platforms for the tents. There was a shower tent and port-a-johns located inside the main compound. The detainees were escorted to these facilities. For medical attention, detainees were taken to the MASH hospital down the hill from the detention compound.

The meals, a diet of MREs and bottled water, were served to the detainees. Although surprised at first that detainees were not eating the same meals as the soldiers, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concurred that MREs, given the sanitary conditions and general poor health (active TB and heart problems) of some of the detainees, provided the safest food source. The ICRC visited the facility several times and provided some reading material and cigarettes for detainees. The MPs also provided sleeping bags, cots, personal hygiene items, shower shoes, personal items storage bins, pants, shirts, coats, boots, games, books, reading material and other items for long-term incarceration detainees.

A few hunger strikes occurred, usually during weekend visitation periods when their families brought them food. The detainees cut off this practice after the MPs told them they would start feeding them intravenously. Earlier in the year there was one escape attempt by three individuals. Two got away and one was captured.

There was a tent that served as a court, a meeting room for visitors, and other activities. Visitors were allowed to bring cigarettes and non-perishable foods for detainees. The MPs searched all items before they were given to them. The visitors were searched as well before entering

the visitation tent. Families and detainees met in the tent and sat on benches across from each other. There were a couple of MPs in the tent to monitor activities. There were also tents used for interrogations. The MPs and CIVPOL/UNMIK police interrogated the detainees. The resident UNMIK police officer Lt Paul Ories, a deputy sheriff for the county of Essex in Virginia, assisted with the processing and transport of detainees to their court hearings and did interrogations as well. The MPs and UNMIK used local and Computer Aided Translation (CAT) II translators. CAT II translators were used for sensitive counterintelligence and combat identification (CID) interrogations.

CHAPTER XIX

Operations

Larry Wentz

Setting the Stage

LTC Dave Hogg, U.S. Army, was the MNB(E)/Task Force Falcon G3. He came to Kosovo with extensive Balkans experience, but he still felt that this was probably one of his toughest operational assignments. He found that in addition to performing the traditional military support to peacekeeping operations, he had to worry about the possibility of fighting breaking out between the UCPMB and the VJ/MUP in the Presevo valley, weapons smuggling and counterinsurgency operations on the MNB(E) borders with Serbia and the Former Republic of Macedonia, and combating increasing ethnic violence and organized crime activities. There were also concerns related to refugee returns and registration and planning for the upcoming Kosovo elections, including the potential for violence due to political power struggles.

There were other considerations as well. Every Opstina in MNB(E) had different problems and there were different civil-military approaches to their solutions. There was no political-military or KFOR strategic plan. Additionally, there was no KFOR civil-military operations or information operations plan. As a result, integration and synchronization of UNMIK, KFOR, the MNBs, IOs, and NGOs efforts were problematic. There were also perceptions that MNB(E)/TFF was being too risk adverse and this needed to be dealt with as courses of action were developed and executed. MNB(E)/TFF headquarters was in reality a brigade-plus (division-like) operation, which presented command staffing challenges. This was because TFF was essentially staffed with brigade-level experienced officers instead of divisional-level officers. In general, the TFF staff lacked peace operations expertise and experience as well. As a result, both experience and expertise short falls had to be accommodated to meet the needs of a brigade-plus operation. In addition

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to dealing with short falls, it also was necessary to continuously accommodate changes in leadership and staff. The frequent turnovers had to be carefully managed in order to minimize disruptions to the continuity of operation and stability of the organization.

Achieving unity of effort in the MNB(E)/TFF operation was difficult, but it was further complicated by having to accommodate KFOR C2 arrangements that favored consensus and leading by committee as the preferred way to conduct operations. There were other challenges related to command and control of non-U.S. forces under MNB(E)/TFF command. Most non-U.S. forces were under NATO OPCON but tasking the Russians required their Ministry of Defense approval. There were also concerns that high-level political decisions were being made without adequate consideration and appreciation of local impact.

Command and Control

A typical week in MNB(E) was quite active. The following snapshot illustrates many, but not all, of the operational activities soldiers were engaged in the MNB(E) area of responsibility over a 1-week period in June 2000:

- 1,470 Security patrols (day and night);

- 200 staging/infiltration zone operations patrols;

- 350 Hot Gun, force protection, and QRF missions;

- 112 Aviation missions;

- 49 Checkpoint operations;

- 81 Fixed-site security missions;

- 40 Satellite camps;

- 2,653 Squad-size missions;

- 7,500 to 9,000 PSYOP products distributed;

- 10 Combat Camera missions;

- 8 to 10 MEDCAPs/DENCAPs;

- 15 civil affairs projects;

- 5 to 9 live PSYOP radio and 1 television show;

- 4 to 5 press releases and media events;

- 7 types of bilateral meetings with local leaders, plus KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE, and NGO meetings; 50 to 60 contacts weekly; and

- 7 to 10 VIP visits to Task Force Falcon.

The Task Force Falcon battle rhythm (see Figure 1) was brutal. There were lots of meetings throughout the day and well into the evening, many occurring after 8 p.m. The commander's intent and priority drove operational priorities, activities, and headquarters' battle rhythm. Headquarters workdays of 15 to 18 hours were not unusual and it was quite easy to get caught up in the high op tempo routine since there was little else to do. Staff burnout was a serious concern and continuous efforts were made to encourage staff to get adequate sleep and take some time off to do physical training and general relaxation, read a

Time	Sunday	Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Time
0600 - 0715								0600 - 0715
0715 - 0745		CG Synch Mtg	CG Synch Mtg	CG Synch Mtg	CG Synch Mtg	CG Synch Mtg	CG Synch Mtg	0715 - 0745
0745 - 0800								0745 - 0800
0800 - 0830		BUB	BUB	BUB	BUB	BUB	BUB	0800 - 0830
0830 - 0900	BUB / ACE Combo	ACE	ACE	ACE	ACE	ACE	ACE Roll Up	0830 - 0900
0900 - 0930								0900 - 0930
0930 - 1000		Long Range Plans Mtg				G2X Update	CoS-Primary Staff Call	0930 - 1000
1000 - 1030								1000 - 1030
1030 - 1100								1030 - 1100
1100 - 1130	Go/No Go Meeting			Info Ops Working Grp				1100 - 1130
1130 - 1200								1130 - 1200
1200 - 1230								1200 - 1230
1230 - 1300								1230 - 1300
1300 - 1330								1300 - 1330
1330 - 1400								1330 - 1400
1400 - 1430	Cmd & Staff	Initial Tgting Meeting	G3 Plans Meeting	Executive Targeting Mtg		G3 Plans Mtg	Target Planning	1400 - 1430
1430 - 1500								1430 - 1500
1500 - 1530	Cdr's Conference							1500 - 1530
1530 - 1600								1530 - 1600
1600 - 1630								1600 - 1630
1630 - 1700	JVB	JVB	JVB	JVB	JVB	JVB	JVB	1630 - 1700
1700 - 1730								1700 - 1730
1730 - 1800								1730 - 1800
1800 - 1830		BUB	BUB	BUB	BUB	BUB	Big BUB	1800 - 1830
1830 - 1900								1830 - 1900
1900 - 1930					G3 / S3			1900 - 1930
1930 - 2000	CoS-Plans Huddle	CoS-Plans Huddle	CoS-Plans Huddle	CoS-Plans Huddle	CoS-Plans Huddle	CoS-Plans Huddle	CoS-Plans Huddle	1930 - 2000
2000 - 2030								2000 - 2030
2030 - 2300								2030 - 2300

Figure 1. Task Force Battle Rhythm

Distinguished visitors were an integral part of the fabric of TFF life that was given priority consideration by the commander and required full-time attention. COL Landry, the Task Force Falcon Chief of Staff, spent a lot of his time helping work this activity until a senior military officer was brought in to fill the JVB OIC position. The commander's daily to-

do list included the constant stream of VIPs, the list of which was briefed daily at the battle update briefings (BUB). The Chief of Staff tried to limit the number of high-level distinguished visitors to a maximum of two per day in order to make sure they got proper treatment. There were also a large number of other visitors, referred to by COL Landry as BRAs (Bubbas running around) in sector that required TFF caring, feeding, and other support as well.

The first main event of the day at Task Force Falcon headquarters was the 8 a.m. battle update briefing (BUB) in the main briefing theater in the TOC area followed by a U.S.-only intelligence briefing in the Analysis and Control Element (ACE), a U.S special access secure facility. The morning BUB, which covered subjects such as weather, UAV status, current ops, aircraft utilization, and FRAGOs, normally ran a half-hour or less. The last regularly scheduled event of the day was a BUB at 6 p.m. that summarized the key events of the day and usually lasted less than an hour. On Saturday evenings the BUB would run at least an hour since an even broader set of organization elements briefed their week's activities. Sunday was a day off for BUBs but there was an ACE Ops-Intel briefing in the morning and in the afternoon, there was a 1-hour meeting between the TFF Commander and his staff followed by an hour meeting with his non-U.S. forces commanders.

Obviously a great deal of other activity was ongoing including preparations for the BUB and ACE briefings and other command level briefings and meetings held throughout the day and evenings. There were numerous weekly briefings and meetings scheduled in advance that related to operations, targeting, planning, information operations, civil affairs, PSYOP, public affairs, intelligence, Joint Visitor's Bureau, and other TFF Ops-Intel and command support activities. There were also unscheduled events such as the establishment of a Crisis Action Cell (CAC) in the TOC (used the BUB briefing theater) to monitor and manage unfolding critical events requiring the commander's involvement and use of force, including the QRF. A CAC could be set up in less than 30 minutes and was usually initiated in response to the spontaneous occurrence of a sector incident such as a roadblock of a major highway, a demonstration, or a riot, and these events could happen day or night.

There were also external meetings, such as the weekly meeting between the Commander of MNB(E)/TFF and COMKFOR, and the TFF Chief of Staff meeting with his KFOR counterpart. The MNB(E)/TFF Commander

met every Sunday with the UNMIK regional administrator and the UNMIK police and every other week he met with the KPC regional commander. There was an UNMIK four pillar (UNMIK Admin, UNHCR, OSCE, EU) meeting every Monday evening in Gnjilane which the Deputy Commander MNB(E)/TFF and the TFF G5/Civil Affairs Commander attended. A weekly Joint Security Committee (JSC) municipal meeting was held and included the UNMIK administrator, NGO representatives, the civil affairs team chief, and local ethnic group representatives. Although invited, the local Serbian representatives rarely attended. The meeting was chaired by the MNB(E)/TFF maneuver commander responsible for the area. There was also a weekly regional level JSC meeting chaired by the TFF commander. The civil affairs team chief assigned to the key municipalities met daily with UNMIK, OSCE, NGO, and others as necessary to work a variety of local issues such as distribution of supplies, restoration of phone service, and other things that needed to be fixed. There were weekly KFOR-sponsored information operations and PSYOP working groups with the MNBs and biweekly Joint Implementation Commission, civil affairs, and public affairs working groups and meetings. The KFOR-sponsored meetings alternated between Film City in Pristine and the MNB headquarters. TFF civil affairs team chiefs also held frequent meetings with the local Serbian clergy to keep them informed of KFOR efforts and to address issues of concern to them. There were numerous other KFOR, UNMIK, OSCE, and EU sponsored meetings and working groups that TFF commanders and staff attended. They also met with senior Albanian and Serbian religious and community leaders. There were also MNB(E) civil affairs, PSYOP, and intelligence related bilateral initiatives to strengthen collaborative arrangements with the lead nations of the MNBs on its border—the UK for MNB(C) and Germany for MNB(S).

The G3 plans shop was a constant center of attention and meetings. There was a continuous flow of U.S. and non-U.S. staff in and out of the planning area. Part of this activity was no doubt due to the fact that headquarters staff elements were physically spread around the TOC area, which did not serve to facilitate information sharing and collaboration. Furthermore, the information systems were not used effectively for collaboration (other than e-mail exchanges), so it was necessary for the staff to physically get together. For example, the collaborative planning tools available on SIPRNET were not used. The G3 and G2 planners (MAJ Jones and MAJ Latham) worked together daily in the G3 plans area as an Ops-Intel team even though the G3 and

G2 shops were in physically different locations within the TOC area. There were G2 and PSYOP liaisons collocated in the plans shop and the information operations cell that included the LIWA team was collocated with them as well.

There were no NATO or U.S. secure-phones in the G3 planning area. Unsecured DSN phones were on all desks and there was one KPN unsecured KFOR phone, which was hardly ever used. The unsecured phones in a classified planning area presented an OPSEC problem, especially when classified discussions were being held at the same time as unclassified conversations were being held on the unsecured phones. This happened often throughout the day and finally it was necessary to have someone monitor the situation and alert those having the classified discussion that an open line existed and to hold up on the classified discussions. Use of the unsecured phones during classified discussions was discouraged as well.

Access to the plans area was not tightly controlled, which meant there were staff entering and leaving during classified discussions and classified wall charts, displays, and other classified material were lying around as well. The U.S. secret-level SIPRNET workstations were on most desks and the screens were visible to those walking through the area. Additionally, care needed to be exercised since many of the discussions were U.S.-only, yet there were non-U.S. staff in the TOC area from time to time. Local hire cleaning crews also showed up at random times during the day and the area needed to be secured before allowing them in. Eventually *Do Not Enter* signs were posted on the doors to the planning areas and a person was placed near the doors to prevent entry of unauthorized personnel when classified planning and briefing activities were in progress.

The G3 planning was, by tactical operations necessity and time urgency, more focused on the short term, many times at the expense of long term planning, which was lacking. For example, there was no MNB(E) campaign plan. MNB(E)/TFF needed a future plans cell and they also needed an operations-independent lessons-learned cell. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) or the USAREUR lessons learned cell could have provided on site assistance but they were not deployed to do so. Instead, the G3 plans had to assemble and produce the 1ID after action review and lessons learned as another duty assigned while still being actively involved in on-going operational planning activities. An operations analysis branch similar to the one used by the ARRC to

conduct soft analysis, such as return to normalcy indicators and village assessments, would have benefited the G3 plans shop and could have been used for lessons learned documentation as well. Use of civil affairs to provide such a soft analysis capability might be worth exploring in future operations.

National priorities and interests were major factors to be considered in the course of action planning and execution. NATO and national policies and interests, including the United States, often differed on critical issues. In this regard, commander TFF guidance from higher headquarters was plentiful, but sometimes conflicting, and placed the commander in a difficult situation, especially if the higher headquarters commander wore both U.S. and NATO hats. Nations could and did play their red cards blocking actions or refusing to participate in operations. One famous example of such an action was the ARRC commander, British General Sir Michael Jackson's reply to General Clark, SACEUR, and his superior in the SHAPE chain of command. Clark ordered him to block Russian access to the Pristina airfield at the outset of the deployment into Kosovo. Jackson replied, "I'm not starting World War III for you." The UK government backed him up when London, through his national chain of command, ordered him not to comply with the Clark order. In other cases, national policy and strategy was not clear and this uncertainty added challenges to the commander's planning and execution on the ground. For example, concerns about the clarity of U.S. National Command Authority policies introduced some planning uncertainties for the U.S. commander on the ground. There was also a feeling that "on the ground situation awareness" was lacking at the policy and higher levels of command. Commanders on the ground also felt they needed to be given a better working knowledge of higher headquarters positions, initiatives, and related critical issues that affected their operation and plans. The boundaries between strategic, operational, and tactical were blurred, making the need to bridge the information gap among the key participants all that more important.

The informal network proved to be an essential means for working around command level disconnects, helping to deconflict actions, and providing information in a timely fashion. Responsiveness and flexibility were key attributes of the shadow operation. The command was under a fine microscope and when something serious happened there was an instant demand for information that needed to be filled and filled quickly. Under these circumstances, it was important to inform upward quickly and the resulting tasking from above and command response process

needed to be carefully managed in order to avoid unnecessary overloading of an already busy staff trying to solve the problem. Many times the early field reports on a serious situation were incomplete and in some cases incorrect, so it was important to allow some time to assemble a reasonably clear and correct picture of the incident on the ground and then engage as necessary.

There were two collateral level video teleconferences (VTC)s with USAREUR every week, one on Wednesday for a Balkans update for the Deputy Commander, USAREUR, and one on Friday which was an O-6 level meeting chaired by USAREUR. The USAREUR liaison officer at MNB(E)/TFF was the main conduit to USAREUR for issue actions. The TFF ACE held weekly SCI VTCs with the USAREUR DCSINT and ACE in Heidelberg, Germany, and with the Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England. The National Intelligence Support Team held a weekly SCI VTC with the U.S. Balkans Task Force in Washington D.C.

There were no MNB(E) VTCs with NATO, SHAPE, KFOR, the other MNBs or UNMIK. There were a few VTC activities in addition to those noted above but generally speaking its use in TFF operations was not as dominant as its use in Bosnia and the air war over Serbia, where VTCs were used daily by the Commander and his staff. For example, in Bosnia there were daily VTCs between SHAPE, IFOR/SFOR and the MNDs and throughout the day other elements such as the U.S. and NATO IFOR/SFOR organizations used the VTC frequently to coordinate related implementation, operation, and maintenance activities. During the air war, General Clark used the NATO and U.S. secure VTC capabilities daily to communicate and coordinate air operations with his Allied and U.S. commanders who were dispersed throughout the European theater and in CONUS.

Coordination among the MNB(E)/TFF headquarters staff was also a challenge due to the fact staff and organization elements were distributed throughout the TOC area as well as other locations on Camp Bondsteel. The TFF battle rhythm established regularly scheduled meetings such as the BUB, the morning intelligence briefing, the targeting meetings, the information operations working group, the command and staff meetings, and others. These were good opportunities to bring staff together, provide information or training, and enable discussions after the briefings or meetings. Daily and weekly staffing meetings among elements such as PSYOP and civil affairs were used to

keep each other informed. Ops-Intel and other information were posted on the SIPRNET and NIPRNET Task Force Falcon Web sites and there was a wealth of information available. There was so much information that the issue quickly became one of better discovery tools to help find the information needed. In fact, there was a need for the equivalent of a Chief Information Officer to help manage the information processes and capabilities of the task force, including external interfaces with KFOR, the other MNBs, UNMIK, and the NGOs.

The TFF Chief of Staff employed a number of techniques for creating an environment for mentoring, educating, sharing, and focusing the efforts of the staff. In spite of these efforts, there still were junior officers at all levels of the command that expressed concern about micromanagement and insufficient mentoring. The COS also held nightly meetings with the G3 staff (without the G3) to review planning activities. He hosted the weekly executive targeting meeting and humanitarian assistance board; he had a weekly chief of staff call where staff principals provided updates on important actions and concluded with his theme of the week, special emphasis areas, and hot topics. Once a week, he hosted an informal command level staff dinner at the DFAC as a team building measure.

Tactical Operations Center Support Systems

The BUB was held in an amphitheater-like room that was quite large and was used for other meetings such as the command and staff, operation after-action reviews, awards and promotion ceremonies, and for the crisis action cell (CAC). There were two BARCO projectors hung from the ceiling that projected onto screens at the front of the room and there were two elevated large screen televisions at each side of the front of the room. A control room in the back directed the use of the projection and sound systems. The control room was quite sophisticated and could mix various audio and video sources to be piped over the sound system and projected on the displays. Video feeds from Hunter, Predator, JBS, CNN, AFN, VHS tapes, computer outputs (source for the BUB slides), and other sources could be individually or simultaneously directed to any combination or all display capabilities. CDs, tapes, microphones, and other sound sources were selectable as well. The commander and his principals, including the multinational commanders assigned to MNB(E), sat at a long table at

the front of the room and behind them rose several rows of seats also equipped with telephones that were occupied by representatives of the various headquarters elements, e.g., G-staff, JIC, SJA, Chaplain (passed out candy, offered a prayer and thought of the day at every evening BUB), PAO, CA, PSYOP, MSU, ALO, and others.

In front of the commander's table was a map table that was used by the CAC when it was set up in the BUB. The commander's table was pre-wired to give the head table SIPRNET, NIPRNET, MSE, UHF TACTSAT, and other access when needed and could be configured in 20 minutes or less to support the establishment of a CAC. A hotline to the ACE and radio access to the LNO, CMD, CONOPS, and FSE nets could be activated as well. There were direct tactical phone accesses to the tactical voice switched network. There was DSN access for camp-to-camp and intra-base communication, DSN access to MSE, and direct DSN access to CONUS and Germany, and a KPN phone for access to KFOR headquarters. There was MSE access to DSN for camp-to-camp and direct access to Germany and CONUS. Motorola radios and handheld radios were also used. When a CAC was set up in the BUB, the Hunter, or other video was displayed on the two large screen televisions and the map board was raised. One of the front screens one showed an Excel spreadsheet with events as they occur, and a map overlaying the location of events was projected on the other screen. The BUB essentially had access to all communications and information system capabilities supporting the TOC.

Although advanced U.S. C2 and planning capabilities, such as GCCS, were available in the TOC area, the staff, including the operations center, generally did not use them. Instead, the processes and tools were more manually oriented with stand alone workstations used for planning, butcher paper used for tracking daily events in the operations center, and 1:50,000 wall maps with acetate overlays used to display operational information.

NATO did not provide secure VTC capabilities for use by KFOR and the MNBs. The U.S. provided MNB(E) with both collateral and SCI level secure video teleconference capabilities for U.S. use only. The SCI VTC was located in the Analysis and Control Element area and the collateral VTC was located in the TFF command section area of the TOC.

There were high-end workstations connected to the U.S. SIPRNET and NIPRNET for the exchange of Ops-Intel and there were other information sources such as the Internet that supported civil-military operations, open

source intelligence, and other needs. A NATO-provided CRONOS (NATO Secret) workstation supported access to NATO Ops-Intel and access to the NATO Intel dissemination network LOCE. Unfortunately, although the NATO terminal was located in the G4 area of the TOC, its physical location did not lend itself to ready access during G3 planning activities. A NATO-provided KFOR Secret Network (KSN) workstation supported access to KFOR Ops-Intel information and it was located in a back room in the G3 plans area, only a few knew about its existence. Needless to say, the NATO provided Ops-Intel information network accesses were rarely used to support day-to-day MNB(E) operational planning.

There were other information system capabilities including collaborative planning tools and state-of-the-art analysis and common operational picture capabilities. The TFF staff used both laptops and workstations for building complex color briefings and there were color printers for producing hard copy handouts. Generally speaking, however, the TOC staff was not exploiting the advanced technology capabilities available to them. The information support tools actually used were pretty basic such as 1:50,000 maps with acetate covers either on a table, hung on walls, or attached to large wooden frames. Grease pencils were used to draw on the acetate to portray the actions of the past week and provide other information for operational planning purposes. In fact, for the targeting sessions there were three large wood framed maps that were used for operations planning and briefing the commander. One portrayed the past week's activities, a second the next week's activities, and the third a 1-week-out projection of events and focus. A laptop connected to a projector was also used to display operations planning briefings on the wall as the plans were being developed by staff sitting around a collection of tables that served as the G3 plans cell work area. Briefings for the commander, COS, and others were held in this area as well. The aim was to keep briefings simple.

In order to improve Blue Force tracking in the operations center, the C2PC system was being installed in the TOC to exploit the OMNITRAC/DTRAC position location system installed in many of the vehicles and used to track their location when on mission. More than 400 vehicle-mounted OMNITRAC's and 41 DTRAC systems were on hand. GPS receivers were also installed on some vehicles and handheld GPS receivers were also used for navigation along Serbian border areas. The OMINTRAC automatically transmitted the vehicle location about every 5 minutes via a satellite gateway access to the NIPRNET and

then through a guard gateway to the SIPRNET and then to the C2PC workstation that displayed the vehicles being tracked on a map. C2PC could also be used to display the air picture but was not being used for this purpose.

The air picture provided for use by the operations center was downloaded from the CAOC using FAADCS system and a STU-III DSN dial-up connection. There was a slight problem in maintaining continuity with this arrangement because a low precedence level was assigned to the DSN connection to the CAOC and as a result of high precedence traffic, it experienced frequent disconnects due to preemption. The FM broadcast could be used to send the air picture to laptops in the field and the air picture could also be sent to MANPAD radios and the laptops of deployed forces. Early warning was also via voice FM communications. There was also access to AWACS JTIDS but there was a line of sight communications problem that interfered with transmitting the signal to the TOC. The problem was caused by shifting the AWACS orbit from Kosovo and to over the Adriatic where transmission over the mountain ranges to Camp Bondsteel was poor.

The Automated Mission Planning System was used for helicopter mission planning. In the TOC alone, there were other stand-alone information systems for tracking mines and UXO clearing status, fire support planning and operations, and other planning and operations tracking activities in the operations center. There were numerous other stand alone computer systems spread through out Camp Bondsteel such as those used by the ACE/NIST, engineers, staff weather operations, SOCCE, public affairs, PSYOP, and combat camera product development facilities.

Other TOC communications consisted of FM nets supporting the ALO, CONOPS, TFF Command, TF FS, and Unit Command. The TOC antenna tower did not allow for proper separation of antennas and this caused interference for adjoining command nets. There was also MSE, DSN, STU-II(B)/STU-III, KPN, S/C TACSAT, and a Motorola base station. Although the communications capabilities were reasonably well documented by the TFF G6, a similar level of documentation of information systems was lacking. This was most likely because there was no equivalent of a chief information officer to manage the configuration stand-alone and networked capabilities employed by the various disparate elements that supported the TOC.

Transfer of Authority

The transfer of authority (TOA) from 1st ID to 1st AD was scheduled for June 20 and this also required the careful attention of the TFF commander and his staff. In spite of the enormity of the effort, the TOA went off without any major hitches. The only noticeable evidence that it was taking place was the increased number of personnel on Bondsteel and increased vehicle traffic as the new replaced the old, and then the rehearsals and the actual TOA ceremonies. BG Sanchez, at his last BUB the night before the TOA, thanked the staff for their contributions. He said, "Kosovo was an enigma and that we brought values these people didn't understand." His final guidance was to "be evenhanded and treat everyone with dignity and respect."

Figure 2. Transfer of Authority Ceremony

The TOA ceremony was held on the newly constructed gravel parade ground next to the TOC with a view of the Sharri Mountains in the background (see Figure 2). MNB(E) soldiers from the U.S., Greece, Poland, and the Ukraine stood in formation and displayed regimental colors. The ceremony started at 9 a.m. and lasted about an hour. LTG Juan Ortuno, COMKFOR, symbolically transferred authority by handing over the Task Force Falcon flag from General Sanchez to General Tieszen. There were a number of dignitaries including LTG James Riley, Commander V Corps, and Ceku, commander of the TMK/ KPC.

In an interview after the TOA ceremony, General Tieszen told the press that peacekeeping comes down to what he referred to as "The Three Fs. Be Fair, Be Firm, and Be Friendly." Tieszen also told the reporters, "It's very important that we be evenhanded and fair. Firm but friendly. And that's what we will do." He was tested a few days later with a riot in Strpce.

At his first BUB the evening of the TOA, General Tieszen provided guidance for the next 30 days. His goals included:

- Setting standards and enforcing them;

- Getting settled into sector and considering TTP adjustments;

- Engaging the population and generating a rapport;

- Reviewing missions and determining what changes were necessary;

- Looking at the quality of life and force protection for remote sites (we had 40);

- Working on systems and processes;

- Developing a personal battle rhythm (read a book and do physical training);

- Maintaining current HQ battle rhythm; and

- Maintaining alertness on safety and security.

The 1st AD team started off with a somewhat internally focused tough-guy attitude that gave the impression that things were going to be a lot different from the 1st ID operation. As a result, there were some tense moments over the following few days and weeks as the new senior level players competed for leadership positions and the new team adjusted to the operational environment. The team building dynamics of storming, forming, and norming were all observed as the new team came together. Since trust and confidence had to be earned, it took some time to integrate existing staff and the new arrivals into the 1st AD team. The most noticeable changes were related to a less stressful battle rhythm and op tempo and, *Iron Soldiers* replaced *Duty First* as the motto of the day.

The battle rhythm of the 1st ID that had been driving headquarters' operations was immediately disrupted with the TOA to the 1st AD. Meetings and events were suddenly not as predicable in terms of when they would occur and how long they would last. There were changes made to the battle rhythm over the next several months that refocused activities, streamlined processes, balanced external with internal requirements, and afforded the staff some down time on Sundays. A 2-week cycle replaced the 1-week of intense activities—for the new battle rhythm, 1 week focused on staff activities related to targeting and the other week on the commanders.

The headquarters' op tempo certainly slowed down, starting on day one—the high activity G3 plans shop essentially closed down in the evening and was quiet even during the daytime hours. As the factions tested the 1st AD team and they became more sensitive to the environment, the team and operation began to stabilize, but this took several weeks. The frequent turnover of commanders and the 6-month unit rotations created significant turbulence and challenges in both the leadership and continuity of operations for KFOR and the MNBs. In the time leading up to my arrival in May 2000, there had been three MNB(E) commanders and before the end of July there would be two more. In Bosnia, it took more than 2 years to see a similar number of commanders for the U.S.-led contingent. The seemingly revolving U.S. command door raised concern on the part of some that maybe careers and administrative requirements were being put above getting the mission accomplished. After all, the Kosovo peacekeeping mission was work in progress and the Army's most important and visible mission at that time.

KFOR and the other MNBs experienced similar cycles of force rotation but not necessarily the same frequency of commander turnovers. There had been three COMKFORs in the first year of operation and a fourth would take over in October 2000. There were also NATO and SHAPE level turnovers in this same timeframe. The Chairman of the NATO Military committee changed in May 1999, the NATO Secretary General changed in October 1999, and then in May 2000 SACEUR changed from Army to Air Force with General Ralston, U.S. Air Force, replacing General Clark, U.S. Army. These represented significant changes from the highest levels of NATO command down to the levels supporting the NATO Balkans operations and the Kosovo deployment in particular.

The rotation of military personnel was a problem in the Multinational Brigades, especially at the tactical level. Civil-military trust relationships earned over time were interrupted every time a new team rotated into the CA/CIMIC, PSYOP, and maneuver units. In MNB(E) the rotations occurred every 6 months. Units such as civil affairs and PSYOP rotations overlapped the maneuver units and this, fortunately, accommodated some continuity of operation. Even here it was necessary to reestablish trust and rebuild the team when new units deployed. Attempts were made to facilitate the transition by reassuring the local leaders and residents nothing would change in the relationships with the shift in personnel. However, opportunities were missed. New civil affairs and PSYOP teams and others such as the MPs and maneuver units had to be careful that they did not get drawn into situations based on locals saying the previous team promised them something or that the military would do it for them. A civil affairs' rule of thumb was to never promise anything.

Joint Implementation Commission

The MNB(E) Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) facilitated communication between the task force commander and the parties in order to ensure overall compliance with the provisions of the MTA and UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 regarding the establishment of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC). LTC Ingram, U.S. Army, and MNB(E) JIC, had a staff of one officer and two specialists first class and a contract translator. He reported to the commander TFF through the Chief of Staff. For movement around the sector he had a Montero SUV and a Humvee with secure communications. He also used Motorola *TalkAbout* handheld radios.

As the JIC, LTC Ingram served as the MNB(E) LNO to the KPC, supervised the activities of the training advisory team to the KPC, monitored KPC-related international agreements and implementation activities in sector, and held meetings with KPC leaders and key staff personnel. For example, in response to the construction of a UCK monument in Kamenica, the JIC worked with the KPC leadership to try to get their support to have it taken down. There were NATO officers with Partnership for Peace and U.S. Army Reserve CA forces that had military-to-military mission experience that could have been ideal consultants to the KPC under JIC guidance. Yet, very few of the former and none of the latter were ever assigned to them. There was no institutional involvement

of KFOR J9 with the KFOR JIC in the conversion of the KLA into a civil emergency preparedness and disaster relief type organization. Likewise, the MNB(E) G5 was not involved either.

The MNB(E) JIC served as Secretariat to the MNB(E) Joint Security Committee and attended and facilitated weekly meetings on sector security with representatives of the international community, including UNMIK. He actively interfaced with the KFOR JIC, TFF battle Commanders, and the MNB(S) and MNB(C) JICs. He had contacts with the UNMIK regional administrator, Gnjilane, UNMIK Police in the Gnjilane region, and with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) offices in Gnjilane and Ferizaj.

In an interview with the former MNB(E) JIC, LTC Wiseman, U.S. Army, before he left, he expressed some concern about the rate at which the UCK was disarmed and UNMIK was trying to transform them into a FEMA like humanitarian assistance organization. His concern related to whether this would work in the long run. After all, the Albanians viewed the TMK/KPC (formerly the UCK/KLA) as the liberators and the KPC viewed themselves as the Army of Kosovo. In spite of the potential problems related to power positioning, the Task Force Falcon commander was trying to work with them, but was firm as well. The stated mission of the KPC, as established by UNMIK, was to be the only multidisciplinary, multiethnic, indigenous emergency service agency in Kosovo. They would react to disasters affecting the population and territory, conduct search and rescue operations, and assist in rebuilding the infrastructure and community. The KPC would also provide assistance to UNMIK and KFOR and perform ceremonial duties such as TMK/KPC leadership (see Figure 3) attendance at the June 2000 MNB(E) TOA. They would not, however, have a role in law enforcement, riot control, counterterrorism, or any other task that involved the upholding of law and order. Members were also not to participate in political activities, hold public office, or actively take part in political affairs.

Figure 3. TMK Leadership

The KPC structure consisted of six regional headquarters, one for each of the five MNB regions and one for the Drenica area, with the headquarters located in Pristina. There were three to five detachments per region and an honor guard and rapid reaction group that would be able to be committed anywhere in Kosovo. The KPC would consist of 5,000 personnel with 3,000 active at any given time. The pay ranged from 150 to 700 DM per month (for a comparison, local hires working at the PX on Camp Bondsteel earned about 650 DM per month). They were allowed 2,000 weapons but no more than 200 could be used at any one time. Ten percent of both active and reserve members had to be comprised of ethnic minorities, but there were no Serbian members in June. On any given day, 75 percent of the KPC members were idle. Typical activities that they were used for included school repairs and renovation, road improvements, water system repairs, city parks and sports field construction, and abandoned car removal.

The demilitarization of the KLA was viewed as one of the major UNMIK and KFOR accomplishments in the first year of Operation Joint Guardian. Few post-war guerrilla armies have agreed to disband and surrender their weapons as the KLA did. Few believe, however, that the KLA's disarmament has been complete. KFOR has found weapons with linkages to former UCK/KLA members that support this observation. In mid-June, KFOR Operation Leatherman in the Malisevo region led to

one bunker containing 67 tons of weapons and explosives and documentation linking them to the KLA.

The KPC also suffered from a chronic lack of international support. It was not included in the regional Kosovo budget and financing was dependent on contributions from a few interested nations. The hand-to-mouth approach did not help maintain the independence of the KPC, some of whose members were suspected of engaging in intimidation and corruption. If the international community wished to resolve the possible corruption problem then it needed to ensure the KPC that the members would be given a decent wage and provided the training and equipment necessary to carry out their assigned mission. It should be noted, however, once Kosovo-wide government structures have been chosen through democratic elections, it will be difficult for the international community to avoid the issue of the formation of an Army in Kosovo and the role of the KPC in this regard.

Some Operational Realities

Maintaining a safe and secure environment was the primary military mission. However, MNB(E)/TFF also assisted with the further development of Kosovo and reestablishment of essential services throughout the U.S. sector. MNB(E) units adopted schools and facilitated spring planting through the delivery of seed, fertilizer, and fuel. Over $3.4 million of Department of Defense (DoD) humanitarian assistance funds were provided to rebuild schools, public utilities, and health care facilities. TFF also coordinated and facilitated the restoration of electrical power and telephone services, especially to the Serbian enclaves. As KFOR's first anniversary approached, MNB(E) began to experience increased ethnic violence in its sector as well as hostilities along its border with Serbia, particularly in the Presevo valley. In spite of these renewed hostilities, TFF continued to support UNMIK, NGOs, and other efforts of international organizations to restore fundamental public services and lay the groundwork for the eventual transfer of functions to the appropriate civil institutions.

One tactic for combating hostilities was the cordon and search operation. These operations were carefully planned and rehearsed before being executed. Each operation had clearly defined objectives and contingency plans. Soldiers reviewed extensive reference material before the operation,

including photographs of people, buildings, and access areas. Search teams needed to be creative since these folks have been hiding weapons for years and were pros at it. Soldiers from other districts conducted cordon and search operations so that the locally stationed units could maintain a good rapport with the civilians. These operations, because they were invasive and disruptive, were followed immediately by resumption of normal operations and by PSYOP and civil affairs team visits. The locals needed to understand that this would be part of the normal way of life if they didn't cooperate— the units would never apologize for a search, and the residents would normally be supportive as long as they saw that it was fair and evenhanded.

TFF faced numerous challenges at the tactical, operational, and even strategic levels in executing its command, control, intelligence, and other support responsibilities. The lack of a clear national and international policy, strategy, and goal for Kosovo complicated the U.S. commander's planning and execution on the ground. Although labeled a brigade, TFF was really operating at a higher level with U.S. division-level augmentation and non-U.S. elements that needed to be integrated into the operation as well. For a number of reasons, the task force was not adequately provisioned (manpower and expertise) to perform the many and varied missions. There was a feeling that peacekeeping deployments tended to depend more on political limitations rather than on an analysis of the requirements for success. Therefore, TFF had to be more creative in using its limited resources to meet its mission responsibilities that in many cases were as, if not more, demanding and complex than those encountered by Task Force Eagle (TFE) in Bosnia.

Proper maps continued to be a problem in spite of NIMA efforts to do better. One creative response to the map problem was the replacement of the military maps with tourist maps. The military maps provided were ill-suited for use in urban operations because of their scale and lack of detail. For example, military maps of Gnjilane only showed the main routes, so the maneuver units and foot patrols had to use tourist maps of the city. Civil affairs helped find some local large-scale maps that showed every street. Topographical maps provided for counter-insurgency operations on MNB(E) borders were also inadequate. Soldiers obtained Serbian maps of the mountains that provided the detail they needed. The absence of grid locations on the substitute maps necessitated the use of GPS receivers by deployed units to provide

accurate position location as they moved about the sector and along the borders.

Kosovo was largely a policing operation for which the military was neither properly trained nor fully equipped to support. MPs were certainly trained for policing skills and civil riot control including the use of non-lethal weapons when approved by COMKFOR. The multinational specialized units, such as the Italian Carabinieri, provided expertise in these areas as well, but organized crime and criminal investigation expertise were still lacking. There was an urgent need for organized crime expertise and the MPs had to teach many of their own people how to be basic investigators. Non-MP military personnel were not trained in crowd control techniques, yet crowd control was often one of the most dangerous duties they had to perform. Training for many of the units occurred after deployment into Kosovo. Riot gear was also not readily available for all units. Some soldiers were supplied with older gear that could not withstand an actual riot control situation, resulting in shattered face and body shields and injury to KFOR soldiers.

In order to restore the local governments, OSCE began registration for an election scheduled for the fall of 2000. Registration facilities were established in both Albanian and Serbian communities, but a boycott severely lowered Serbian participation. Fear of personal safety remained a concern for the Serbs. Registration sites were set up on the border with Serbia, but this did not help. Additionally, many of the Serbs remaining in Kosovo were pensioners who received their monthly payments from the Belgrade government. Threats were made to stop pension payments if they registered, which had an adverse impact on Serbian registration. UNMIK police guarded the registration facilities and no violence was directed against these facilities. For those who did register, the registrants had to provide proof of identity and were then photographed and fingerprinted to produce identity cards.

There was a general feeling that TFF requests for U.S. resources were constantly met with resistance. For example, a longstanding TFF request for a Department of Justice multidiscipline criminal investigation team with European and international organized crime experience was still unanswered at the time I visited. On the other hand, in terms of U.S. ADCON and Title X support, TFF received excellent support from USAREUR and USEUCOM. Additionally, 1 ID and V Corps filled many shortages for short-term resources and staff personnel to tackle key

issues and conduct planning, but these addressed the symptom and not the problem. The fact remained that the expertise that resided within the brigade staff was neither equipped nor experienced enough to tackle the complex strategic and operational issues that MNB(E) had to wrestle with each day. Complicating the situation was the fact that over time, the missions were expanded significantly beyond maintaining a safe and secure environment and included activities such as dismantling organized crime and counterinsurgency operations on its borders. Other MNB(E)/TFF resources were increasingly being diverted to support civil-military assistance activities to fill gaps and shortfalls in UNMIK capabilities and this created additional resource shortages.

The young men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces and the civilian contractor workforce supporting TFF were hard-working, dedicated soldiers and civilians trying to serve their country with dignity and pride. They did so under trying circumstances and sometimes at great personal sacrifice. I was constantly amazed by their accomplishments and I was reminded that nothing was easy to do in Kosovo. Remaining patient and managing expectations became an important part of their daily routine.

CHAPTER XX

Intelligence and Situation Awareness

Larry Wentz

Intelligence

The intelligence setting for KFOR extended beyond the Kosovo and MNB(E) boundaries into the neighboring countries of Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia. In fact, for the U.S. as the sole superpower, intelligence had global implications. The MNB(E)/TFF intelligence team had to cast a wide net, far beyond the theater of operation, to grasp the influences in the area. The boundaries between strategic, operational (theater), and tactical intelligence were not only blurred, but overlapped significantly. Tactical level intelligence was needed at the strategic level and strategic (political) level intelligence was needed at the tactical level. A strategic-tactical level big picture needed to put together to meet the situation and mission awareness needs of the commander on the ground. In fact, total mission awareness had to be pushed not only to the brigade, but to levels of command below brigade as well.

Peace operations intelligence doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures such as those set forth in FM 100-23 and Joint Pub 3-07.3, are maturing but not yet adequate for multinational operations. Military intelligence doctrine focuses on fighting an enemy whose doctrine is known and understood, but for peace operations such as Kosovo, the enemy was not clear. Furthermore, there was no doctrine to target, but rather tendencies that evolved over time. In order to be successful in peace support operations, it is also important to be able to understand the culture you will be involved in, to know who the local decisionmakers are, and to have an understanding of social issues. The military did not have a complete understanding of the cultural aspects at the outset of the operation. Developing an appreciation of

cultural sensitivities continued to be a challenge for each new rotation of forces.

Putting the Kosovo intelligence picture together at the outset of the operation was not an easy task, in spite of the fact that there was a considerable amount of Balkans experience in the U.S. and European intelligence organizations and military commands. For example, the 66th Military Intelligence Team in Europe had analysts that managed target sets on the Balkans daily. This provided critical continuity for U.S. Army intelligence activities in theater, but this was only part of the picture. Overhead imagery did not tell the whole story at the outset of the operation. The military tensions and civil situations in Kosovo, coupled with the speed with which the decision was made to introduce ground forces, precluded conducting a proper reconnaissance of the area or putting intelligence forces on the ground in advance of the major deployment. There were no standard templates for structuring intelligence support for peace operations, so the military had to adapt those used for wartime operations. This also required an intellectual adaptation to the new and complex peace operation environment. The intelligence needs of KFOR and the related coalition reporting procedures, information sharing criteria and methods, and national responsibilities were only broadly addressed. The nature and intensity of a potential threat could change suddenly, so the intelligence resources needed to be flexible enough to aggressively adapt to changing requirements. The intelligence effort needed to be unified through the integration of resources and capabilities across all levels, including the multinational partners as they joined the task force. Sharing and mutual support were key to being able to integrate resources and capabilities into a unified system to satisfy the ever changing needs of the combined operation.

The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) was a continuing process and it took time to properly characterize the overall environment. Early versions of the IPB fell short in their characterizations of the non-military aspects of the environment, such as the ethnic situation of cultural hatred, the socioeconomic situation of clans and organized crime, as well as attitudes among local leaders and civilians towards the foreign military presence. Further complicating the situation was the fact that the front line of the peace operation battlefield was 360 degrees wide.

Strategic guidance and a definition of a clear end state for Kosovo were lacking. Kosovo was a non-traditional intelligence environment that had a heavy emphasis on asymmetric threats and capabilities. In order to accommodate the situation, Task Force Falcon intelligence activities needed to modify traditional U.S. Army intelligence doctrine. Traditionally, operational needs and courses of action determine priority intelligence requirements for decisionmaking by the commander. In Kosovo operations were driven by intelligence that was available. The TFF G2 identified the threats to a safe and secure environment and the commander issued priorities for intelligence collection based on the threat, directives from higher headquarters, and political considerations. The collection manager allocated assets based on the commander's priorities and the intelligence section attempted to fuse the information collected into actionable intelligence.

It was difficult to collect and exploit the full range of information, identify indicators, and provide predictive analysis, especially since TFF operated in a reactive mode. The process required robust intelligence collection and soft analysis capability, which were lacking. There was also a shortfall in predictive analysis, but then this was not surprising since today's U.S. intelligence systems and doctrine favor data collection at the expense of analysis. Furthermore, intelligence system acquisitions are built around platforms. The task force intelligence operation was a difficult job and the non-traditional collection and soft assessment demands exceeded the experience, expertise, and capabilities of the personnel assigned. Since the outset of the operation, the characterization of the complex environment matured to a point where a reasonable understanding of the belligerents and of the non-military aspects of the environment existed as parts of situation awareness. Maintaining the situation awareness and transferring insights across each 6-month rotation of forces was a challenge and the process was not perfect, but did improve.

The MNB(E)/TFF intelligence operation was a challenging round-the-clock, high op tempo activity. They had to be able to collect and conduct traditional hard targeting-based analysis supporting military courses of action related to maintaining a safe and secure environment and countering insurgency activities on MNB(E)s borders. Intelligence also had to be able to collect and conduct softer analysis of the political and local organization intents, economic needs, civil unrest, vigilante and rogue capabilities and intents, election support needs, refugee

movements, international and non-governmental organization activities, revenge violence, civil infrastructure strengths and weaknesses, and organized crime. Further complicating the situation was the fact that intelligence was traditionally collected to answer specific questions about an operation the military had decided to undertake. In Kosovo, intelligence and information were collected in order to determine when, where, and how to act, which was a different approach.

The Task Force Falcon U.S. military maneuver commanders discovered quickly upon arrival that they would need to create their own collection and analysis capabilities to develop a knowledge base which would allow them to take effective action against the belligerents. The initial focus was to collect intelligence against all belligerent parties. Everyone that went outside the compound was considered a collector of intelligence and tasked to do so. Target folders were prepared for key towns, population centers, and organizations and individuals with influence. Information was collected on town leadership, political and economic climate, key establishments, and other demographic, infrastructure and terrain information. Because of the high crime rate in the area, it was necessary to develop criminal intelligence capabilities and integrate the military operations into the law enforcement activities of the UNMIK police. This made it important to also be able to analyze criminal intelligence in relation to the evolving social problems and potential for military actions. The information collected was used to create link and influence diagrams and to perform the soft analysis necessary to identify power bases and to develop an understanding of the life and daily operations within the towns of their area of responsibility.

Police information operations were relatively new for the MPs and it was necessary for them to put a plan together that not only addressed the information flow from inside police channels, but also the flow of information collected from non-police units. The MPs and CID formed a crime-analysis cell that sorted through police reports and cases and performed some critical analysis of the information. The efforts were linked with the battalion S2 and eventually with the ACE at Task Force Falcon headquarters. One of the hardest parts of the operation was collecting the information that the infantry, armor, engineer, and other units received from their daily contacts and patrols. In order to improve information collection, the MPs worked closely with the combat-arms units through daily personal contact, emphasizing that even the most

mundane information could be the missing link in a police investigation. They also provided feedback so the combat arms units could see the fruits of their work. Soldiers worked closely with partner nations, such as the Russians, Greeks, Poles, Ukrainians, Swedes, Canadians, British, Germans, and the UAE to collect information from them and provide feedback as well. Civil affairs and PSYOP teams were used to communicate with the public to help mold attitudes and desired behavior and to inform the community of successes in reducing crime. The MP commanders also participated in local radio shows as a way to get their message to the population. Civil affairs and PSYOP were extremely sensitive to being viewed as an intelligence asset. They consciously maintained an appropriate separation from the intelligence element to preserve their credibility and objectivity.

Many of the criminal, ethnic, and paramilitary relationships were found to extend across the Task Force Falcon sector boundaries into other multinational brigades. The belligerents knew the boundaries and operated across and along them where they perceived a weakness or lack of coordination. Exchange of information between multinational military elements at the tactical level became important and it was necessary to develop special arrangements at the battalion and below levels to do this. Joint operations and patrols were also conducted with the multinational brigade units on TFF boundaries as a way to regularly exchange information and develop shared situation awareness. Active inputs from Special Forces and force protection teams, and passive inputs from PSYOP and civil affairs teams were used to help complete the overall intelligence picture or provide greater focus. Once the commanders had a good understanding of how things worked in their area of responsibility and solid knowledge of the belligerents, their tendencies, their strengths, their weaknesses, and most importantly an understanding of their motivation, they were able to shift the focus to developing actionable intelligence. For the most part, the tactical commanders felt they were able to maintain the focused intelligence picture and to stay out in front of the belligerent forces and maintain a safe and secure environment.

U.S. national and theater level intelligence collection and analysis assets were employed to support MNB(E)/TFF, as well as national purpose-built and tactical collection systems to exploit the non-lethal environment. The Task Force Falcon G2 and the Analysis Control Element (ACE), supported by a National Intelligence Support Team

(NIST) and Special Operations Coordination and Control Element (SOCCE), represented the heart of the Task Force Falcon intelligence operation. There was also access to USAREUR DCSINT, 66th MI, EUCOM J2, the Joint Analysis Center and national-level agencies. Split-base and reach-back secure information networking capabilities provided the ACE and others access to intelligence analysts who have been monitoring and tracking the Balkans over a long period of time.

The Task Force Falcon G2/ACE had access to the KFOR intelligence dissemination systems, as well as daily KFOR and MNB INTSUMs. The non-U.S. elements assigned to MNB(E) provided intelligence inputs and support as well. The U.S. NIC at KFOR headquarters was a small operation relative to the Task Force Falcon G2/ACE/NIST capability. There was some interaction and exchange of information with both the U.S. NIC and the KFOR CJ2, who was an appropriately cleared U.S. military officer. There was some cross-MNB sharing, mainly with Britain, but also with the German and Italian intelligence cells at the Task Force Falcon G2/ACE level. At the battalion and lower levels there was an operational need to share tactical intelligence pertinent to activities along the MNB border areas. There was also close cooperation at the tactical level with the British, French, and Scandinavians on signals intelligence collection and sharing. In this case, NSA was quite cooperative in sharing appropriate U.S. signals intelligence with KFOR and the other MNBs.

The intelligence staff mainly integrated the various stovepiped streams of information coming into the TFF operation. They had access to the information available locally and were the only organization that could effectively weigh the importance and relevance with respect to the capability of the commander on the ground forces and operational intentions and needs. It was important for the MNB(E)/TFF commander to have the ability to perform his own assessment of the situation from all potentially useful sources. These sources included U.S. tactical, theater, strategic and national levels, and multinational sources as well. With today's technological capabilities, there were many varied sources of information at all levels, which required a major effort to integrate and assess at the Task Force Falcon level. Herein lies one of the significant challenges, since the sources of information were largely stovepiped with little integration and processing before being sent to the task force. The amount of information that could be disseminated downward as well as from within the task force's own capabilities was

enormous, which many times overloaded the commander and staff due to the lack of tools and resources to process and analyze the inputs. The problem was not getting information to the commander and his staff, but finding useful data and assembling, analyzing, and packaging the volumes of information into actionable intelligence.

Use of the NIST, which had access to the NSA, the DIA, the CIA, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, provided agency representatives on the ground to prepare products that could be more directly used by the G2/ACE and commanders. Other split-base and reach-back operations were used as well, which was an effective way to obtain access to the breadth and depth of knowledge, skills, tools, and assessments not available locally. The approach did have some limitations, in that the further away the analyst was from the operation, the more diminished his view became of the sense of urgency and true understanding of the situation and commander needs. The use of the NIST-like teams in the theater for short periods of time began to bridge the understanding gap. The Task Force Falcon analysis and control element even found it necessary to send staff into the field for several days at a time to walk patrols and participate in other on the ground operations, so they could better understand the intelligence needs of the organization elements they supported.

COMINT, IMINT, MASINT, HUMINT, ELINT, SIGINT, and OSINT intelligence collection capabilities contributed to TFF intelligence activities. The military intelligence community provided communication systems, such as JWICS and Trojan Spirit II, which were used to extend secure wide band intelligence services into Kosovo supporting both SCI and collateral secure intelligence-oriented information services. The tactical military and commercial communications systems supporting these intelligence related services were operating at the limits of their bandwidth throughput. JWICS provided SCI level Web based access (INTELINK) to intelligence databases and Web sites worldwide. Deployable intelligence workstations such as JDISS and CHATS (CI/HUMINT laptop) provided the ability to access a core set of intelligence databases and applications at all levels of the intelligence structure. JDISS access was, in fact, the tactical link to the rest of the U.S. intelligence world. CHATS gave the CI/HUMINT community a significant capability but teams using it were not fully trained on its software utilities, and thus could not take full advantage of the power of the capabilities offered. Lack of training tended to be true for other

high tech information systems deployed. Some CI/HUMINT teams were using the older TRRIP system (the predecessor to CHATS) that was employed in Bosnia. TRRIP put HUMINT reports in different formats, complicating the database population in the Kosovo operation. This issue is representative of backwards compatibility problems experienced with the introduction of enhanced versions of a fielded capability into an operational environment that employs a mix of both the old and new versions. The tactical military intelligence all source analysis system (ASAS) was deployed, but found to be marginally useful. SIPRNET provided Web based access to the collateral intelligence databases offered by INTELINK-S. The Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal was used to process ELINT data. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), such as Hunter and Predator, were used extensively. The joint broadcast system was used to disseminate UAV video as well as other imagery and information including weather. Intelligence collectors JSTARS, QUICKFIX, and ARL were not used. The U-2s, AWACS, P-3s, RIVET JOINT, RC-135, Guardrail, AR8000, ground surveillance radars, REMBASS, multinational tactical reconnaissance, combat camera, low level voice intercept (LLVI), helicopter gun camera video, and handheld digital cameras were part of the inventory of intelligence collectors available to the Task Force Falcon commanders.

These intelligence systems have been identified in order to give the reader a feel for the breadth and depth of capabilities available to the commander and his staff without a discussion of their specific capabilities and use. The subject of intelligence systems and how they are used to support peace operations would fill a book by itself.

In addition to combat camera and other sources providing visual documentation of special events, almost every soldier had his own digital camera to take pictures and videotape events. The freedom to take pictures had some downside risks, in that sensitive photos could and did show up on Internet Web sites. Sometimes soldiers wanted to share experiences without proper consideration of the force protection and security implications of making the information available to the general public. For example, sensitive pictures of Camp Bondsteel and the helicopter flight line with pictures of the cockpit showed up on a Web site. From an OPSEC point of view, there was a need to sensitize soldiers to which photos they could take with personal cameras and how they were shared with others. This was a problem because there was no policy on picture taking. The more difficult challenge, however,

was integrating, archiving, and cataloging the information collected. Sometimes the documentation supporting the pictures and videos did not clearly indicate the subject and when and where the pictures were taken. It was also a challenge to make others aware of the availability of information such as the "happy snaps" from handheld digital cameras, aerial photos of villages taken from helicopters and the content of videotapes from UAVs, P-3s, gun ship cameras, and handheld cameras. Combat camera units were an exception. After every mission they would post pictures on their Web site for authorized access and they also archived still pictures and videos for other uses as appropriate, e.g., PSYOP used combat camera pictures for posters, newspaper ads, and handouts supporting the MNB(E)/TFF information campaign. The analysis and control element, and other intelligence activities used combat camera photos and videos for assessments and constructed target folders on key people, places and things.

Dissemination of intelligence products was a challenge, especially to the soldier at a remote site in the field who only had a SINCGARS radio. Because of the mountainous terrain it was difficult, and sometimes impossible, for headquarters to maintain voice contact with deployed units. These deployed units made weekly visits to higher headquarters to review the intelligence files. The forward-deployed forces also monitored company and battalion headquarters command radio nets for special intelligence reports. Higher headquarters frequently distributed CD or hard copies of INTSUMs and other information to the forward-deployed units. These were often the only ways to get the information to those who needed it in the field. At remote outposts, such as the Eagle's Nest, a counterinsurgency operation, the platoon leader told me that he got together frequently with his foreign counter parts to conduct joint patrols and share information, in addition to his weekly visits to higher command headquarters for intelligence updates. During a visit to Letnica, there was an U.S. Army platoon monitoring activities in the area. They said they generally got their intelligence updates once a week when visiting company headquarters and they also monitored both company and battalion radio nets for special intelligence alerts.

Deployed units also experienced problems getting timely and reliable information on suspects at road and border checkpoints. Requests for information to the company level were not answered quickly since the suspect databases resided at the battalion level and an additional request

needed to be filed. This process sometimes suffered from the parlor game problem in that requests and subsequent replies were passed by voice from one level to the next with errors introduced, which reduced the value of the information eventually provided to the soldiers.

The U.S. Defense Information System secure data network, referred to as SIPRNET, can now be extended over military tactical communications systems to serve operational units at the tactical level. SIPRNET access was extended to the U.S. battalion level and to the U.S. intelligence support teams collocated with non-U.S. elements, such as the Russian 13th Tactical Group in Kamenica. There was also a U.S. Army signal brigade that provided a contingency operations (CONOPS) tactical communications package that could be deployed on short notice that extended SIPRNET, the non-classified Internet protocol router network (NIPRNET), and secure phone and video teleconference services to support special tactical operations. For example, the CONOPS package was deployed to support the MNB(E) force deployment to Metrovica during the riots. It was also used to extend morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) services to remote outposts such as the Eagle's Nest. Such deployments not only facilitated information support to operations, but also allowed soldiers at remote locations to make phone calls and e-mail home, surf the Internet, view current movie releases, and in some cases to even have a video teleconference with their families at the home station in Germany. The CONOPS package was road transportable and once onsite could be operational in less than 2 hours. While visiting a CONOPS deployment to Eagle's Nest, the platoon leader mentioned that in addition to problems related to getting intelligence to recently deployed units, the U.S. maps provided to him for his area of responsibility were not as good as some Serbian maps he had acquired. Detailed maps have been a continuing problem in operations and NIMA has been constantly trying to improve the maps it makes available to the forces. Release of NIMA maps to non-U.S. elements was a challenge as well. The UNMIK police criminal analysis team in Pristina was trying unsuccessfully to get maps for use in their criminal analysis and profiling activities.

There were some non-U.S. intelligence collection systems that were used in the MNB(E) sector to help with special collection needs. One such system was the Canadian surveillance system COYOTE that was used to monitor smuggling routes and activities in the Presevo Valley. The system was mounted on a military vehicle and had a 30-foot telescopic radar antenna and a video camera with thermal optics

capabilities. The radar had a range of 24 km in good weather and could identify a vehicle at a distance of 7 or 8 km. Using two observation posts, the COYOTE system could cover an arc 20 km long. The video camera had a 20x zoom lens. Anything that penetrated the arc alerted the operator and the COYOTE system would give him the distance, direction, date, and time. With the click of a button the situation could be video recorded or sent in real time to higher headquarters.

The U.S. Army's Hunter UAV was a true workhorse and a valuable asset to the operation. It was used everyday, weather permitting. The aircraft was a giant radio-controlled plane, 23 feet in length, a wingspan of 29 feet, weighed 1,600 pounds, and flew at 10,000 feet with a range of 288 nautical miles or 12 hours in flight. Two pilots, one on the runway and one at a control room at the Skopje military operations base, worked in tandem through various portions of the flight using a remote control and global positioning device. The pilot on the runway visually flew the UAV from take off to 2,000 feet and then upon return from a mission took over for landing. At 2,000 feet the pilot in the control room took over the aircraft for the duration of its mission. One of the key target areas was the Presevo Valley. While on station, a two-person team in Task Force Falcon ACE directed the mission and identified target areas to be covered. A secure military mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) voice link from the analysis and control element to the control room at Skopje was used to communicate with the pilot who guided the UAV. Analysis of the Hunter video was an art, which was handled by a contractor. The contractor did a very good job, but it was a missed opportunity for the military to develop expertise in this area. Mission planning usually took 48 hours but could be adapted while in flight if necessary. During the mission, commanders could watch live video feeds of the terrain via a retractable camera in the belly of the plane.

The video was sent back to a control station at Skopje where it was digitized and entered into the U.S. defense data dissemination system via the DISA provided point of presence access to the DISN. The DISN extended the digitized signal to the joint broadcast system's satellite broadcast injection site in CONUS. This is where the signal was converted to video and disseminated to the commanders involved in the operation anywhere in the world. The Hunter employed a parachute system that would deploy in the event of a malfunction that allowed it to float back to the ground to be recovered. Over hostile territories, the parachute deployment mechanism was disabled so that in the event of a shoot

down or malfunction the aircraft and its equipment would be destroyed upon impact with the ground. While I was in Kosovo, a Hunter UAV was lost due to a malfunction. Although the parachute deployed, the aircraft sustained heavy damage and could not be repaired.

There were problems with some of the surveillance and collection assets that supported ongoing ground operations. The Airborne warning and control systems (AWACS) aircraft flew out of Italian military airbases but after the air war these bases were placed on reduced operations at night and weekends and therefore, the aircraft could only be used during daylight hours and weekdays. This placed limitations on the operational flexibility needed by the ground commander. Additionally, with the resumption of civilian air traffic over the Balkans, AWACS stand off orbits had to be flown over the Adriatic making it difficult to sustain the line of sight communications with the MNB(E) TOC introducing other limitations to its usefulness to the commander. During civil disturbances, the commander needed live video feeds to the TOC. In particular, it would have been desirable to have an on the ground CNN-like live video feed but this was not possible with the capabilities deployed. Helicopter gun cameras and combat camera could videotape and photograph events but the tapes and pictures had to be taken back to the TOC for use by the commander and his staff. Platforms such as the UAVs and P-3s could provide live aerial video with a zoom capability but these too had some operational flexibility limitations.

The MNB(E) commander could task the U.S. Air Force Predator UAV, which was flown out of Tuzla, Bosnia, but he had to compete with SFOR and MND(N) priorities for its use. Needless to say, the commander MNB(E) priority was frequently not high on the list for the use of this limited availability, high demand asset. There were also weather differences between Kosovo and Bosnia that limited the operational flexibility of its use. There were times when the Predator could not be launched due to bad weather in Bosnia even though the weather in Kosovo was fine. The U.S. Army Hunter UAV was brought into the Kosovo operation specifically to help meet MNB(E) surveillance needs and to provide the commander some added operational flexibility to accommodate rapidly changing needs. Hunter was flown out of Skopje, Macedonia international airport. This had an unintended OPSEC consequence in that the Hunter takeoffs and landings had to be operationally coordinated with the Macedonian civil air traffic control. During the winter months, wing icing prevented both Predator and

Hunter from flying. P-3s equipped with video cameras replaced the UAVs during this period and the UAVs were sent back to their home bases for refurbishment and upgrades. Force protection concerns required the P-3s to be flown at higher altitudes than normal and this affected the quality of the video and usefulness to the ground component commander. Both the U.S. and Dutch P-3s were used. The initial use of the Dutch P-3 uncovered an interoperability problem caused by the use of different standards for video. The problem was resolved by simply using a commercially available U.S. and European standards compatible video display system. Neither the P-3 or helicopter gun cameras provided as good quality video as the UAVs systems.

A key source of intelligence in peace operations is human intelligence (HUMINT), and Kosovo was a HUMINT intense environment in which everyone became a collector. This placed a real challenge on the Task Force Falcon G2X who coordinated the task force's HUMINT activities and on the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC), which integrated national and tactical level HUMINT. They were both required to deconflict collection activities, integrate disparate inputs from both traditional and non-traditional HUMINT collectors, and then analyze, archive and disseminate findings. There were situations where HUMINT, civil affairs, PSYOP, and the MSU were talking to the same person or persons that threatened their confidentiality and viability as a source. Death threats were made to people who were willingly seen working with KFOR soldiers, so in many cases these people refused to deal with KFOR or U.S. soldiers. Public approval of KFOR often varied widely between the Albanian and Serbian communities and depended on recent regional events. This required constant monitoring to detect changing situations, attitudes, and potential problems. The G2X chaired a weekly HUMINT coordination meeting with the commander, G2, G3, and all of the players conducting HUMINT related activities. The purpose was to have each element discuss its current and planned activities in order to deconflict efforts and seek commander guidance where necessary. Although invited, PSYOP did not always attend since they were very sensitive to being perceived as HUMINT collectors.

There were some concerns about several of the key U.S. CI/HUMINT leadership positions. The U.S. military felt that a CI/HUMINT officer familiar with USAREUR procedures should fill the G2X position and that the U.S. Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) should fill the HOC position. At the time I was in country, the DHS chief filled both

positions. There was also a U.S. Task Force CI Coordinating Activity (TFCICA) leadership position that was unfilled. Requests to USAREUR to provide U.S. Army CI/HUMINT officers to fill both the G2X and TFCICA positions were outstanding. There were other HUMINT operations concerns. The NATO ARRC had the Allied MI Battalion (AMIB) to support HUMINT collection needs at the outset of the KFOR operation but this capability went away when LANDCENT took over command of KFOR and was not replaced by subsequent commands such as EUROCORPS who led KFOR when I was there. There were non-U.S. collectors such as the MSU (Italians), British, Swedes, and Dutch who were very good at CI/HUMINT operations but these combined capabilities were not being fully exploited by MNB(E) or KFOR operations. In regard to the MSU unit assigned to MNB(E), there was an exchange of information but there were also coordination and collaboration conflicts in areas were their efforts and similar U.S. efforts were operating. Since Task Force Falcon intelligence operations were essentially U.S. only and the use of the MSU was unclear, they were not integrated into the intelligence operation as effectively as they might have been in a truly combined operation.

The military police criminal investigation division (MP-CID) recognized the need to collect information from non-traditional sources including the combat-arms units. They found at the outset that it was difficult to collect from these units but over time they were able to gain the level of cooperation needed. The MP-CID established a crime analysis cell that sorted through police reports and conducted some analysis of critical information. Over time, crime analysis cell assessments were provided to the ACE intelligence operations. Generally speaking, there was a need for the military intelligence activities to more effectively exploit non-military and non-traditional sources that supported the overall operation. These sources had insights and direct contacts with the local populace and leaders and organizations that were of interest to the military intelligence activities. The reluctance to exploit non-traditional sources appeared to be a military intelligence culture and trust issue that seemed to be driven by war fighting oriented doctrine and training that did not adequately address the needs of military support to peace operations.

As noted earlier, the relationship between CA/CIMIC and intelligence was highly sensitive, yet for peace support operations a relationship is necessary. There have been U.S. and NATO discussions about the role

of CA/CIMIC in support of intelligence operations but there was no doctrine on how they could or should support them. Certainly there were insights that they could provide through information they obtained about political-military situations, persons of interest, ethnic minority abuses, and rule of law and anticrime operations. Civil affairs was making progress in its effort to earn an appropriate role in support of the Task Force Falcon intelligence team. The civil affairs teams provided the G2/ACE information regarding NGOs, village assessments, key leaders, economics, and demographics. LTC Beard referred to his civil affairs team as information warriors. Over time they became more of a part of the intelligence team because of their on-the-ground insights.

PSYOP responses to task force priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information requests (IR) were communicated through their daily situation reports, although they were a passive intelligence collector. Combat camera units were players on the intelligence team and were active participants in covering special situations and events in conjunction with PSYOP. They supported quick reaction forces (QRF) and deployed to support coverage of events such as the construction of a UCK monument in Kamenica and local manifestations celebrating the first anniversary of the liberation of Kosovo by the UCK and KFOR.

In the field, good cooperation was observed among Special Forces, civil affairs, PSYOP, and HUMINT teams as well as with other military units, such as the maneuver battalions and MPs. The MSU, although not fully exploited by the task force, provided useful inputs in their areas of expertise including organized crime, counterterrorism, corruption, and smuggling. Some open source information was shared with OSCE, which conducted open source monitoring of the media, but this was not a proactive two-way link between MNB(E) and OSCE. Some criminal intelligence was shared between the military and the UNMIK police but other military dealings with non-military organizations were much more cautious. There was a military need to verify by other means the information provided by them and there was a concern about how they would protect and use the information given to them. Sanitized security and safety information was provided to non-military organizations and the local population through meetings such as the regional and municipal joint security meetings chaired by the military with UNMIK, NGOs, and Serbian and Albanian participants. The civil affairs information centers located in the major towns of the MNB(E) sector were also used to provide information to the local

population. KFOR shared sensitive information with UNMIK at the COMKFOR and SRSG level and with some key staff elements such as UNMIK police. KFOR provided regional security and safety information to the humanitarian community information center that shared it openly with whoever needed it.

The task force OSINT capability was inadequately staffed and, like Bosnia, continued to be a challenge for the military. There were four translators (three Albanians and one Serbian) on Camp Bondsteel, but only one was a CAT II with a U.S. clearance. Camp Montieth had three translators (two Albanians and one Serbian). At Montieth they monitored Gnjilane radio and at Bondsteel they reviewed print material and tapes of radio broadcasts. *The Daily Falcon*, an open source newsletter, was produced from open source material and provided the task force a wealth of information. It was readily available in both soft and hard copy. The 66th MI produced the *Cloak and Dagger,* but this was a classified report and only accessible on the SIPRNET and focused mainly on Serbia. Access to the Foreign Broadcast Information Service was finally provided for the MNB(E) analysis and control element in June of 2000. The OSCE also produced daily reports and weekly summaries of its media monitoring activities and these were available in soft and hard copy as well. The OSCE monitored Albanian and Serbian print media, radio and TV and maintained an extensive database. However, the MNB(E) analysis and control element was not yet adequately connected with this source of open information collection and assessments. There were also over 50 Web sites that were searched daily by MNB(E) staff. Lack of resources limited cross-MNB and KFOR OSINT collaboration and sharing.

The modernization of intelligence collection and dissemination systems focused on building bigger pipes to get more information to lower levels more quickly. They had fallen short in providing more useful information to lower levels and this combination put the commander and his staff in the field in information overload. There was an expressed need for improved fusion and more analytical support to help get the information in a form that the commander could use to support his decisionmaking. In MNB(E), the stovepiped approach even extended to the daily intelligence briefings for the commander. When first attending the morning intelligence briefings, each organization element involved in some form of intelligence collection and assessment separately briefed its input for the day. As a result, the TFF commander

frequently became the integrator of information and in turn performed his own version of predictive analysis on the spot. He then generated courses of action and crafted intelligence requirements that drove near-term collection activities. Hence, subsequent daily intelligence briefings often became overly focused on answering previous questions of the commander. When LTC Greco, U.S. Army, arrived in June as the new Task Force Falcon G2, he made the ACE team chief responsible for the morning brief in order to provide one voice and overall assessment for the commander. However, since SOCCE reported directly to the commander organizationally, their briefing was separate from the ACE and sometimes there would be disagreements in assessments. These issues were not necessarily bad, but in some cases they could have been settled before briefing the commander. There were also some disconnects related to intelligence collection and mission planning that could have benefited from improved collaboration and coordination. The new G2/ACE approach was certainly far better than the earlier stovepiped briefings. Measures and processes were introduced to improve the fusing of information and to conduct predictive analysis to give the commander a big picture assessment and actionable intelligence for more coherent decisionmaking.

Adapting the task force's collection and analysis capabilities to meet their operational needs was a major challenge. The brigade intelligence operation was functioning as a division or higher level for intelligence operations, but not staffed or equipped to do so. Staff members generally were not senior intelligence officers with division level experience and did not possess the broad set of analytical skills, linguistic skills, or specialized knowledge to do the complete range of soft analysis needed. Furthermore, the military-oriented collection processes and capabilities had to be adapted to meet the asymmetrical threat challenges of ethnic violence, terrorism, and organized crime. They had to conduct surveillance in urban areas and exploit unconventional communications such as commercial radios, cellular phones and ham radios. Exceptions to force protection policies were necessary to facilitate field HUMINT team (FHT) collection activities. FHTs could consume local beverages and food and visit shops, cafés, and business establishments. They could also remove flack vests and Kevlar helmets during meetings with locals. SOCCE personnel were exempt from the force protection polices and wore BDUs without name and rank patches while walking around the towns and villages and some lived in safe houses in the communities where they were operating. Non-traditional databases such as

KRYPTON and archives had to be created to address needs such as individual profiles, ethnicity profiles, criminal activities, organization profiles, detainee profiles, and documentation of acts of ethnic violence. The limitations of performing soft analysis meant it was easier to analyze what happened rather than predict what might happen. LTC Greco was able to make some improvements in the task force focus on predictive analysis and introduced some strategic and big picture thinking and analysis.

Information sharing was not a natural proclivity for many of the multinational military and civil organizations and actors involved in the Kosovo operation. Military intelligence organizations were not accustomed to sharing with international and NGO organizations and vice versa. There were suspicions of intent on both sides. NGOs were concerned about maintaining impartiality and tended to keep the military at arm's length. For operational security reasons, there was reluctance on the part of the military to share time-sensitive operational information with anyone, especially multinational political bodies such as the U.N. and NATO headquarters. This was most visible during the air war where SHAPE was reluctant to share information with NATO headquarters and others outside of the direct military chain of command. Information coordination centers had to be established to facilitate sharing with groups such as NATO. In Kosovo, KFOR and the MNBs created information centers to facilitate information sharing with NGOs and international organizations.

For military to military sharing, strict need-to-know rules were applied. Fears that data would be misused or that databases might contain inaccuracies prevented more open exchanges. Not all nations in the military coalition were treated as equals and many partners in the Kosovo operation were former enemies in the Cold War, so differing restrictions were placed on sharing sensitive information with them as well. There was a need for the Western nations to learn how to make better use of the military intelligence and cultural insights that these former enemies brought to the table in support of the coalition peace operation. There were also other non-NATO troop committing nations that had capabilities KFOR and the MNBs could have used more effectively.

No matter how dedicated each nation was to the overall cause, there was a tendency to protect intelligence capabilities, to control what tasks they performed and to control sharing and dissemination of their

products. Needless to say, intelligence sharing in a combined operation continued to be a major challenge. There were a number of obstacles that impacted KFOR and MNB operations, such as a lack of accurate, consistent and timely intelligence, redundancy and wasted efforts, and a lack of experienced and trained KFOR CJ2 intelligence staff. There were also problems related to cooperation, coordination, collaboration, and sharing to leverage and exploit all of the multinational capabilities employed in support of KFOR and the MNBs. For example, there was little obvious KFOR and cross-MNB collaboration to exploit the combined capabilities of the U.S., Norway, Sweden, and British EW strengths and the U.S., MSU (Italians), British, Swedish, and Dutch CI/HUMINT capabilities. MNB(E) was able to achieve some signals intelligence collection collaboration among the U.S., UK, French, Norwegians and Swedes. The U.S., British, French, and German UAV capabilities were not shared nor were they leveraged in combined operations or to fill gaps in operational needs. Some UAV videos and pictures were shared, but not in real time or as a combined operation.

NATO policy directs member nations to provide intelligence to NATO as a national requirement and NATO assembles, classifies, and disseminates the processed intelligence to authorized users. An unintended consequence of this policy as it applied to the KFOR operation was that NATO not only required the participating member nations to provide the intelligence but they also required them to provide the communications to deliver it to KFOR headquarters as well. In this case, the nations provided intelligence though the national intelligence cells (NIC) collocated with KFOR headquarters and through the MNB lead nation provided intelligence operations. In both cases, there were no NATO communications requirements for intelligence connectivity to support these operations. Under the ground rules, they were considered national activities. Since NATO policy does not allow use of its communication systems to support national requirements, the nations had to provide their own intelligence communications connectivity to deliver intelligence to KFOR.

There were several key players involved in the KFOR and MNB combined intelligence operation:

- First, there was the international, fully integrated combined headquarters intelligence staff of the KFOR CJ2 organization element. The CJ2 organization was not, however, modeled after

an existing headquarters staff so it did not have a national design and established procedures. The organization and procedures used were developed for the KFOR operation. The staff was contributed by nations in accordance with internationally allocated billets and therefore, was not a trained and experienced intelligence operation. The senior intelligence officer (CJ2) was a U.S. military officer. The staffs filling the KFOR CJ2 deputies and subordinate positions were well representative of the NATO allied nations. The senior U.S. presence assured support from the extensive U.S. intelligence capabilities. The intelligence staff assumed an allied flavor and generally did not reflect national views, but did reflect the needs of the combined forces commander.

- Second, a number of National Intelligence Cells (NICs) were established and collocated at KFOR headquarters to contribute national intelligence to the KFOR commander through his CJ2 and intelligence staff. The major contributing nations were the U.S., UK, Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy. The U.S. NIC provided intelligence support to KFOR mainly through briefings to the KFOR CJ2 and the U.S. Deputy Commander KFOR, both of whom were special access cleared U.S. military officers. Weekly NIC meetings were held among the key players, but the reality was that many of the NICs absorbed more information for their home audience than they contributed to the KFOR operation.

- Third, the U.S. NIC at KFOR was a combination of a Theater Intelligence Support Team that was essentially a field extension of the EUCOM J2 and the Joint Analysis Center at Molesworth, England and a small National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). The U.S. national intelligence agencies were represented through the NIST. The NIST had access to the direct feed of raw collection from U.S. national level sources that provided information releasable at the KFOR combined operations level for selected categories (e.g., imagery, SIGINT and OSINT material). There was a slight problem in that the U.S. national level agencies tended to write their reports at the highest U.S. classification level and then upon request would decompartment to coalition releasable. Think and do combined operations is an intelligence culture change yet to be realized. A role the NIST

served was as a direct link for rapid and responsive decompartmenting of U.S. high-level intelligence for release to KFOR CJ2 and selected allies.

- Forth, the intelligence staffs (G2) of the five multinational brigades, who were the principal subordinates of the combined forces commander under the combined headquarters, provided KFOR releasable intelligence to the KFOR CJ2 through daily intelligence summaries and other inputs as deemed appropriate. These staffs generally wore national hats and therefore, were at times reluctant to share certain intelligence not only with their coalition force superiors but also with officers from their own nation who were occupying higher level positions in the coalition structure. One needed to be reminded every now and then that the intelligence operations were nationally driven and controlled not KFOR driven, as a true combined operation would be conducted.

The KFOR dissemination capability supporting intelligence sharing consisted mainly of three independent secure information networks and the NATO provided STU-IIIB secure voice capability that used the KFOR common user voice switched network referred to as the KPN. The KFOR information networks consisted of: the CRONOS network, a NATO Secret level operations and intelligence information system that provided access to NATO intelligence applications and databases; the LOCE network, a NATO Secret level intelligence dissemination system that provided access to imagery and other intelligence stored on a releasable to NATO server at the U.S. Joint Analysis Center in Molesworth, England; and the KFOR Secret Network (KSN), a KFOR releasable information system that allowed access to NATO member military elements and some of the non-NATO member military elements supporting the KFOR operation. Therefore, at best the de facto KFOR intelligence system architecture was a federated network of stovepiped NATO and national systems that for NATO and national security policy reasons were not interconnected. Hence, exchange of information was essentially by hard copy and "sneaker net" soft copy. NATO had no direct access to the national intelligence systems other than through persons with access to special information sharing arrangements with the KFOR NICs and access to nationals manning the NATO provided CRONOS and LOCE network workstations that were located in the MNB operations and intelligence centers.

Special classifications and storage and release procedures had to be established by NATO for use by the coalition forces. In the theater of operation, there were multiple classifications: national releasable intelligence, RELNATO for members of the NATO alliance, and RELKFOR for certain contributing nations. There were differences in NATO and national doctrine and disclosure rules and not all nations of the coalition were treated equally. For the U.S., there were strategic and operational level foreign disclosure restrictions that limited the tactical level's ability to share certain information with selected nations. Even within these levels there were different bilateral arrangements for sharing among authorized nations. There were even more strict release procedures for international organizations such as UNMIK and UNMIK police, the non-NATO troop committing nations assigned to KFOR, and the NGOs that resulted in limited sharing of information with many of them.

National differences also adversely influenced sharing. The British and French tended to be very need to know oriented and kept others at arm's length. The U.S., as the dominant player in reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence, was viewed as being even more insular and to some extent, even arrogant. The U.S. feeling that they had a better view of situation awareness than anyone else did not foster in MNB(E) a need to proactively share with KFOR CJ2 and other MNB G2s, especially since they received less information than they provided. Additionally, the U.S. NIC at KFOR had access to the same national and theater level information that was available at MNB(E). A difference was that they did not have an analysis and control element to exploit intelligence onsite. However, the U.S. NIC/NIST at KFOR did have the ability to release sensitive intelligence that essentially gave the KFOR CJ2 and some allies access to most things that the MNB(E) G2/ACE had. There was also the feeling that KFOR CJ2 really had little more to offer than some occasional details from other sectors. In spite of a seemingly unwillingness on the part of the U.S. to more openly share, MNB(E) did share selected U.S. source intelligence with the KFOR CJ2 and the other MNB G2s. The MNB(E) G2/ACE on occasion provided SIGINT, EW, and CI/HUMINT summaries and imagery. They also shared operations specific information bilaterally with the British, Germans, and Italians.

The daily KFOR INTSUM was essentially a summary of intelligence provided by the NICs and the MNB G2s. There was some added input

from the CJ2 staff sources and analysis related to KFOR special interest areas. The daily INTSUMs produced and disseminated by KFOR and the MNBs was the primary source of shared intelligence. Otherwise, there appeared to be little other active sharing among the MNB G2s. The lack of more extensive intelligence sharing may be simply due to the fact that the five nationally-led sectors were essentially set up as independent operations except for cross-boundary operations where there was a select need to share. On the other hand, the absence of an operations and systems architectures for KFOR intelligence may have been more of a contributor and was the likely reason for the intelligence disconnects and unnecessary duplication of effort across KFOR and the MNBs.

The U.S. communications security policy does not permit NATO classified information to be sent directly over U.S. secure communications systems. Additionally, most of the U.S. special security facilities used by intelligence personnel do not have direct access to the NATO dissemination systems. Thus, there were problems in getting time sensitive NATO classified information to U.S. intelligence analysts in these facilities, especially those located in the United States. The U.S. intelligence producers also persisted in using U.S.-only classification and secure information systems to disseminate intelligence releasable to NATO. During the air war over Serbia, this problem was exacerbated to the point that U.S. personnel had to print out NATO releasable material from the U.S. system, digitally scan the paper product, reclassify it for release to NATO and insert the product into the NATO dissemination system.

In the KFOR operation, there were other factors that worked against U.S. intelligence personnel using the NATO systems, most notably were lack of familiarity and accessibility. MNB(E) intelligence was essentially a U.S.-only driven operation and the personnel were trained on and accustom to using U.S. systems to conduct operations. The NATO systems were new to them and they were not that familiar with the capabilities offered and hence, reluctant to use them. As a result, the NATO systems were essentially used for secure e-mail and to exchange the daily INTSUMs with KFOR and the other MNBs. There was a LOCE terminal in the TFF ACE but maintenance and crypto problems resulted in the staff not relying on its use. Besides, the U.S. systems available to the ACE personnel not only offered access to

similar information but access to more extensive intelligence databases and analyses.

NATO provided the MNB(E) headquarters with KPN voice network access and STU-IIBs for secure voice and secure information network access and two CRONOS workstations and a KSN workstation. One CRONOS workstation was located in the TFF ACE and the other in the G4 area of the TOC. The KSN workstation was located in the G3 plans area and many of the staff did not know that it existed or what it was used for. This was true of the KPN access as well. It was referred to as the white phone that rang every now and then but no one was sure what it was to be used for. Three workstations were not enough to provide the operational access necessary for more extensive use of the NATO capabilities by the intelligence and operations staff. They were physically located in different areas of the TOC and not where the duty staff would normally be working further limiting there operational utility. The workstations located in the ACE introduced an additional restriction in that the ACE was a special security facility with access limited to appropriately cleared personnel so this significantly reduced the availability of workstation access to a broader set of likely users such as civil affairs and PSYOP staff. Another factor influencing the lack of use of the NATO provided capabilities was the MNB(E) operations and intelligence staffs were physical separated in different buildings within the TOC compound. If there had been an integrated MNB(E) combined ops-intel cell, then the CRONOS, LOCE, KSN, and KPN terminals could have been physically collocated enhancing their utility to the overall operation. The fact that the NATO capability was not extended to the tactical units also limited its accessibility and usefulness to battalion ops-intel staff.

The U.S. procedures for sharing with NATO and non-NATO nations were cumbersome as well. Downgrading the classification of U.S. national products before they could be shared was problematic. Analysis Control Teams (ACTs) composed of several military intelligence analysts with appropriate language skills were used by MNB(E) and placed with multinational partners assigned to MNB(E) to facilitate intelligence sharing with them. Maneuver and tenant units, such as civil affairs and MPs, also used ACTs for intelligence support and as a liaison to the Task Force Falcon analysis and control element. Although ACTs helped, it was not a totally satisfactory solution. The Task Force Falcon G2 and KFOR CJ2 were both U.S. Army officers and

had a good personal working relationship, which facilitated intelligence sharing between KFOR and MNB(E). Since the U.S. NIC and its national intelligence support team at KFOR were authorized to release U.S. information to KFOR, they became a useful vehicle for getting certain sensitive U.S. information released to KFOR CJ2 and certain allies.

Intelligence sharing within U.S. elements of Task Force Falcon was a challenge as well. Information sharing and coordination disconnects existed between almost every level. The G2X had problems deconflicting the HUMINT collection efforts. There were a number of initiatives aimed at improving intelligence sharing and bridging disconnects. Weekly G2/ACE SCI-level video teleconferences were held with USAREUR and the JAC. The NIST held weekly video teleconferences with the Balkans Task Force. Brigade G2 and battalion S2 conferences were held twice a month. The S2s visited the ACE and the TFF G2 visited different battalions each week. ACE personnel were sent into the field for several days at a time to get a firsthand understanding of the environment and needs at the lower levels. SIPRNET connectivity was extended to battalions and this gave them direct access to various databases and intelligence Web sites. Databases were also put on CDs and sent to lower levels, such as battalion command posts. The ACTs had SIPRNET access and these teams, where necessary, translated the releasable intelligence from SIPRNET sources into the language of the nation being supported. This was particularly true for the Russians who had few English-speaking officers. The U.S. team located with the Russians not only translated releasable intelligence into Russian, but news stories from the Internet that related to Chechnya were translated as well. The Russian units in Kosovo were from the Chechnya operation and many would be returning to that operation at the completion of their Kosovo tour.

Translators and Interpreters

The U.S. military did not have enough Albanian and Serbian translators to fill the needs of their elements interacting with the local Albanian and Serbian population. There was a need for translators with military clearances and accesses. CAT-II and CAT-III linguists were required for sensitive and classified missions such as those conducted by SOCCE, HUMINT teams, SIGINT collectors, and other special intelligence operations. The CAT-II and CAT-III interpreters required

additional qualifications such as written language proficiencies. If they were used for interrogations then they needed to be emotionally suited to work in that environment. For electronic warfare operations, they needed to be able to translate and comprehend the discussion quickly without time to review recordings or notes. They also needed to be willing to work long hours under field conditions for multiple days. The CAT-II and CAT-III linguists were in short supply and were stretched between the Kosovo and Bosnia operations. Fluent bilingual interpreters were also hard to find. Most American interpreters did not speak both Albanian and Serbian. Because of the short supply of good interpreters, there was a tendency for U.S. elements to get attached to a particular translator and resist release for their use elsewhere.

It was necessary to contract linguist support. TRW was the contractor who provided interpreters from a pool of U.S. contracted and local hires. Many of the local linguists had little or no background in the military and initially had difficulties translating military jargon. Because of the deep-rooted ethnic hatred, there were problems with Albanians translating in Serbian areas and vise versa. The fact that most Albanians could speak Serbian did not necessarily make them suitable for interaction with the Serbian communities. Interpreters are cultural liaison agents. Besides the language, a lack of trust and ethnic tension were key factors. Even American born translators exhibited biases. Both ethnic groups could tell the ethnicity difference immediately and this could provoke heated reactions such as cursing and spitting at the interpreter. Many times the Albanian interpreters would say they were from Macedonia. Names, however, were revealing since they could identify the area or town or clan from which the individual came from. It was also necessary to be aware that sometimes interpreters would interpret and not translate. At times they would put their own spin or political slant on the translation. Many others were not fluent in the language they were translating and could not interpret properly. On one particular civil affairs visit to Kamenica, it became clear that the Albanian interpreter was having trouble translating into Serbian, so the civil affairs officer stopped the meeting and told the church leaders that they would come back at another time.

Elements such as civil affairs had to mainly rely on local hire (CAT-I) interpreters to support their missions. The CAT-I interpreter contracts strictly required them to only be able to provide interpreter support and not offer social, religious or cultural insights to the teams. However,

without the institutional knowledge of Kosovo, teams often solicited such information and many of the interpreters welcomed the opportunity to educate and explain the many cultural and social aspects of their society. Nevertheless, it had to be remembered that the local interpreter's first loyalty was to his or her country, not the United States. Since the United States forces needed interpreters to support them, those hires that were detrimental to the missions would have normally been replaced. However, that did not frequently happen because interpreters were in such short supply.

Force Protection and OPSEC

After a year of military presence, the operational environment was reasonably stable. There were fewer incidents of attacks against KFOR soldiers and facilities. Soldiers came into more frequent contact with locals as patrols of towns and villages increased and civil affairs and PSYOP teams actively engaged local businesses, civil government organizations, and the local population in general. More locals were out and about on the streets and attending the weekly markets. There were concerns by some that the reduced level of violence might lead to complacency and a relaxation in the security posture of the military but the commander MNB(E) continued to be concerned about the high target value and threat to American soldiers. Thus, strict force protection rules remained in effect for movements off base in the MNB(E) sector. Travel off base required two-vehicle convoys, two-shooters per vehicle, flack vests, Kevlar helmets, and locked and loaded weapons. Soldiers were not generally allowed to consume local food or beverages or purchase things from local shops, cafes, and business establishments. It was felt by many in the field that the flack vests, helmets, and weapons intimidated local civilians and was awkward and disruptive in small offices and other areas where the teams came in contact with the locals. Some relaxation of the rules were being enacted for forces such as field HUMINT, civil affairs, and PSYOP teams who dealt with the local people everyday. One was constantly reminded, however, that in Kosovo the situation could and did change at a moment's notice. As a result, force protection, as well as OPSEC, continued to be a challenge that needed to be assessed and managed carefully by the military.

Although force protection was not a mission it has become one, as the U.S. military has become overly risk adverse for peace support operations. The reason for this seemed to be largely political and driven by the view that such operations can and should be bloodless. This was certainly the view of our allies (especially the British) regarding U.S. force protection measures. Some U.S. field commanders expressed concern that if the U.S. continued to pursue this philosophy, we might breed a generation of military leaders that may not make the tough decisions when it comes to putting soldiers in harm's way. A number of commanders also expressed the belief that approval authority for many activities was being retained at too high a command level. For example, assessing and managing risk to his forces is a fundamental task of any combat commander. The task force conducted a continuous and extensive intelligence and risk analysis to anticipate problems before they occurred and to take reasonable precautions in allocating forces and tasks in order to minimize the risk to the soldiers while still executing the mission. It was important that the soldiers were seen as a force that was professional, impartial and highly capable so that it gained the trust and confidence of the population it was there to protect.

Unsecured communications became an OPSEC problem with the pervasive use of commercially purchased handheld radios such as the Motorola *TalkAbout* sports radios. They were used for convoy communications, for dismounted operations and as on base communications. Military tactical radios also had to be operated in the clear mode in order to over come an interoperability problem that precluded secure communications with non-U.S. forces in the MNB(E) sector. This was the case for cross-MNB border communications for operations such as joint patrols as well. There were also cases where MNB(E) soldiers were in tactical pursuit of civilian vehicles about to cross the border had to notify check points on the other side using non-secure communications. There were still numerous international and local radio, TV, and print journalist questioning soldiers in the field. The Serbian press showed up at demonstrations in Serbian communities, filmed the activities and interviewed locals. In one incident I witnessed in Strpce, they interviewed one of the KFOR interpreters. Incidents of photographing U.S. facilities and soldiers were on the rise. A large number of local hires worked on Camp Bondsteel and Camp Montieth and also populated the interpreter force and their activities needed to be closely monitored, including security screening before being hired by the contractors Brown and Root and TRW.

The forces in the field had to constantly be aware of the complexity of the environment. Serbs were reluctant to talk. Albanians were more willing, but often lied. The Albanians wanted conflict to exist between KFOR and the Serbs, while the Serbs seemed to want the chaos to continue. Both ethnic groups were known to be good at human intelligence, propaganda and intercepting communications traffic. Radios tuned to KFOR frequencies and weapons were found during cordon and search operations. The weapons usually found were the basic Kosovo home defense package that consisted of an AK-47, 300 rounds of ammo and a hand grenade but some times large caches of weapons were found as well. It was known that Albanian and Serbian intelligence services and organized crime contacted the local Albanians and Serbs hired by KFOR so monitoring these activities was a major challenge for the counter intelligence teams. Propaganda was being published in local newspapers and broadcast on local Kosovo radio stations. Since there were no Serbian newspaper publishers in Kosovo, Serbian language newspapers came from Serbia and as expected, contained propaganda as well. An aerial photograph of Camp Bondsteel even showed up in a Serbian newspaper. The OSCE monitored the media for abuses and UNMIK had policies in place against misuse of the media and took actions to shut down newspapers and radio stations that violated its policies.

The variety of Albanian and Serbian activities employed against KFOR and its mission presented MNB(E) with continuous force protection, intelligence and counter intelligence challenges. The Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability Assessment team was used to help baseline the force protection posture of MNB(E), identify weaknesses and develop recommendations for improvements. MNB(E) established a force protection working group to manage the resolution of outstanding deficiencies. There were other physical security, COMSEC, INFOSEC, and OPSEC analysis done to assess vulnerabilities and develop initiatives to improve the security posture of the task force and raise the awareness of the importance of using proper security procedures. Force protection and OPSEC were a common theme of the commander at the daily battle update briefings.

Special Operations Forces Liaison Elements

While on a visit with the Vitina civil affairs tactical support team, I had the opportunity to meet with two of the Special Forces liaison team

members and their interpreter, who was a CAT-II interpreter from New York City. We met at Sam's Pizzeria on the main street in Vitina across from the UNMIK police headquarters. Ironically, Sam's did not serve pizza and was well known to be a front for organized crime. The café was undergoing construction to include a very nice restaurant area. The commercial power was off, a regular occurrence in Kosovo, when we sat down to have a cappuccino. There were a number of suspicious locals sitting near us trying to listen to what we were saying. While sitting in the café having a discussion, a truck pulled up and delivered a portable power generator. Shortly thereafter we were served a freshly made cappuccino.

The purpose of the get together was to learn a little more about the things SOF elements do in support of peace operations. The teams lived in a safe house (with appropriate force protection) in town and spent a lot of time walking around town talking to business people, town leaders and the general public. They did not come under the TFF force protection rules, so they wore BDUs with no name, rank or other identity patches and drove Pedjero SUVs. As they put it, "if you want to know what's going on then you need to get downtown and talk to the people." SOF's purpose was to observe, meet, and develop contacts and trust relationships in order to build a better understanding about what was happening in the area. They spent time in cafés and ate in local restaurants talking with various individuals. Locals would visit the safe house to have discussions as well. It was noted that when KFOR first arrived in country, many of the stories about atrocities were probably true. Today, the stories tended to be embellished and the real truth is less obvious.

The team members I spoke with were from Ft. Carson, Colorado, and were on a 5-month assignment. They felt that peace operations did impact combat skills and that it took time to re-train after serving in such an activity. The frequent rotations were a problem for maintaining trust relationships with locals on the ground, but they tried to have overlap in team members to facilitate the transition. Knowledge of local customs, conversation skills, type-A personality, and good listening skills were important attributes for team members. They did cross-level briefings for teams rotating in and out, and the after-action reviews were built into pre-mission training. SOF members with in-country experience discussed their lessons with those preparing to deploy. They were trained on what to eat and not eat. They told me that their

unit had a high rate of tuberculosis due to the many different areas they deploy, and the fact that they live, eat, and drink on the economy. They cautioned me to stay away from dairy products, including cheese that the locals tend to put on everything, for fear of contracting hepatitis.

Kosovo was essentially made up of small clans of either Albanians or Serbs, but in some rare areas there was a mixture. If something happened, they would not give information on each other. As a result, it was very hard to break into the clan culture. During the cold weather there were not many problems because no one went out. However, with warm weather, problems started to occur. The greatest challenge faced by SOF teams was the ability to present an open presence to the clan-based population so they would open up and talk about what was going on. The teams found it difficult to know who to really trust or believe of the locals.

The daily reports from the field teams went directly to SOCCE at Task Force Falcon and not through the intelligence chain of command. SOCCE was the first to brief at the daily intelligence briefing for the commander. It was clear BG Sanchez placed a lot of trust and confidence in their reports. The Special Forces team tried to match its younger soldiers with the young locals and the mature soldiers worked with the older folks.

There were shifting local perceptions and expectations with the passing of time. KFOR was viewed at the outset as the liberator. Then the Albanians began to retaliate against the Serbs and the level of violence increased. The sympathy of the international community was initially with the Albanians, but with the escalation of violence against the Serbs this sympathy was shifting to the Serbs. Albanians were concerned about the loss of international support.

Combat Camera

The mission of combat camera was to install, operate, and maintain tactical visual information systems, and to provide division level commander's situational awareness and decisionmaking support through visual documentation of the operation. They provide:

- Documentation to support the onsite commander, essential for command and control, as a battlefield information resource, and force multiplier;

- Support to the requesting staff sections for reconnaissance, intelligence and operational missions to support their programs; and

- Documentation of operational forces as a permanent visual record to the joint combat camera center (Pentagon). Combat camera records of DoD activities allow offsite management authorities to visualize ongoing activities.

Combat camera consists of soldiers with still photograph and videography skills. They are employed for the purpose of acquiring tactical visual documentation of the actions of U.S., allied, and hostile armed forces in combat and combat support operations, and in related peacetime training activities such as exercises, war games, and operations.

Combat camera provides near real time tactical and visual information to keep the command informed on the conditions and actions in the area of operations. The imagery is used to assist commanders at all levels to make informed decisions about effective use of combat and combat service and support assets. At times the teams find themselves being viewed by the military commanders as something between media and military. However, once they have had a chance to work with the commanders, they were more likely to be accepted.

The combat camera team reported to the MNB(E) G3 and was led by 1LT Tony Vitello, 55th Signal Company, U.S. Army. The team was located on Camp Bondsteel and had an office and small production facility in the tactical operations center. There were three two-person teams, consisting of a photographer and a videographer, which went into sector on missions. The team's Humvee did not have a radio but it was equipped with a Qualcom *Omnitracs* that could be used for tracking their location. Because force protection rules required two vehicle convoys when going into sector, the team had to link up with a unit that was going outside of the wire. Sometimes the teams had to be creative to find a link up, such as the time I traveled with them to support a MEDCAP out of Camp Montieth. In this case, we had to linkup with the early morning military escorted bus service from Camp Bondsteel to Camp Montieth. At Camp Montieth we linked up with the MEDCAP team and also with the evening bus

returning from Camp Montieth to Camp Bondsteel. Other times the linkups were more straightforward, such as the time I accompanied them on a PSYOP support mission when we linked up with the PSYOP team at Camp Bondsteel.

Figure 1. Combat Camera in Action

The teams have conventional and digital still image cameras, as well as digital video cameras (Figure 1). Upon return from a mission, digital pictures were reviewed and the best ones were selected, annotated, and e-mailed to the joint combat camera center for posting on the Web site. The team also had a limited photo and negative scanning capability and still and video editing capability. Digital stills could be put on CDs, ZIPs and JAZZ disks, e-mailed, or made into hard copies. There was also a limited night vision still and video photography capability. Tasking was either direct from the G3, by FRAGO or word of mouth. They offered a 24-hour turnaround for products.

Combat camera covered quick reaction forces and significant operational events to document for historical purposes, use by the intelligence cell, and for after action reviews. They documented training and MMB(E) TOA activities and events, such as the riots in Metrovica and Gornje Kuse, cordon and search activities, MASH surgical operations, MEDCAPs/DENCAPs, site evaluations, aerial photos of villages, and nighttime operations. Combat camera supported special documentation needs for civil affairs, PSYOP, and information

operations. For example, when I accompanied combat camera on a MEDCAP mission, they were photographing various scenes for possible use by PSYOP for handbills or posters as part of the MNB(E) information campaign to promote the good things KFOR does for the community. Combat camera did not do command photos or group photos or lend their equipment to others.

Staff Weather Operations

A visit was made to the 7th Expeditionary Weather Squadron (EWS), commanded by Major Clements, U.S. Air Force. Staff weather operations (SWO) had a team of 4 forecasters and 3 observers who provided weather forecasting services for the task force and supported over 40 aircraft in 5 unique weapons systems in 7 separate flying units. They also had one forecaster at Camp Able Sentry who supported CH-47s and UH-60 MEDEVACs. The Air Force served a 90-day tour, whereas the Army tour was 6 months. The SWO expressed some concern about the number of unaccompanied tours the weather staff was being assigned. Normal assignments are accompanied, but for longer operations and the change in mode of the operation have raised concerns about the ability to retain forecasters and to attract new recruits into this career field.

Staff weather operations was a critical ops-intelligence player that provided accurate, timely, and relevant weather intelligence for planning, weather warning, and operations. The 7th EWS mission was:

- Support Task Force Falcon headquarters staff;

- Resource protection through weather advisories, watches, and warnings;

- Flight weather briefings for Task Force Falcon and transient aircraft; and

- Weather observations from U.S. base camps within MNB(E).

The area between Skopje, Macedonia, and Camp Bondsteel was mountainous and forecasting weather along the air route was difficult. Frequently helicopter pilots would unexpectedly encounter bad weather. An automated system was being installed to improve their ability to meet mission needs and to accommodate future staff reductions. The new

system also offered online weather service via dial-up access through DSN. Weather was of interest to everyone on base and was the first morning and evening briefing for the battle update brief. In addition, the SWO supported the analysis and control element, daily forecasts, FRAGO weather (weekly), aviation briefings, 3-day forecasts for *The Daily Falcon*, operational mission briefings (QRFs), JVB weather briefings, 24-hour observations and forecasts, and UAV support.

The tactical meteorological (TACMET) and communications systems supporting the Camp Bondsteel weather operations included systems such as the portable automated surface observing system (PASOS), the remote miniature weather station (RMWS), the NATO automated meteorological information system (NAMIS), Ellason Tactical Weather Radar, tactical wind measuring set TNQ-36, Wrasse near real-time satellite-gathered weather receiver, pilot to meteorological service voice system (PMSV), BF Goodrich lightening protection system, light weight satellite terminals, TV-SAT, NIPRNET and SIPRNET access, MSE phones and FM, UHF, and SINCGARS radios.

The SWO weather operations had a number of other challenges as well. There was a need to identify other meteorologist in Kosovo and to better coordinate information sharing among the related weather activities. There was a need for improved weather forecasting during degraded winter operations. The SWO needed access to Kosovo area weather history, case studies and observation databases and there was a need for additional portable automated surface observations sensors in U.S. zone and other KFOR locations.

CHAPTER XXI

Civil-Military Operations

Larry Wentz

The U.S. military civil affairs (CA) doctrine uses civil-military operations (CMO) as a comprehensive term that describes the general activities that a military force conducts in coordination with and in support of civilian entities in a peace operation. The U.N. and NATO refer to these activities as CIMIC (civil-military cooperation). The U.N. uses the term *civil affairs* for its civil administration activities. In this chapter, CA and CIMIC are used as they apply to CMO activities conducted by the U.S. and NATO elements respectively.

KFOR headquarters conducted operational-level CMO that focused on promoting unity of effort through coordination and synchronization of the tactical-level CMO conducted by the Multinational Brigades (MNB). The MNBs focused on the traditional activities that promoted the legitimacy of the military's presence and supported the civilian-led peace building efforts. Although the military force, KFOR, was not under the executive authority of the Senior Representative of the U.N. Secretary General in Kosovo, the NATO OPLAN 31402 made it clear that KFORs mission was to coordinate with and support UNMIK. Commander KFOR General Directive 1 recognized that "the success of KFOR was inextricably linked to the success of UNMIK." Thus, the mission of CIMIC and CA was to conduct civil-military operations in support of KFOR and its MNB efforts to establish a safe and secure environment. The mission was also to provide within means and capabilities support to the U.N. by facilitating the execution of the UNMIK four pillars: humanitarian assistance, civil administration, institution building, and economic reconstruction. Support to international organizations (IO) and non-governmental organizations (NGO) humanitarian, public safety, and infrastructure repair activities was permitted as well, as long as it was conducted within military means and capabilities.

During the time of my visit to Kosovo, support elements from the U.S. Army Reserve 411th and 443rd CA battalions were combined to form Task Force Yankee to conduct the MNB(E)/Task Force Falcon CMO activities. Task Force Yankee was under tactical control (TACON) of Task Force Falcon (TFF), and under operational control (OPCON) of Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). The commander was LTC William G. Beard, U.S. Army Reserves, who was also dual hatted as the MNB(E)/Task Force Falcon G5. One of his duties as the G5 was to represent MNB(E) when dealing with KFOR, UNMIK, and civil and government organizations. A change to this arrangement occurred with the June 2000 transfer of authority to the 1st Armored Division. A deputy commander for civil-military operations was created under the new MNB(E)/TFF commander, which raised the level importance of the effort and placed a more senior officer in position to negotiate on the behalf of MNB(E). TF Yankee soldiers staffed both the G5 section and the CA tactical support teams (TSTs). The G5 operation was located in the MNB(E) tactical operations center on Camp Bondsteel and the TSTs were located in SEAhuts dedicated for CA use on Camps Bondsteel and Montieth.

The G5 staff not only served as MNB(E)/TFF plans and policy, but was the operations element of the civil affairs battalion as well. The G5 team consisted of five officers and two sergeants. The team was not a trained G5 staff element. The CA battalion commander had to split his time between commanding tactical civil military operations and performing the duties of the G5 and this challenged his ability to effectively cope with the demands for his active involvement in both functions. The ad hoc G5 staff struggled to meet the operational level plans, policy, and program demands, while at the same time focus on CA tactical operations and command issues. The operational demands suggested there was a need for both a trained G5 staff with a dedicated leader and a dedicated civil affairs tactical commander.

The G5 staff monitored and managed the $5 million DoD Humanitarian Assistance (HA) program and conducted analysis and assessments of HA projects based on the Task Force Falcon commander's priorities. They were also often involved in the coordination and some times participated in the tactical distribution of humanitarian supplies in the MNB(E) sector. There was a HA board that was used to review and approve projects for funding and implementation. The board required detailed presentations based on a fully integrated staff assessment

that included the engineers, legal, and other staff sections as appropriate. Detailed explanations with engineer sketches and other supporting material were required as well. It was felt the HA project approval process was slow and cumbersome. The G5 produced a staff study recommending procedures for quick impact humanitarian projects with funding of $2,500 or less. The study recommended the use of blank purchasing agreements to accelerate the processing and approval of funding for small projects.

As the lead planner for MNB(E), the G5 supported the Joint Registration Task Force. During civil registration, they maintained communications with the civil affairs liaison officer to OSCE, as well as maintained statistics on the number of registrants and registration site openings or closings in the MNB(E) sector. The group briefed these statistics daily at the evening battle update brief. G5 was also responsible for planning for the return of Serbian internally displaced persons (IDP) and Albanian displaced persons (DP). They used reports provided by the Joint Committee for Returns to support the planning.

The G5 staff maintained a database containing information on NGOs, village assessments, key leaders, local economics, USAID programs, area demographics, village locations, daily CMO situation reports, and other related information. The G5 staff responded to information requests from the G2/ACE, tactical support teams, other TFF units, and higher headquarters such as KFOR and USAREUR. Sometimes the information requested was not available from the existing database and had to be obtained from other sources. Although the database was maintained on a computer, it was not maintained on a server as an online data network service and therefore, could not be remotely accessed from other workstations in the MNB(E) TOC or remotely from the NIPRNET or Internet. Providing an automated data network interface accessible from the Internet and NIPRNET would have offload some of the G5 burden of responding to requests for information and would have facilitated information sharing and dissemination in general. It would have also facilitated automated linkages to other relevant databases and the population of the G5 CMO database from remote sources.

The tactical support teams were key to the success of CMO in MNB(E). They deployed Monday through Friday into sector where they had direct contact with UNMIK, IO, and NGO personnel and with local civilians and leaders. The teams were assigned areas of responsibility

that allowed the same soldiers to visit the same villages, neighborhoods, civil administration, and business establishments. This served to build trust relationships and allowed team members to gain a first hand understanding of the local concerns, needs, and what works and what does not. The TSTs were also used to support MNB(E) QRF and special operations initiatives. A typical team consisted of an officer grade team leader (usually a major), one or two other officers, three sergeants, and a CAT-I interpreter. TSTs traveled in two to three vehicle convoys, had a Montero SUV, and several Humvees for deploying into sector. SINCGARS radios, GPS receivers, and *Omnitracs* were mounted in the Humvees. Motorola *HT1000* and *TalkAbouts* were used for dismounted and convoy communications. They also had an INMARSAT capability. Civil affairs units, like others who deployed into the field, experienced poor line-of-sight radio performance in the mountainous terrain of Kosovo. Laptops and Palm Pilots were used for note taking and preparing situational reports. The team needed digital cameras to support documentation of HA project related activities and other events of importance to the MNB(E) mission, they were a passive intelligence collector. The CA tactical administration room at Camps Bondsteel and Montieth had SINCGARS base stations and DSN and NIPRNET access. The physical separation of the battalion communications and the commander who was located at the G5 section in the TOC presented operational challenges to communicate with the deployed TSTs. At Camp Montieth the administration room also had local telephone access for calling within the Gnjilane area. Local telephone service was not that good. When it was necessary to make commercial calls to Pristina and elsewhere outside of the Gnjilane area, one had to go to the telephone company office in Gnjilane to place the call.

The operations tempo of civil affairs was as hectic as the rest of the task force. They participated in the weekly command and staff meetings and met weekly with the targeting and information operations groups. They participated in the daily battle update briefings and morning intelligence briefing. The G5 representative briefed the status of the civil registration and HA programs daily at the evening battle update brief. LTC Beard represented civil-military operations at the weekly UNMIK sponsored regional four-pillar meeting in Gnjilane. TST team leaders participated in local UNMIK administrator meetings and the weekly joint security meetings chaired by the maneuver commander responsible for the area. Team members held regular meetings with local religious leaders, UNMIK, OSCE, NGOs, local mayors, business

leaders, and public utility managers. They represented Multinational Brigade East at the KFOR sponsored civil-military operations coordination working group held every two weeks. The CA commander held a weekly staff meeting with his G5 staff and TST members. The location of the meeting alternated between Camp Bondsteel and Camp Montieth. LTC Beard organized some bilateral meetings with the German CIMIC team to get a better understanding of how they do things and share information on current activities, which was a step towards building some cross-MNB collaboration.

As with other combat support units, civil affairs felt the force protection measures distracted from their roles and limited their ability to operate and move about the area. Flack vests, helmets, and weapons intimidated local civilians. It also made the TSTs indistinguishable from standard combat units and introduced inefficiencies into their operation. For example, a one person meeting required a two vehicle convoy and the rest of the team had to wait while the meeting was being conducted. Arriving in full battle gear did not send a signal of a safe and secure environment. The U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) liaison elements, also under OPCON of SOCEUR, were not constrained by the force protection rules. They attended many of the same meetings and dealt with many of the same local leaders as the TST members.

The CA support to the UNMIK pillars of humanitarian assistance, civil administration, institution building, and economic reconstruction was multidimensional. In support of the UNMIK humanitarian assistance (HA) pillar, civil affairs coordinated with NGOs and the international community to provide adequate shelter, clean water, food, and medical assistance. For UNMIK Civil Administration they assisted in the establishment of multi-ethnic governmental structures to perform civil service functions and public services such as sanitation, postal, and fire services. They also coordinated utility repairs for local individuals to get services such as telephone, water, and power restored to their homes and met regularly with local religious leaders to discuss issues and needs and coordinate activities to facilitate resolution. Institution building was the responsibility of the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and CA assisted OSCE in the democratization and institution building including human rights monitoring, organizing a judicial system, media development, training of local administrators, and organization of elections. Finally, the European Union (EU) was responsible for economic reconstruction,

but managing Kosovo's transition from a socialist to a market system had been problematic. EU suffered chronic shortfalls in money and staff. There was no light or heavy industry in Kosovo to provide jobs for the unemployed. Power plants only delivered 75 to 80 percent of the required electrical power and loss of power was frequent. The water system, whose pumps were also driven by the power system, was problematic as well. It was recommended not to drink water from the taps in the cities or elsewhere. In some cases, more water was being lost than was being used by the local populace due to broken pipes in major cities. It was not unusual to have the water shut off from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. in cities such as Pristina.

The MNB(E) reconstruction efforts focused on conducting detailed damage assessments of industry, assisting development programs, identifying and activating revenue sources, coordinating utility reconstruction and manufacturing aid, as well as coordinating projects with IOs and NGOs. Efforts were also made to develop and fund labor intensive projects that would employ locals. The Village Employment Rehabilitation Program (VERP) was such a program funded by the EU and implemented by the U.N. Development Program. It focused on funding low cost projects that would hire unemployed locals in selected rural areas. Typical projects funded riverside cleanup, retainer wall construction and secondary road repair at a project cost of roughly $25,000. CA also facilitated getting humanitarian projects for the TMK and recommended future reconstruction projects. The U.S. civil affairs approach to reconstruction projects was to facilitate, coordinate, and enable. This approach gave the locals buy-in and ownership in what they did. The main idea was to help them do it themselves instead of doing it for them. Managing a sizable number of HA programs that had a heavy focus on construction created high demands for engineering assistance. Although TFF engineers helped with the technical aspects of construction, facilities, public works, and related project assessments, they were often unavailable to civil affairs due to other operational demands. A few soldiers on the CA team had relevant expertise and were able to fill some gaps. It was felt that CA could do a better job staffing its teams with officers and enlisted personnel with relevant engineering skills since many of its reserve force soldiers have such skills in their civilian careers. Alternatively, funds could be made available in country to hire local general engineering consultants.

The approach of the other MNBs to CMO and reconstruction projects was not necessarily the same as the U.S. For example, the MNB(S) German-led brigade, reconstruction, and humanitarian aid were coordinated and channeled by a separate staff within the brigade headquarters and implemented by a specific task force called the Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Task Force. The MNB(S) sector was a rural environment with agriculture and wine being the principle sources of income. Industrial enterprises were few and unemployment was high, at 60 to 65 percent. Here too, as was the case in the rest of Kosovo, the family structure provided for the social security of each member. The German conscription program allowed them to review skill profiles and select candidates that were needed to meet their CIMIC staffing needs. They assisted in building over 30 schools and more than 960 houses, repaired roads and bridges, and were involved in more than 350 other projects such as building playgrounds and gymnasiums. More than 68 million DMs were spent for construction during the first year. As part of the humanitarian aid effort, about 960 tons of relief supplies were distributed, particularly to small villages in the mountains where other organizations did not go, due to rough terrain or the lack of media coverage of these areas. Their military field hospitals provided assistance for civil emergencies while CIMIC provided training for locals, such as teaching villagers how to repair tractors. Cooperation among more than 70 NGOs, UNMIK, OSCE, and UNHCR in the MNB(S) sector was problematic at the outset, but improved over time.

Following a field assessment in March 2000 (which identified that the international community lacked a capacity to assess reconstruction needs across Kosovo) planners at SHAPE set up a Kosovo development group (KDG). The KDG was under the authority of the European Union's Kosovo reconstruction department and reported to EU offices within the region. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain volunteered a staff of 18 non-CIMIC officers, who worked in teams of 3 in the province's 5 sectors. KDG teams traveled (in civvies not military uniforms) throughout the province, identifying and prioritizing reconstruction projects in cooperation with local authorities and about 120 NGO organizations. The projects covered all aspects of reconstruction, from repairing infrastructure to regenerating the economy. The cost of deploying the KDG was shared among the participating nations, KFOR, and the European Union.

Information sharing was problematic among the civil and military organizations as well as with the local population. As a result, KFOR and its Multinational Brigades established information centers rather than the traditional civil-military operations center (CMOC) or CIMIC Center in NATO parlance. The centers were placed outside the wire of the military compounds and located in the larger urban areas either in a separate facility or collocated with the UNMIK building used for municipal administration purposes. For example, in MNB(E), the Gnjilane information center was located in a building near the Serbian enclave. The other MNB(E) centers were collocated with the TST offices in the UNMIK municipal buildings in towns such as Strpce, Kamenica, Vitina, and Kacanik. For KFOR headquarters, instead of providing a CIMIC center, they provided a liaison officer to the UNMIK sponsored Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC) located in downtown Pristina. KFOR used the HCIC conference room for its civil-military operations working group meetings with the MNBs and participants from UNMIK and NGOs. The military centers were run by CA/CIMIC soldiers during weekdays and provided a visible presence of commitment and solidarity from KFOR and UNMIK. They also represented a non-threatening environment for citizens to voice complaints and request assistance.

The HCIC was staffed and resourced primarily by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). They were supported by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK's Department for International Development, Catholic Relief Services, International Rescue Committee (IRC), OSCE, World Food Program, and Save the Children. The center provided a database of local and international organizations working in Kosovo, advice and information to the humanitarian community, and disseminated information through its Web site (www.reliefweb.int/hcic/). Information was available in the form of reports, maps and geo-referenced data for which the place codes had been standardized and were compatible with *MapInfo* and *ArcView* geographic information systems. A database was being constructed on what organizations and agencies were working in specific regions and the services they were providing. The HCIC was very successful in facilitating the sharing of information in Kosovo.

Figure 1. TST Visit to Gnjilane OSCE Center

The OSCE began to open information centers as well. These centers tended to focus on helping local NGOs find opportunities. While visiting Major Lapage, U.S. Army and Gnjilane TST team leader, we did a walk through the town and found an OSCE information center that had just opened. We stopped by and they invited us in for a look around. There was a conference room on the second floor that could be used by the NGOs. Major Lapage (Figure 1) took the opportunity to explain his role to the office manager and discussed how civil affairs might help. He arranged for a follow-up meeting with them and suggested they provide him a list of NGOs and their capabilities so he might be able to find some tasks for them. As we sat around the conference table, someone noted that this was not the right professional environment for cutting deals. They felt it would be a much better approach if civil affairs could be authorized to wear civilian clothes and bring economic and financial planners to the table.

Strategic planning was a short fall in the Kosovo operation. There was no UNMIK strategic plan at the outset to focus, coordinate and synchronize the CMO efforts of UNMIK and KFOR and its MNBs and with the NGOs. Recognizing the importance of early synchronization of strategic vision, KFOR provided staff support to UNMIK to help develop

a strategic planning document. Additionally, the U.S. assigned Colonel Rich Roan, U.S. Marines, followed by Colonel Mike Dziedzic, U.S. Air Force, to UNMIK as the director's of strategic planning. Under their tutelage, a working draft of an UNMIK strategic planning document was issued in December 1999 with a second draft in the Summer of 2000. The UNMIK strategic plan was limited in scope and did not contain timelines and milestones for implementation. It was essential a list of things that needed to be done but this in itself was an important step forward. UNMIK also lacked the staff necessary to execute the plan.

The absence of a strategic plan was not limited to UNMIK. KFOR and the MNBs lacked plans as well. Broad civil-military cooperation guidance and intent was provided by KFOR to the Multinational Brigades along the CIMIC lines of operation that covered freedom of movement, humanitarian support, public safety, civil administration, infrastructure repair, economics and commerce, and democratization. Measures of effectiveness and end states for the lines of operation were not specified. In order to foster collaboration and cooperation, KFOR produced and disseminated daily CMO SITREPs based on reports provided from each MNB and the activities of KFOR headquarters. KFOR sponsored CMO meetings at KFOR headquarters every two weeks between CA/CIMIC chiefs to facilitate coordination, informing and consensus building. On the other hand, KFOR assessments of ongoing CMO activities were not always provided to the multinational brigades. A KFOR civil-military cooperation campaign plan was drafted during the first rotation of KFOR staff but it was never really implemented. Subsequent KFOR CIMIC officers had no knowledge that there even was a campaign plan. Attempts to resurrect the plan at KFOR J9 failed, mainly due to inadequate command emphasis. The KFOR record for passing on institutional knowledge during the transfer of authority between rotations had been in need of improvement.

There were many challenges in conducting tactical level civil-military operations, but the lack of a KFOR approved CMO plan that integrated and leveraged the activities of the MNBs was viewed as a major shortfall of the operation. The MNB(E) G5 in his after action review reported that tactical level CMO activities within MNB(E) were hampered by the absence of an overarching KFOR campaign plan and means for measuring the status and effectiveness of the CIMIC lines of operation at the municipal and maneuver unit levels. Additionally, there was no overall CMO campaign for MNB(E) either. As a result, the CMO activities

were not fully integrated and synchronized with KFOR and other Multinational Brigades, or within MNB(E) elements and maneuver units. Many of the CMO activities were more reactionary than deliberately planned and synchronized to attain an overall objective. Reports requested by KFOR and the CIMIC sponsored meetings were primarily used to inform themselves, the MNBs, and other organizations, such as UNMIK, of activities within the KFOR and respective MNB sectors not to manage the CMO program.

Although UNSCR 1244 required that the "international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployed under unified command and control," the balkanized approach to civil-military operations in KFOR was representative of the lack of overall unity of effort for NATO forces in Kosovo. KFOR headquarters was a coordinating rather than a command and control headquarters. The MNBs were relatively independent and had approaches to civil-military operations that were more indicative of national political priorities and military operating styles. In addition, national contingents often sought to involve NGOs or government sponsored relief agencies from their own countries or regions rather than treating UNHCR as the designated lead agency for relief coordination. Beyond inappropriate use of resources, this sort of favoritism affected the impartiality of the military. On the other hand, there were occasions where CA/CIMIC assistance helped steer clear of excessive village chief and clan involvement in the selection of relief based on local politics rather than need. What was missing was an overall civil-military operations strategy and campaign plan. As a result, the CMO strategy became driven from the bottom up. This approach lacked unity of effort and ran the risk of missed opportunities, misuse of resources, duplication of effort, unintentionally legitimizing certain behavior, and empowerment of local leaders and organized crime elements.

The MNB(E) maneuver unit's focus was to provide a safe and secure environment. In executing that mission they performed CMO related activities, such as sponsoring town meetings and coordinating with IOs and NGOs. The focus of the civil affairs teams was to perform extensive civil-military operations activities to support the Task Force Falcon commander's intent and the maneuver units in their area of responsibility. The potential for disunity of effort existed because neither civil affairs nor the maneuver units had been provided phased objectives with means to measure the effectiveness of civil-military activities.

The civil-military operations conducted by the tactical support teams contributed significantly to influencing the behavior and attitude of the local leaders and community. The TSTs operated in all maneuver battalion task force sectors to coordinate civil-military projects and humanitarian assistance. A year earlier, many local Serbs viewed KFOR as evil. Through the good efforts and actions of civil affairs to prove KFOR was there to help, the local population attitude changed substantially, especially in the Serbian communities. Many examples of positive things civil affairs did have been cited in articles in the TFF *Falcon Flier*, NATO press, international press, and elsewhere. I personally witnessed many while on mission with several of the tactical support teams. For example, while visiting Major Ricci, U.S. Army and TST team leader in Kamenica, a Serbian man approached us when we arrived at his office at the UNMIK building. The man was there to seek help in getting his telephone service restored. The word was out that Major Ricci and civil affairs had taken an action with UNMIK that directed the local telephone company to restore the telephone lines that had been cut to the Serbian enclaves. Power and water companies had become responsive as well. Major Ricci took down the man's phone number and passed it to UNMIK for action. It turned out that Major Ricci spoke a little Serbian. When Serbs came to him with problems he could talk to them a little, which helped a lot in building trust. With the word out that CA was helping, people were waiting at their office door every morning to get assistance to help solve problems or they stopped team members in the street.

MNB(E) had Greek, Russian, Polish, Ukrainian, Jordanian, and UAE units assigned to it, which offered an opportunity to gain some operational experience in working with a foreign military force. It also presented some cultural, procedural, and language challenges. For example, the Russian contingent spoke little English. There was an underlying hostility from the K-Albanian population towards the Greeks and Russians. The Greeks and Serbs shared an Orthodox background in contrast with the K-Albanian Muslim background. The decision of the Greek government to openly oppose the NATO air campaign also added distrust. Russian alignment with the Serbs created a strong distrust of them from the K-Albanians. In fact, the Russians were frequently attacked in their MNB(E) sector, endangering U.S. soldiers as well. Civil affairs teams played an important role in trying to build trust in these sectors by demonstrating solidarity between the U.S.,

Greek, and Russian forces. U.S. forces conducted joint patrols with Greek and Russian forces in their sectors. The U.S. conducted joint cordon and search operations as well. Greek and U.S. forces combined efforts for humanitarian assistance, treating Albanian patients, and visiting schools together. The civil affairs team leader often accompanied the Greek commander when he attended civic events and spoke with the local media. The Russians were somewhat fascinated with civil affairs and attempted to put together their own program. Joint U.S. operations with the Russians, such as security escorts and deliveries to medical clinics, legitimized the KFOR commitment.

Civil affairs teams went into towns and looked at the state of the infrastructure, including public works, sanitation, financial status, education, and limited administrative services. They assessed the situation, looked at the available resources, and then tried to help the locals plan projects to improve the situation. Many local leaders seemed to lack the basic skills that are needed to lead, manage, and guide progress in a peaceful society. The Albanian leaders were taking every opportunity to further their cause. At municipal meetings they didn't want to focus on problems, but on political issues. Nepotism ran rampant. Most local people getting jobs in the municipalities were not qualified, had their own agenda, and the ones in position of authority gave jobs to family members. For example, the Vitina civil administration was behind most Opstinas in MNB(E). The previous UNMIK administrator was reluctant to populate municipal positions because he knew the history of personnel using their positions to promote their agendas. Civil affairs provided some material and facilities for educating the emerging provincial leaders. The efforts required a lot of time negotiating and conducting face-to-face meetings with the community leaders, managers of small businesses, UNMIK representatives, and international organizations such as the Red Cross, the World Food Program, and CARE. The CA leaders and maneuver commanders often had to craft a compromise between competing points of view that carried the day and ensured the peace.

The tactical support teams earned trust, built good rapport with the local people, and spoke informally with them to pick up details that didn't emerge from the more formal discussions. CA tried to get contracts for small companies with Camp Bondsteel and attempted to identify projects that would bring people together. While visiting with Captain Barwikowski, U.S. Army and TST team leader in Vitina, I witnessed the

signing of a contract (Figure 2) with some local workers to install speed bumps along the main street of Vrbovac. Civil affairs coordinated the hiring of local nationals. Though difficulties did arise with the workers and the quality of work, problems were resolved, and the residents of Vrbovac were happy with their new speed bumps.

Figure 2. TST Signing Contract for Speed Bumps

Captain Barwikowski also told me about the "great potato deal." Serbian farmers had been unable to sell nearly 200 tons of potatoes harvested last fall. The tactical support team contacted the agricultural co-op in Vitina to coordinate the sale of 40 tons of potatoes to Albanians. This was a first for Albanians buying Serbian produce in large quantities. The TST was also instrumental in helping some Vitina Serbs get hired by Brown and Root, who had previously hired Albanians due to Serbian concerns for personal security. The 101st Airborne set up its operation in an old fan factory on the edge of Vitina. There were jobs available in the dining facility as well as custodial work. Working with Brown and Root human resources, the civil affairs team worked out an arrangement where by the Serbs could be hired to work the night shift. In another example shared with me, the Vitina TST coordinated a local contract to repair a school that had been torched by Serbian soldiers before KFOR arrived. The team provided school supplies, coloring books, and crayons to local schools as well. LTC Miles, U.S. Army and commander of the 1-187 Infantry, was responsible for the Vitina area and held a weekly joint security committee (JSC) meeting at the UNMIK building

in Vitina. For this meeting, the TST team leader participated with the UNMIK administrator, NGOs, and local representatives from the Serbian and Albanian community. The Serbian representative rarely attended. As a result, the TST worked with the local Serbian church leadership to help address Serbian concerns in the Vitina area.

TST and G5 representatives attended the TFF weekly operations planning and targeting meetings to try to help synchronize CMO with the maneuver and information operations plans. They were also helpful in providing ground-truth insights on the current situation in sector and changing trends within the local community. They had contacts with local civil, political, and religious leaders, and could provide perspectives on likely reactions of these leaders to events and actions taken by MNB(E). CA personnel worked with the information operations cell to help them capture the specifics related to civil-military projects and humanitarian assistance successes in sector. This information was then included in press releases, PSYOP products, and information operations talking points, which were used to persuade the populace and local leaders of the benefits of cooperating with MNB(E). The CMO activities were not specifically integrated with the information operations effort, except in those instances when sanctions were imposed on specific communities. KFOR civil-military projects and humanitarian assistance were withheld to send specific messages to a community. For example, sanctions were imposed in Kamenica and Strpce in response to civil disturbances.

In addition to standard civil-military projects, such as repairing utilities and school construction and repairs, CA personnel also coordinated small-scale employment projects. Local business rehabilitation was sponsored as well as interethnic business cooperation. While visiting Major Bob Albanese, U.S. Army and TST team leader for Kacanik, we stopped by a soft drink bottling plant to see if there might be a way to link them up with an U.S. State Department small business investment opportunity. Initially, the Kacanik civil affairs TST office and living quarters had been located in the Polish headquarters building, until for force protection reasons they were not allowed to stay overnight and had to return to Camp Bondsteel. The Kacanik TST office and information center are now located on the first floor in the UNMIK municipal building and the team travels to Kacanik daily. The UNMIK administrator in Kacanik was very good. He got out to the towns in his area to understand the situation firsthand. The UNMIK building,

including OSCE offices, was next to the Polish battalion headquarters that was collocated with UNMIK police in an old MUP building. The TST made daily trips to Kacanik from Camp Bondsteel. UNMIK occupied the first floor and some local government staff funded through UNMIK occupied the rest of the floors. The locals wanted more people put on the payroll, like the old style communist system. However, UNMIK could not afford to fund a larger staff. Although they employed 5 locals, they were still in need of help. KFOR, USAID, DRA, and other organizations funded or provided material for reconstruction projects in the Kacanik area.

Major Albanese was a schoolteacher when not on a civil affairs assignment. He was interested in helping the Kosovo school system in the Kacanik area but thought it needed structure and discipline. For example, an 80K DM investment was made in refurbishing a school in Kacanik, but there were already signs of destruction by students and the teachers didn't seem to want to take any accountability or corrective action. The Serbs had suppressed the Albanian school system so many children were taught at home. As a result, structure, discipline, and lesson planning were not a part of the newly established Albanian school system and culture. Students were sometimes in class for a one-half hour before a teacher showed up. Little lesson plan development was done. They have not had a formalized system in place for a long time. Major Albanese talked to the director of the Kacanik school system about taking procedures from his school district in New York and modifying them for their use. At that time, grades 5 through 8 used the school in the morning and grades 1 through 4 in the afternoon. There was a high school that went to grade 12, but it could go longer for what we would refer to as vocational school. The director of the high school had 15,000 DM to invest in school improvements. He spent about 7,000 DM for painting fences and outside improvements, instead of making the inside structure more pleasing for the students by patching holes and windows. There was no quality control of the construction and no controls on the use of the money the director was given for improvements.

Humanitarian assistance efforts by the TSTs included escorting Kosovar Serbs to medical and other social welfare visits in or through Kosovar Albanian communities, coordinating for food, clothing, and medical assistance distributions to specific families and communities. While visiting the TST at Kacanik, we distributed blankets and pillows to the town of Kerbliq.

As noted earlier, TSTs were also used to support MNB(E) QRF and special operations. For example, they were deployed to try to help convince local residents to take down UCK monuments in Petrovce and Kamenica. They were also called upon to try to help defuse possible further civil disturbances following the vandalism of the UNMIK office in Strpce. I accompanied Major Rob LeValley, U.S. Army and TST team leader for Strpce, on a visit he made the day after the Strpce office was vandalized. He interviewed locals about the incident and talked with the Polish brigade commander and the local UNMIK police chief to try to get a sense for whether there might be any further disturbances. We also witnessed a Serbian-led demonstration that set up a roadblock to express their concerns about the lack of KFOR action to find a missing Serbian shepherd who they believed had been kidnapped and possibly killed by some ex-UCK soldiers the locals they claimed to had seen in the area. A few days later the shepherd was found dead in the woods near Strpce. Following the accidental shooting of a 6-year-old boy by a KFOR soldier near Vitina, TST members were on the scene to monitor the crowd and keep them informed of the situation surrounding the shooting. Team members provided emotional support to the family following the boy's death. When two Serbs were reportedly abducted in Domorovce, TST members were deployed to monitor and defuse local resident demonstrations and protests. In Kamenica, some 3,000 Albanians celebrating the illegal renaming of the town and unveiling of a UCK monument started throwing rocks at Russian forces when they were told they could not affix a UCK plaque to the monument. TST members supporting a QRF team intervened and were able to calm the situation by negotiating with Albanian leaders they knew. Getting to know the villages, their residents, and particularly the leaders, cannot be underestimated. TST members were quite effective in building local trust relationships and legitimizing the commitment of KFOR.

The KFOR appreciation day gathering in Gnjilane was another example of using TSTs to get out and test the pulse of the community during special events and to resolve conflict. The Gnjilane event included traditional ethnic Albanian dancing, songs, and speeches, and was held in the center of town. Although organizers and KFOR estimated the turnout to be very large, only about 6,000 people actually attended the event to thank American KFOR troops for their role in bringing peace to the province. The event was organized by the LDK political party but was not sanctioned by UNMIK or KFOR. KFOR troops provided security protection. The roads into the center of town were

blocked and there were plenty of checkpoints and infantry walking around. The celebration was very peaceful. There were also UNMIK police and KPS police around the area. SOF team members were seen in the crowd as well as in the cafés. This was also the first event and first day in the driver's seat for the 2-2 Infantry who replaced the 1-63 Infantry. I accompanied LTC Beard, Major Lapage, and other members of the Gnjilane TST for a walk during the height of the celebration.

TSTs and G5 staff received no pre-deployment training for their role in support of information operations. The G5 participation in the targeting process was viewed more as support to information operations than using civil-military operations as a weapon of choice for meeting the TFF commander's operational priorities and objectives. In the absence of a CMO campaign, there was a need to better link CMO activities with TFF objectives and the information campaign. This was especially true for the information operations talking points. The TSTs viewed the talking points as an excellent idea for delivering KFOR messages with one voice. It was felt that those developing the talking points needed to spend time in the field to gain a better appreciation for life outside the wire in order to improve the credibility of the messages. Members of the information operations cell did take some measures to get out with the civil affairs and PSYOP teams and maneuver units to develop some first hand experience and understanding of the situation in the field. Sometimes there were conflicts between TST views and those expressed in the talking points. The TSTs felt they had a better understanding of ground truth. This led to concern about being too restrictive with the use of talking points and not allowing the TSTs and other with direct contact with the locals to have more flexibility and discretion in dealing with locals on key issue areas.

Reporting was a major activity of the TSTs daily tasks. Situation reports, village assessments, spot reports, and results of discussions and reactions to the use of the talking points were typical information that was collected and provided to MNB(E). A frequent problem was that TSTs were often asked for information that they had previously reported to MNB(E) headquarters elements. Additionally, little information ever came back down from higher organization levels. There was a concern on the part of the TSTs that information was not being reviewed, assessed, assembled, and distributed in a way that others could access and use it. Many felt that the MNB(E) process may have been more cut and paste reporting that became shelfware. On the other hand, the daily KFOR

CIMIC report was quite well received and provided useful information on UNMIK and KFOR civil-military operations activities. The report served to inform the civil-military community in and outside of Kosovo, as well as promoted CIMIC legitimacy and unity of effort among the civil-military players within Kosovo. Unfortunately, the more open dissemination to UNMIK and civilian agencies outside of Kosovo had to be stopped. This was due to a NATO policy that states any NATO document, regardless of classification, is not releasable to non-NATO entities without the expressed permission of the North Atlantic Council.

Pre-deployment training included participation in a five-week language training course in either Albanian or Serbian. The language training included some instruction on basic aspects of the social culture in which the soldiers would find themselves. Some soldiers with Hispanic background actually picked up Albanian quite quickly once in country. Once onsite, the fact that soldiers were trying to learn basic language skills had positive effects of helping to break the inner barriers of the local Albanian and Serbian cultures. As was noted by other units, however, the CRC/IRT training was less than satisfactory. It implied that Bosnia and Kosovo were the same, when in fact they were not. Every Kosovo AAR emphasized the point "Kosovo is not Bosnia," yet the pre-deployment training had not yet adapted to this point. There was no Kosovo block of instruction per se. Frequently instructors would say, "when I was in Bosnia," while discussing issues about the situation in Kosovo. The civil affairs unit also did not participate in an MRE, so the leadership learning curve was fast and furious when they hit the ground in country. Although the CA units had soldiers with Balkans experience, they did not necessarily have Kosovo experience. Nor did they have an understanding of how Task Force Falcon operated, including the battle rhythm. Trust and confidence were essential elements of team building, as well as timely integration of the teams into ongoing operations.

Per discussions with LTC Holshek, U.S. Army and KFOR liaison to UNMIK, one of the most valuable Kosovo civil-military operations lessons at the KFOR level was that it was more important to have adequately trained and qualified personnel than it was to have up-to-date doctrine. Soldiers often forget doctrine, but they less often forget the training that shapes their instincts in the field. The after action reviews tend to overly focus on doctrinal changes. The real issue is whether soldiers on the ground actually read or apply the doctrine, or

even are aware of it. For example, LTC Holshek noted that six months after publication of the latest version of FM 41-10, U.S. Army civil affairs officers at KFOR headquarters were not even aware that it had even been published, let alone obtained a copy. It was also pointed out that the most elegant and sophisticated doctrine is hardly useful to the uninitiated. The field is not always the place to learn basic theoretical concepts of CMO, although it is an ideal environment to reinforce them. As implied above, doctrine rarely fits every practical application, especially U.N.-led international peace operations. CMO doctrine in particular has barely been able to keep pace with the rapidly evolving and complex realities of peace operations over the past few years. This has been evidenced by both U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), and SHAPE in their difficulties in updating their doctrinal references. In the final analysis, training closes the gap between doctrine and operational reality.

Peace support operations tend to be mainly led or conducted by civilians, especially in transitional civil administration situations. Thus, the skill set requirements for the military CA/CIMIC forces have been radically altered. Holshek noted that the good news is that the requirement for CA/CIMIC specialists to perform nation-building is diminishing. The bad news is that the demands on CA/CIMIC generalists, particularly at the operational level, are increasing rapidly. The kind of people required to perform or coordinate operational level CA/CIMIC (for operations such as Joint Guardian) must possess greater peace support operation knowledge, combined/joint staff experience, CMO-related training and skills, political and cultural sensitivity training, and oral and written communications skills (usually in the English language). They must be solid staff officers and know something about risk assessment, and mission and course of action analysis. Beyond this, they must be knowledge and information managers and basic public administrators, logisticians, engineers, legal, and law enforcement specialists, and educators. They also need to be skilled at networking and coordinating in a multinational operational environment. The CA/CIMIC soldier today, in addition to the structured CMO training, must also possess interpersonal skills and an openness and sensitivity to their mission that cannot be taught. It is an art, not a science. They must be enablers as much, if not more, than technical experts. Between the military and civilian worlds they simultaneously inhabit, they must be engines of synergy, fueled by knowledge and information. They may not know all the answers, but they should at least know how to

find them. Thus, the effectiveness of the military team on the ground ultimately comes down to the quality of the participants. CA/CIMIC military force providers like SHAPE J9 and USACAPOC must now concentrate even more on making sure the people they select to perform operational and tactical level civil-military operations are the right kind, with the right background and the right training, for the right phases of the mission.

There is a historical reality related to the introduction of a non-traditional military role such as CMO into a traditional military warfighting force. There is the danger of developing a non-integrated subculture, or a CMO ghetto, within the deployed military community. This was certainly the case in the early days of CA/CIMIC activities in Bosnia. Admiral Smith, U.S. Navy and IFOR commander, made the comment upon his departure that "he didn't know what civil affairs was when they first arrived but now he can't do without them." As LTC Holshek put it, even the best-trained and most experienced CA/CIMIC officers have three strikes against them when they first report to many of the commands and commanders they support. First, they are not one of them (meaning they are either not in a combat specialty, not from the commander's unit, and/or are a reservist). Second, they are involved in something many commanders don't inherently understand and feel uneasy about, referred to as mission creep. The third strike is when a CA/CIMIC officer asks what he ought to be doing, rather than explaining what he can do to support the force and the extended mission (which implies an ability to conduct mission analysis and understand the CMO mission). Therefore, the first CA/CIMIC mission is to establish legitimacy with the supported command and commander. The untrained, unqualified and inexperienced CA/CIMIC officer is not as likely to be able to explain the value added and convince the commander that the CA/CIMIC team will be a force multiplier and an enabler to his operation.

For U.S. Army Reserve civil affairs forces, real world peace operations deployments are particularly challenging. Unlike most other Army Reserve forces, Reserve CA units are not afforded the usual two-week annual training (AT) exercise. This is the time during which the entire unit deploys to a military training center to conduct training in common soldier skills and other U.S. Forces Command or USACAPOC training required for deployment readiness. This leaves the typical Reserve CA unit commander with 48 unit training assemblies in 12 weekend drills per year, with an average of 60 to 70 percent attendance on a given drill

weekend. The challenge is for the CA commander not only to maintain readiness in these basic deployment readiness skills, but also to provide training in refreshing and improving the civil affairs skills for which they are needed.

USACAPOC provides great emphasis on doctrinal development and one time CA qualification training at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina. However, once initiated at Ft. Bragg, CA training involves rather perishable skills that cannot be updated solely through publications of updated doctrine. A careful review of USACAPOC training requirements for CA forces should look to streamline training requirements to cultivate skills that bring the most value-added to field operations. In this regard, USACAPOC could develop adaptable training modules or packages that enhance training for the emerging operational CA skills now needed rather than functional specialists in nation building. It should also consider sharing some of the training innovations of its units throughout its command. The 304th Civil Affairs Brigade has now run two mini-AT events on extended weekends at Ft. Dix, NJ. The events are intended to maximize opportunity, and to train as many of its soldiers as possible in basic deployment related skills. Training preserves the AT option for its soldiers, as well as opens many more options for CA intensive green-phase training throughout the remainder of the training year. Its headquarters company has implemented a system to group additional duty assignments in teams along mission and training lines to build leadership, improve training quality, and overall skill levels. There are many other such initiatives occurring across the CA community, which could be shared on a Web site. Distance learning tools and virtual simulation environments could be employed as well.

LTC Holshek noted that USACAPOC could explore implementing the U.N. Association of the United States recommendation that stated, "the United States, should renew the offer made by President Bush in 1992 to make Fort Dix, NJ—within easy driving distance of both United Nations headquarters and Washington—available for U.N. training of earmarked contingents." Besides supporting this idea, USACAPOC could take a step further by offering to run an international CIMIC training center (ICTC) to train in civil-military cooperation in international peace operations. There is also a potential opportunity to help create a research and analysis center on international CMO as well. In regard to the latter two points, the Canadians have such a training and research facility at the Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Training

Center in Nova Scotia. The Pearson center trains international civilians and military peacekeepers in a wide range of peace support operations skill areas, as well as conducts research into peace support operations. The George Mason University Program on Peacekeeping Policy co-sponsors an annual workshop with the Pearson Center, referred to as the Cornwallis Group, that brings together civil and military personnel with real world peace operations experiences and those concerned about the use of international forces and organizations in interventions. The focus of the workshop is to educate and explore ways to enable these forces and organizations to work together. There may be a possibility for other collaboration initiatives with the Canadian activity as well. Such a training capability could afford the opportunity for all CA and PSYOP battalions to rotate through an ICTC and test and upgrade civil affairs and peace support operation skills before deployment. The program would operate much like combat maneuver units, which rotate through the National Training Center in the U.S. or the U.S. Combat Maneuver Training Center in Germany. These soldiers obtain tremendous return on investment and training value-added.

In spite of many obstacles, civil affairs made a number of significant contributions to the success of the first year of MNB(E) operations. Over 500 detailed village assessments were conducted and documented. These assessments consisted of information and evaluations of food, water, sewage, sanitation, medical facilities, schools, religion, roads, transportation, electricity, governmental organizations, communications, public safety, key leaders, and more. TSTs forwarded their assessments to the G5 for database archiving, tracking, and distribution. Several village employment and rehabilitation program pilot projects were implemented and as a result of the success of these efforts, about 800,000 DM were obtained for additional projects. Utilizing a DoD funding source for $5 million, the civil affairs element was able to fund over 250 humanitarian assistance projects such as school repairs, electrical power grid and water treatment plant repairs, urgent humanitarian housing needs, and repair and replacement of fire and sanitation trucks. For example, streetlights were replaced in Kacanik where in addition to locating and procuring the right light bulbs, the TST needed to borrow a cherry picker to be used to replace bulbs in the lampposts. The Polish, Greek, and U.S. forces engaged in adopt a school program that provided much needed repairs and supplies. TSTs facilitated the spring planting season by coordinating NGO distribution of fertilizer and seed to local nationals and also helped coordinate the

repair and procurement of planting machinery. CA teams helped delivered 12 tons of humanitarian assistance aid and assisted in over 150 MEDCAPs/DENCAPs and medical training. CA assisted the UNMIK and OSCE Joint Registration Task Force. They coordinated daily with UNMIK, NGOs, international organizations, and local leaders. Labor and employment initiatives were conducted at the Glama Quarry, Gllamica Quarry, and Intregj Factory. CA also coordinated contracts with local companies to install speed bumps to slow down speeding drivers through villages.

CHAPTER XXII

Information Campaign

Larry Wentz

Information Operations

Information operations, led by KFOR headquarters, was essentially an information campaign that supported the KFOR mission and promoted the successes and credibility of UNMIK and KFOR in Kosovo. The Multinational Brigades' information operations took on different forms—there was no consistency in implementation across KFOR and the MNBs. In the U.S.-led sector, the U.S. concept of information operations as an integrating strategy drove MNB(E) information operations. It was therefore an effort to integrate the activities of various commanders, staff elements, and soldiers from the MNB(E) headquarters and subordinate U.S. and multinational battalion forces.

The lack of a strategic end state for Kosovo and overarching strategic plan to guide and help synchronize the information operations efforts resulted in multiple and loosely connected information campaigns occurring simultaneously in Kosovo. Information operations were still in its formative stages in NATO, so doctrine differed.

MNB(E), and the U.S. element in particular, was the most proactive in implementing information operations as an integration strategy. The approach employed was more than simply a public information campaign. There were both offensive and defensive aspects to MNB(E) information operations. The defensive aspects included operation security (OPSEC), information assurance and protection, and monitoring disinformation and propaganda. A Field Support Team (FST) from the U.S. Army Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) was used to support conducting information operations efforts in the MNB(E) region. The LIWA FSTs primary functions were planning, targeting,

overseeing, monitoring information operations execution, and conducting information operations assessments for the brigade. U.S. Army tactical information operations doctrine was the basis for the intelligence preparation of the information environment. This supported the military decisionmaking process, targeting process, and execution of operations by centralized planning and decentralized execution. The 1st ID and 1st AD had different approaches for executing information operations. The 1st ID used the LIWA FST team chief as the MNB(E) IO officer and at the battalion level, IO was just one more duty assignment. With 1 AD deployment, the Deputy Fire Support coordinator was appointed MNB(E) IO officer and the battalion Fire Support officers were appointed IO officers. This action provided a technical hierarchy as well as chain of command to ensure that the information operations tasks and responsibilities were executed.

Information operations in Kosovo strove to garner international support, influence essential Kosovo decisionmakers, and shape the local attitudes to behave in manners that supported KFOR soldiers and operations. The effort focused on providing operationally relevant information to leaders and the population, rather than managing perceptions. KFOR relied on Public Information, PSYOP, civil-military cooperation, and the Joint Implementation Commission. The MNB(E) information operations weapons of choice were the maneuver battalions, public information, PSYOP, civil affairs, special operations, and the JIC. Special services such as military escorts for Serbs, MEDCAPS, and DENCAPS were employed as well. KFOR use of disinformation, propaganda, and deception were not allowed, but this did not necessarily apply to national campaigns. Only white PSYOP was employed by KFOR and there was no counterpropaganda campaign in spite of extensive use of propaganda by the Serbs. Disinformation and propaganda flowed into the sector from various sources, including media sources within Kosovo as well as external to the province in Serbia and Albania. Word of mouth from travelers throughout the region and sector constituted a large source of disinformation. Propaganda in Kosovo tended to be very simplistic and obviously contrived. Serbian propaganda lacked credibility with the local population, especially ethnic Albanians. There was also disinformation on the Internet. KLA-FOR Online (http://www.kfor-online.com/) was an example of a Web site that was a spoof of the KFOR and NATO official Web sites. It depicted the U.N. SRSG and the NATO Secretary General as Nazis, and lauded the

successes of the Albanians with NATO's help to get rid of the Serbs in Kosovo. Direct refutation of propaganda only served to give it credibility. Instead, the KFOR campaign targeted areas such as promoting a safe and secure environment, deterring violence and criminal activities, encouraging a free and open society, promoting a positive UNMIK and KFOR image, and mine and UXO awareness. The target population was mainly 20 to 50 year olds and was a mix of Romas, Turks, Albanians, and Serbs. In Bosnia, the German PSYOP product *MIRKO* specifically targeted teenagers and was one of the more successful products produced by the IFOR/SFOR information campaign. There was no such product for Kosovo and little effort addressed teenager needs.

When I visited the KFOR information operations cell in Pristina in June, COL Bill Carter, U.S. Air Force, had just taken over. The activities of the KFOR information operations cell focused on planning, coordinating, collecting data, and analyzing the effectiveness of the KFOR information campaign. The information operations cell was also responsible for assessing all information-related activities of the KFOR headquarters operation and advising COMKFOR accordingly when conflicts arose, or if there was a possibility of improper use or release of information. The information operations cell reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff for operations and consisted of a PSYOP support element and an IO coordination section that consisted of current operations and long range planning.

There was a KFOR Joint Information Strategy cell, consisting of the IO cell and the Combined Public Information Center (also referred to as the Coalition Press Information Center or CPIC). The strategy cell brainstormed with the KFOR CJ heads to find avenues, methods, and messages for executing the information campaign. One of the concerns at the time was the inability to convey information, since the Kosovo national information infrastructure was dysfunctional. They focused on areas such as promoting KFOR successes, democratization, refugee returns, and law and order.

There were several KFOR working groups used to coordinate information operations activities. A weekly KFOR headquarters information operations working group meeting was held at the Humanitarian Community Information Center in Pristina with UNMIK and NGOs. There were two weekly working groups held with the MNBs

where NGOs were also invited, but usually did not attend. The chief of the KFOR information operations cell sponsored one of the weekly information operations working group (IOWG) meeting that rotated among the KFOR and MNB headquarters locations. The other was a PSYOP working group that met after the information operations working group. The KFOR IOWG was used as a way to facilitate KFOR-MNB collaboration and coordination, share insights on activities being pursued, share information operations tactics, and to deconflict activities where possible. In reality, the working groups focused on consensus building rather than directives, and MNBs only shared some the things they were doing in their sectors. The meetings also provided an opportunity for the KFOR and MNB information operations team leaders to network.

I had the opportunity to attend the KFOR IOWG held the first week of June at MNB(S) headquarters in Prizren. Participants included U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The main subjects of the meeting were the upcoming local celebrations being planned for the anniversary of KFOR, safety of the local population (particularly children), and the registration progress. COMKFOR instructed the MNBs not to participate in any anniversary celebration that was not sponsored by KFOR or UNMIK. Two official activities were scheduled, one of which was a June 11 UNMIK-sponsored celebration at the headquarters building in Pristina. On June 12, there would be a joint UNMIK and KFOR press conference where there would be a presentation on UNMIK-KFOR activities, short statements by the U.N. SRSG and COMKFOR, and a Q&A session. The KFOR 1st Anniversary information campaign, which was still in development, would focus on informing the public of KFOR and UNMIK accomplishments. The MNBs were requested to provide KFOR vignettes on accomplishments in their region. The safety campaign had several aspects. The new Kosovar passenger train service would be opening in June and there would be a charge. The information campaign needed to make the public aware of this, but more importantly, to make the children aware of the train operation since they played frequently on the tracks. With school ending for the summer, COMKFOR was concerned about children's safety from cars and landmines. The campaigns continued to emphasize road safety and mine awareness. The registration was moving too slowly, so the OSCE asked KFOR to help inform the public by putting up OSCE produced election posters in the Serbian enclaves. An OSCE contractor would take care of the

rest of Kosovo. KFOR would be putting an information campaign package together with the help of MNB(E) to address freedom of movement for Serbs, mine awareness, and the registration process. The rest of the meeting was devoted to the MNBs reviewing the focus of the previous and upcoming week's information operations activities, sharing initiatives, and discussing issues in their sectors. For example, MNB(W) shared their success with using T-shirts and ball cap handouts at sports events, as a way to attract people to come and listen to the mine awareness presentations. MNBs emphasized the need to do more joint operations and to continue to improve cooperation with UNMIK police and the Russians.

KFOR and the other MNBs did not conduct information operations like MNB(E). The MNB(E) information operations activity was a well-structured process with direct commander interest and involvement. It also brought all of the task force team into the planning and execution. LTC Smith, U.S. Army, was the MNB(E) information operations officer, supported by the LIWA FST led by Major Brown, U.S. Army. The information operations cell reported to the G3 and was located in the G3 plans area of the TOC. Collocation with G3 plans shop ensured that information operations were integrated into all of the plans and allowed the information operations cell to interact with other battle staff on information operations related matters.

The MNB(E) information operations cell participated in and chaired various meetings with the commanders and staff, the KFOR information operations cell, and KFOR IOWG. MNB(E) had its own internal information operations working group chaired by either the information operations officer or LIWA FST Chief. The MNB(E) IOWG served as a forum to exchange information among representatives of the primary staff elements and units involved with conducting the brigade's offensive information operations. The purpose of the information exchange was to coordinate and synchronize the execution of information operations in sector for the upcoming week and to obtain evidence to support accurate assessments of the brigade's IO efforts. The conduct of the various meetings comprised the IO cell's battle rhythm (Figure 1). These meetings were the initial targeting meeting, the target development meeting, the MNB(E) IOWG, the MNB(E) assessment meeting, the KFOR IOWG, the executive targeting meeting, and the commander's decision briefing. A target synchronization matrix directed and synchronized information operations engagements of

specific leaders and population groups in the sector. An information operations execution matrix was used to assign tasks to headquarters assets and subordinate battalions.


Figure 1. Information Operations Battle Rhythm

The IO cell prepared talking points for senior task force leader discussions with local leaders and supported the Crisis Action Cell (CAC) and QRFs when needed. Additional duties of the MNB(E) IO officer included assisting the OPSEC officer with defensive IO, assessing information-related activities of MNB(E) from an information operations perspective and information protection planning.

UNMIK, OSCE, KFOR, and MNB approaches and products included use of newspapers (including KFOR and MNB funded inserts for local papers), magazines, posters, handbills, radio/television, press conferences and releases, and Internet Web sites. Unlike the Bosnian newspaper *Herald of Peace*, which was published as a single paper in two languages, separate Kosovar newspapers were produced in both Albanian and Serbian languages. UNMIK published the *UNMIK News*, OSCE the *UPDATE*, UNHCR the *Humanitarian News*, KFOR the *KFOR Chronicle*, and at the MNB level the U.S. produced the *K-Forum* and *Falcon Flier*. KFOR also produced a monthly magazine the *Dialogue*. KFOR and the MNB PSYOP teams used posters and handbills extensively (Figure 2) for focused activities, such as land mine and UXO awareness.

Figure 2. PSYOP Product

KFOR and MNB(E) both funded radio stations and television programming. They used these media to provide Kosovo with popular music, KFOR messages, and talk shows featuring KFOR personnel. The content of the messages disseminated to the public included information from NATO, the U.S. State Department, KFOR, and UNMIK. The MEDCAPs and DENCAPs also interacted with the public by visiting remote communities and providing medical services.

The MNB(E) information operations team also created talking points that addressed key KFOR and MNB(E) sector issues and objectives for the information campaign. Typical subjects addressed a wide range of interest areas such as refugee returns, civil registration, mine awareness, role of Kosovo Police Service, and status of UNSCR 1244. These talking points were updated weekly or as required and distributed by FRAGOs to all levels of command. They served to provide a common perspective and educate those involved in the operation so that while on patrol or engaged in discussions with the local populace and community leaders the soldiers were prepared to discuss in some detail

issues and initiatives. Commanders on the ground viewed this as a very effective tool for their use in conducting operations.

PSYOP

Major Jorge Rangel, U.S. Army, commanded the 315th U.S. Army Reserve PSYOP company. The PSYOP company consisted of a tactical PSYOP detachment with three tactical PSYOP teams (TPT) and a product development detachment (PDD), located on Camp Bondsteel. In order to meet MNB(E) force protection requirements, each TPT consisted of four military personnel plus an interpreter. Frequently, combat camera accompanied TPT deployments, and at times, they helped the TPT meet the force protection requirements by providing the additional vehicles and shooters to meet the two-vehicle and four-shooter configuration for deployment into sector. The PSYOP company consisted of assets capable of disseminating operationally relevant information and associated messages to support the brigade's mission. However, given they actually supported all of the Multinational Task Force objectives (six battalions and a brigade level QRF), it was felt that six teams would have been more appropriate. Some believed the TPTs would have best served the task force if they were stationed with the maneuver battalions around the sector. However, the task force leadership wanted to keep this asset centrally located and controlled.

Although PSYOP used the PDD to develop and produce their own products, they did some local contracting for publishing as well. The tactical PSYOP company did not train for Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) operations or deploy with professional journalist and radio/television broadcasters and technicians as part of the team. The PDD staff stepped up to the challenge and under the circumstances did an outstanding job supporting the brigade. The arrival of 1st AD Mobile Public Affairs detachment in June included a broadcast media specialist who was able to provide professional support to PSYOP. By mid tour, the PDD made the greatest contribution to the over all PSYOP effort because of its good relationships with television and radio stations in the region. The impact of their contribution was largely due to the technical sophistication of the target audience and their willingness to engage the mass media.

The PSYOP team provided the ability to reliably and quickly access and influence the behavior of the target audience in MNB(E) using print media, radio, television, and face-to-face dissemination. The PDD could generate print products in 12 hours or less once approved. Radio scripts could be done in less than 2 hours. Getting product approval for dissemination could take up to 12 days. The process involved review by the G3, information operations cell, Staff Judge Advocate, political advertising (POLAD), and any other applicable staff section with final approval requiring sign off by the Chief of Staff, battalion commanders, and the task force commander.

Although the PDD had its own translators, one of the other big challenges was timely and accurate translation into Albanian and Serbian. CAT I personnel (local hires) often lacked basic translation skills and CAT II personnel (U.S. secret-cleared) with Serbian language skills were hard to come by. It was important to have translators that could accurately comprehend, speak, and write the language.

The purpose of TPTs was to provide ground-truth passive intelligence, establish UNMIK and KFOR credibility, foster cooperation between the Albanians and Serbs, help stabilize the region, eliminate violence, and promote ethnic tolerance. PSYOP personnel conducted engagements directed by the MNB(E) targeting process. All PSYOP soldiers were fully briefed and understood UNSCR 1244, the Task Force Falcon commander's intent, and commander KFOR's intent. This allowed every PSYOP soldier to speak intelligently with civilians about the purpose and intentions of UNMIK and KFOR. PSYOP team leaders spoke directly with community leaders, NGOs, and U.N. organization personnel. This offered them an opportunity to develop a sense of ground-truth and to assess the effects of MNB(E) operations. Senior staff read the TPT situation reports because of the consistent value of the (passively) obtained information.

The battle rhythm was demanding. The TPTs deployed into sector 6 days a week and at times on Sunday as well. In addition to supporting QRFs, TPTs were also used to support special events, such as the 1-year anniversary of the liberation of Kosovo. Many of these occurred on Sundays. They also supported cordon and search missions where weapons were confiscated. In these cases, the TPTs deployed with loudspeakers in order to help the maneuver battalion with crowd control should a disturbance occur. The PDD staff of seven supported 17 to 19

live radio shows per week and 1 to 2 television shows. These activities presented a variety of guests and topics all aimed at maintaining support for KFOR and NATO forces at work in the region. In addition, the PDD developed 5 to 7 print documents weekly and a newsletter, the *K-FORUM*. PSYOP participated in the daily BUBs and held staff meetings Monday through Saturday. They participated in the task force targeting meetings and information operations working groups, including representing MNB(E) at the weekly KFOR-sponsored PSYOP working group. MNB(E) PSYOP team also launched a cross training exchange with the German, UK (referred to as Shadow Element) and French PSYOP elements. In September, PSYOP conducted a media conference in which local Serbian and Albanian media providers came to Camp Bondsteel to discuss relevant media issues. Because of this effort, an Albanian station agreed to fax daily news bulletins to a Serbian station. All participants agreed that future conferences would be beneficial. PSYOP personnel also provided the TFF ACE through daily situation reports relevant information (passive intelligence) on topics and issues germane to the MNB(E) mission.

PSYOP fliers were distributed to the public as different needs or events arose. For example, fliers explained to the residents of Strpce that a recent attack on the UNMIK office was an attack against KFOR and would result in sanctions against the community. Fliers announced curfews, explained KFOR actions, and promoted community-building initiatives. Using a Risograph, the PDD produced handbills such as the *K-FORUM*, a one page, front and back newsletter. The news articles were not generally written by the PDD staff, but from open sources. The *K-FORUM* was produced in Albanian, Serbian, and English. Since many the small towns did not have access to news media other than radio and television broadcasts from Serbia, the *K-FORUM* gave them the news of Kosovo. While in sector with a TPT, one of the major points made by the residents of the small village visited was the desire to get access to reading material. They were quite pleased to receive the handouts from the TPT, which also included the *Dialogue*, the KFOR magazine produced in Pristina. For a while, excess *Stars and Stripes* newspapers were distributed throughout the sector.

The MNB(E) PAO published *Falcon Flier* was also given to locals when it was available. Posters addressed a variety of issues, such as reporting crime, the KFOR and local veterinarian program to capture stray dogs, and mine awareness. KFOR placed ads in newspapers such

as the Albanian *Fer Press* in Urosevac. One such ad called for an end to violence and contained a picture (taken by combat camera in the operating room of the MASH hospital on Camp Bondsteel) of an 8-year-old girl who had been shot (Figure 3). Over time, the *Fer Press* proved unpopular with the public and MNB(E) ceased to use it.

Figure 3. PSYOP Product for *Fer Press*

Figure 4. Thumbs Up for KFOR

Along with presence patrols conducted by the maneuver battalions, face-to-face PSYOP was a significant operational capability. The three MNB(E) TPTs were used to provide coverage throughout the brigade sectors including the areas controlled by the Russians, Poles and Greeks. The TPTs distributed PSYOP products, conducted loudspeaker operations, and held face-to-face sessions with the public. Loudspeakers were used for crowd control as well as information campaigns. For example, the "Thumbs up for KFOR" (Figure 4) information campaign that was aimed at trying to stop children from coming up to KFOR vehicles and trying to give or receive a high five from the soldiers. There were some that felt the campaign also aimed at countering the use of the three-finger VJ victory sign by the Serbian children. TPT personnel were trained for personal contact with the public, and were effective in persuading and influencing public perceptions of KFOR. They were also able to assess the immediate effects of their engagements and detect changes in behaviors and attitudes in later visits to the communities.

While face-to-face communication with the locals was the most effective means of PSYOP, television and radio were the best ways to communicate with the majority of the population. Face-to-face is a precision, high impact method of administering the message of the commander. Radio and television allowed PSYOP to convey the commander's message more effectively to the mass of the population, thereby promoting support for KFOR on a wider scale.

In addition to producing and disseminating fliers, handbills, posters, and other print products, the PSYOP company was capable of producing radio and television programming. Local radio stations were contracted to broadcast MNB(E) information and messages (Figure 5). There were two Serbian radio stations, Radio Max in Silovo and Radio Zupa in Brezovica. I was able to visit Radio Max one evening with Staff Sergeant McCarthy. Radio Max was a husband and wife run radio station located in their home, which was under construction in a Serbian enclave. PSYOP paid for airtime and provided the station with CDs, KFOR announcements, and scripts.

Figure 5. PSYOP Sponsored Radio Station

There were seven Albanian stations under contract: Radio Festina in Urosevac, Radio Victoria in Gnjilane, Radio Iliria in Vitina, Radio TEMA in Urosevac, Radio Energji in Gnjilane, Radio Pozaranje in Pozaranje, and Radio Kacanik in Kacanik. UNMIK ran a joint Albanian/ Serbian radio station in Kamenica. I was able to visit this station, which was located in the UNMIK building. To my surprise, there were two collocated sound booths, one Serbian and one Albanian, for the broadcasters. A glass partition separated them (Figure 6). The terrain and cost were too restrictive to initially set up full AOR radio coverage, so several small stations were used to achieve limited coverage to get things started. The number of contracted radio stations grew from 6 regional stations in April 2000 to 14 by the end of July with coverage that extended to all 7 municipalities across the brigade's sector. As the number of stations grew, the PSYOP company took advantage of the opportunities to expand broadcast coverage for dissemination of information and messages to support the MNB(E) mission.

Figure 6. Combined Serbian and Albanian Radio Broadcast Booths

The first operational Kosovar television station in sector, an Albanian station television Vali in Gnjilane, did a couple of KFOR broadcasts in May but did not reemerge until July 2000. Given the new television capability, the PSYOP Company was preparing to initiate a similar vigorous effort with television broadcasting as they did with radio. The most popular program was the live Four Pillars show, which featured the local KFOR commander and representatives from UNMIK, UNMIK police, UNHCR, and OSCE. These shows were normally scheduled for 1 hour, but often went on for 2 to 3 hours and in many cases had to be cut off after several hours of broadcasting. The shows were successful because authoritative principles from important organizations were present and questions on most any subject were answered with credibility.

In addition to producing radio public service announcements, the PSYOP company scheduled and prepared MNB(E) headquarters personnel for appearance on live radio shows. The PSYOP company and the information operations cell coordinated each week on topics, facts, and messages appropriate for public service announcements and radio shows. Meetings were held after shows in which call-in questions were received from the local populace in order to ensure follow-up facts and messages were addressed in later appearances. By July 2000, each task

force maneuver battalion commander had a contracted radio station available in his sector to conduct weekly live radio shows.

At the time of the departure of the 315th, they were doing 17 to 19 live radio shows per week and 1 or 2 television shows. These shows covered a wide range of topics and important KFOR communicators:

- Commanders, soldier shows, and information operations;

- Medical, dental, veterinarian, and pre-natal care;

- Preventative medicine, substance abuse, and nutrition;

- NGOs and UNMIK four pillars;

- Psychological trauma;

- Rule of law, legal issues in the region, and finance;

- English;

- Farming;

- U.S. History and education;

- Weekly operations updates; and

- Children's stories.

Translating and interpreting live on the air was dangerous because hasty translations would leave room for error when accuracy was of highest importance. There were plans to get some broadcast delay equipment to support live call-in radio talk shows.

The weekly MNB(E) information operations working group provided a good source of feedback from those in the field who were able to sense local population sensitivities and changes and views of the products disseminated. Face-to-face interactions with leaders and local residents and building trust relationships with these people provided a means to get honest feedback. The KFOR information operations and PSYOP working groups were good forums for obtaining feedback. Open source literature was reviewed and radio shows and other media were monitored. There was a weekly coordination meeting with OSCE who

had an extensive media monitoring activity. Behavior change takes time and some changes would not become evident immediately.

Figure 7. KFOR Headquarters

While in Prizren for a KFOR-sponsored information operations working group, I met LTC Grade, German military. As the chief of the KFOR PSYOP support element, he was in Prizren to chair the KFOR-sponsored PSYOP working group. In response to an invitation to visit KFOR headquarters to discuss KFOR PSYOP activities, a trip was made to Film City, the home of KFOR headquarters. Film City was a film studio (Figure 7) located on a hill overlooking the city of Pristina. There were some first impressions of KFOR headquarters that served as a reminder that contrasts in Kosovo also exist within the KFOR military establishments. After having spent several weeks at Camp Bondsteel and deploying into sector multiple times with U.S. forces, a few things struck me as being different as I arrived at KFOR headquarters. As I entered the main gate, I saw a street lined on both sides with national PXs that sold anything from alcohol to souvenirs. Second, soldiers were not wearing helmets, flack vests, or carrying weapons. In fact, some of the multinational military uniforms were shorts, not battle dress uniforms (BDUs). Third, although there was certainly heavy force protection around the base perimeter, soldiers were free to walk on and off the base subject to having appropriate identification. Soldiers were also free to eat and drink at local establishments and buy from vendors on the streets, in shops and outside the main gate to KFOR. The pace

of KFOR headquarters operations was busy but certainly less hectic than MNB(E) headquarters activities. It was almost like being on a base in Germany, a stark contrast to MNB(E)'s high OPTEMPO and strict force protection.

The KFOR PSYOP support element (PSE) reported to the chief of the Information Campaign (IC), who in turn reported to the KFOR assistant chief of staff for operations. The PSE was generally focused on the Pristina area, rather than all of Kosovo. This lack of comprehensive focus led to the MNBs being vastly different in their approaches to PSYOP. NATO funding was not sufficient to have the PSE assume a leading role in the information campaign. Reporting to the IC chief was an IO coordination section who were responsible for long-range planning and current operations. France, Spain, and the UK did not participate in the PSE. Germany, Denmark, Belgium, Italy, U.S., and Romania were the contributing nations. The PSE operated the KFOR owned print, radio, and television assets and coordinated the theater-wide PSYOP campaign with the MNBs. The primary means of coordination was the weekly KFOR sponsored PSYOP working group that rotated its meetings between KFOR headquarters and the headquarters of the MNBs.

KFOR taped radio programs and monitored their quality to be sure that the script sent was used and that local stations did not use them out of context. The products were written in English first and then translated. UNMIK, OSCE, and the MNBs conducted media monitoring and KFOR tried not to overreact to propaganda. KFOR was truthful and distributed pragmatic information. The general rule was, "do not react to disinformation, react to selective issues of importance."

There were plans to expand the KFOR PSE from a small, largely military team to a staff of 53 that included civilians as well as military. In order to improve the effectiveness of the operation they needed better continuity, given the high turnover rate of the KFOR military personnel. In addition, they needed to build a professional journalist and radio/television production staff for the longer term. The military would cover 32 positions and 21 would be a local civilian mix of Serbs and Albanians. There would be 12 staff covering radio, 2 for television, and the rest would cover the print media. The PSE had four interpreters and could use the KFOR command group interpreters as well. The military staff would rotate and civilian staff would provide the continuity.

Some Observations

Assessment of information operations effectiveness was extremely difficult. Attempts to do so were highly subjective and dependent upon interpretation. Every 3 months, Gallop conducted a survey of Pristina and Metrovica, which estimated the number people that saw and used the KFOR products. OSCE provided daily and weekly reports on radio, television, and print media activities. All units who interacted with the public also contributed their insights and observations from the field.

There were a number of early KFOR PSE issues to be addressed. The experience, education and training of the military staff assigned to the PSE varied and generally did not adequately cover unique aspects of the operation, such as culture, religion, and politics. The MNBs saw themselves as independent and there was a need to better integrate and leverage KFOR and cross-MNB PSYOP activities. The assets and experience of the MNBs were quite different as well. Two had good access to radio and television and some had none. Radio and print experts were needed to compete with local media. KFOR and the MNBs needed professional journalists and broadcasters. The initial information operations and PSYOP capabilities at KFOR lacked the expertise that KFOR was trying to develop. KFOR had an excellent relationship with Radio Television Kosovo (RTK). They relied on the local RTK television expertise, since this was something their own their staff lacked. In order to develop a capability, KFOR established a training program with RTK to educate their television staff. They were using internships to train their staff. KFOR had good relationships with the local radio stations as well. CJ2 screened civilian candidates recommended by UNMIK, RTK and others for the PSE openings. Candidates needed to provide documentation on personal background, expertise, and demonstrate certain skills.

Other challenges included the Serbian Red Cross, which was essentially funded and controlled by the Serbs. It was reported that they were taking USAID and other international aid packages and covering the source markings with Serbian Red Cross markings before distributing to the Kosovar Serb community. Russian soldiers in Kamenica region were reported to be displaying the three-finger VJ victory sign to the local Albanian population. It did not serve to improve their image, and further created tensions between Albanians and Serbs, especially when

the children started returning the symbol to the Russians and other KFOR forces. Joint U.S. and Russian patrols were conducted to portray unity of effort and an MNB(E) information center was opened in Kamenica, these combined efforts served to enhance the acceptance of the Russian forces in the area.

CHAPTER XXIII

Public Affairs

Larry Wentz

New ways of military thinking about the media have begun to emerge. For example, the term *media awareness* is now used by the military, implying that the old ways of thinking, such as "keep the press under control," are going away. The media today enjoy greater access to soldiers supporting peace operations than in any other military operation. This is not true, however, for combat operations. For the air war over Serbia, General Clark, U.S. Army and SACEUR, placed tight controls on media relations and the release of information on allied air operations.

Peace operations can be just as complex as combat and the media coverage involves more than simply reporting on the military operation. This means that in addition to being familiar with the military, the media also needs to have a working knowledge of the humanitarian, political, economic, cultural, social, legal, and even criminal justice issues of the country in which the peace operation is being conducted. Furthermore, today's journalists and broadcasters often have communications capabilities that are superior to those of most other actors on the peace operations landscape, including in some cases even the military. Coupling the superior communications capability with privately contracted transportation assets means that journalists, once dependent on military forces for logistic and communications support, are now largely independent agents—many times arriving before the first military response to a peace support operation.

The changing reporting and operating environment affords a number of the media the ability to file real-time or near-real-time news from the field. Using satellites, cellular telephones, and computers, the reporters can file their stories and provide simultaneous reports of activities occurring throughout the peace support operation environment. As a result, the media can flatten the traditional organizational hierarchy through unrestricted access and compress decisionmaking cycles

through real-time reporting. Indeed, the speed with which media file their stories is faster than the transmission of information up a military chain of command or through an aid organization to its leadership. Around-the-clock news reporting has created a seemingly insatiable hunger for newsworthy stories. The access, filing capabilities, and pervasiveness of the modern media corps virtually guarantees reporters will transmit all newsworthy events in real-time to a global audience. Therefore, the military needs an effective media policy and a comprehensive strategy and information plan that is part of the overall peace support operation planning process and addresses how the military forces should interact with the media in peace operations.

Multinational peace support operations have high global visibility, but media and public interest in such events is relatively short lived. The conflict in Kosovo was such a case in 1999. There was heavy daily coverage of the air war and Task Force Hawk—its Apache attack helicopter deployment had heavy coverage since the press anticipated possible combat operations. In spite of the difficulty of physically getting to the Kosovar refugee camp (Camp Hope), the Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope humanitarian assistance operation received media coverage up until it was turned over to the UNHCR on June 26, 1999. For the KFOR deployment, it was reported that a staggering 2700 media people accompanied the NATO forces when they entered Kosovo at the end of the bombing (at the peak of the Vietnam War there were 500 correspondents).

The establishment of an effective media policy at the outset of the KFOR operation was important to its overall success. There were differences in media policy among major NATO elements such as SHAPE, AFSOUTH, ARRC, and KFOR. Furthermore, there were differences between NATO and the troop committing nations and their national policies and actions. As a result, the overall media policy for the Kosovo operation was unclear and coordination of related NATO and national activities was problematic at times—NATO and the nations did not always speak with one voice. There was a lack of tactical communications supporting the public affairs (public information) activities and this was particularly true for MNB(E). The communications capabilities of KFOR and the MNB public information elements lacked compatibility and connectivity. There was little coordination among the public information activities during the early phases of the KFOR deployment and even after a year, coordination was still an issue being

worked by the KFOR public information officer with his MNB counterparts. The Internet was an important medium for promoting the image of the operation and KFOR access to the Internet was a problem at the outset of the operation, but it improved significantly over time with the establishment of the KFOR unclassified WAN and the KFOR Web site. The MNBs also had Web sites supporting activities in their sectors and these sites were linked to the KFOR and appropriate national sites as well as UNMIK, OSCE, EU, and NGOs. E-mail was found to be an effective means to communicate with the international media and provided KFOR and the MNBs an ability to surf the Internet to obtain the international media views of the operation.

KFOR tried to have its public information centers located outside of the military bases, usually in a hotel or commercial or government office building, in order to ensure open access but also to avoid unauthorized media access to the military operational areas. Although the objective was to make press access to the military as easy as possible, not all press information centers offered unrestricted access to the media. For example, the German and U.S. press centers were located on military guarded and access controlled base camps, limiting the freedom of access whereas KFOR and the other MNBs had theirs outside. The KFOR press center was in a commercial office building in downtown Pristina with open access to the media. The MNB(N) French run press center was located in an old Serbian military hotel in Metrovica with a military guard at the entrance but the accredited press had free access. Putting the public information center outside the wire did require some military security measures to ensure the safety of the journalist should an attack occur.

The local and international media coverage of the KFOR deployment was generally favorable, however, few international media remained several months after the extensive coverage of the initial deployment and stabilization activities and herein lies a major difference between war and peace support operations. For war coverage, the stories end when the troops go home but for peace support operations, the stories end when the media goes home. Hence, the military Public Affairs Officer (PAO) or Public Information Officer (PIO) has a much more challenging job in the long haul to keep the media interested in telling the soldiers' stories and reporting the successes of the operation. There are other differences that affected military-media relationships. In wartime, the military (for operational security reasons) imposes

restrictions on the release of information, limits press access to the military, and controls coverage in the war zone by using staged briefings, press pools, and military escort officers. In peace operations, the media live and operate outside the military as independents with the freedom to travel and work at their own discretion. In many cases, they were generally better informed on local developments than the military intelligence operations.

When a newsworthy event makes the headlines and the evening news, the world public, the families of service members, the news media, and even governments have an insatiable appetite for information that must be made readily and immediately available. Many of the old sources of controversy such as censorship, access to military units, press pools, and transmission of information back home are no longer at the center of discussion of military-media relationships for peace operations. CNN is everywhere on the peace operations landscape and where they go all other media will follow. Censorship today is virtually impossible, especially with today's communications and information systems capabilities that allow the media to virtually broadcast live from essentially anywhere in the world at any time. Cellular phones offer instant uncensored connectivity to those on the ground and the global Internet's e-mail messaging and Web sites offer uncensored information from persons who are both on the inside and outside of an operation. Globalization of information has significantly changed the way people follow and report on military operations.

The importance of good media relations is reflected in an observation made by COL G. Anderson, USMC. He said, "The media gives you a chance to tell your story. You never get a second chance to create a first impression." Another important observation by Dr. Lawrence Yates of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College is also worth considering. "The news media commands the public's perceptions of the military. The most productive response to the presence of the media is to be honest and to assist the journalists in disseminating information."

There have been moves by the military to become more media friendly, requiring new field manuals and media awareness training for commanders and soldiers. A bold and innovative plan in Army military-media relationships surfaced in Bosnia with the use of embedded media, an approach used successfully by the Marines since WWII. Journalists were assigned to Army units to be deployed to Bosnia and accompanied them when they deployed. The rationale was to foster familiarity on the

part of the journalist with the unit and its soldiers. The assumption was that as the reporters got to know the unit and the soldiers, they would develop a more positive attitude toward the military mission and tell their story. It was also believed that the immediate presence of reporters would foster a more positive attitude on the part of the soldiers toward the media. The downside, from the military's point of view, was that commanders might become too comfortable with reporters thereby making candid remarks that might embarrass the Armed Forces.

U.S. forces deploying into Kosovo used the embedded media concept as well. There were some 30 reporters that entered Kosovo with U.S. troops from Macedonia and stayed 1 to 2 weeks with the units they accompanied—both the PAOs and journalists felt the embedded concept worked well. The military intent was to continue to ensure a free flow of information though a close working relationship with the media and to make press access to the military as easy as possible. Press conferences, media opportunities, scheduled interviews, information handouts, and escorted visits to outposts were organized and used by the PAO as a means to keep the media informed of MNB(E) activities and to keep the information flowing. For example, while I was in Kosovo, the press was invited to attend the TOA between 1st ID and 1st AD held on the parade ground on Camp Bondsteel. MTV news host Serena Altschul and three television producers arrived at Camp Bondsteel to film a documentary about the lives of young U.S. soldiers during a peacekeeping mission. Escorted visits to outposts such as Sapper and deployed units were conducted as well. The *Stars and Stripes* reporters were seen frequently on Camp Bondsteel.

DoD policy encourages cooperative military-media relationships and a culture change is taking place on the part of the military and media, but building mutual trust takes time. There was a feeling on the part of a number people interviewed that the Army was still somewhat at arm's length when dealing with the media. For example, while accompanying a military-escorted group of correspondents to outpost Sapper, I asked Jennifer Black, the *World News* correspondent, for her impression of working with the military. She said she felt from her personal experiences that the U.S. forces (mainly the Army) kept the media at arm's length, whereas other militaries did not. When KFOR deployed, she accompanied the British into Kosovo and had a good working relationship with them while in their sector.

Figure 1. Correspondents Visiting Sapper

These same correspondents interviewed the PAO (Figure 1) and some of the soldiers manning the checkpoint at Sapper. They also interviewed some locals being searched at the checkpoint. Following the interviews, the journalists decided to walk, without military escort, into the town of Dobersin a few kilometers away in the General Security Zone where the UCPMB had a training area. Jennifer Black walked the rugged dirt road in sandals since her luggage had not made it on her commercial flight to Skopje from London. When the correspondents returned from Dobersin an hour or so later they said they tried to talk to some soldiers at the training area, but were told they did not have time to speak to them since they were busy. The correspondents had also walked into the town of Dobersin but were not very successful in getting anyone their to talk to them either. Although these examples are only a small sample of real world experiences, significant efforts were made by the military to work cooperatively with the media and to share information with them.

U.S. Marine Corps (26th MEU) Public Affairs

Marine Corps Public Affairs serves as a link between Marines and the public. Public Affairs Marines must be trained, equipped, and postured to serve the force commanders, as they execute their duties in keeping Marines and the American people informed of what is happening on

the battlefield, as well as on Marine Corps bases. To accomplish their mission, PA Marines must have a sound understanding of the organization, tactics and equipment used in war and other conflicts. They must be integrated into the commander's battle staff and must train side-by-side with the warfighting units.

Captain Gabrielle Chapin, U.S. Marine Corp, was the public affairs officer during the 26th MEU participation in Operation Allied Force, Task Force Shining Hope, and Operation Joint Guardian. The 26th MEU involvement with the media in Kosovo actually began during operations in Albania. An early USMC PAO assessment of where American and international media were located during the air war and the humanitarian assistance operation indicated that the majority was staying in Tirana, Albania. For the press, it was a somewhat dangerous 4-hour trip by land from Tirana to Camp Hope, the Kosovar refugee camp for which the Marines had provided security. Attacks by bandits were a constant threat along the way—besides cash, the bandits were interested in reporter's satellite phones, cameras, laptops, and four-wheel drive vehicles. In order to more effectively engage the media, the PAO created a sort of round robin operation where media would be flown from Tirana to the U.S.S Kearsarge, remain overnight, and then be taken by helicopter in the morning to Camp Hope and then returned to Tirana. In addition to making it easier and safer to get to Camp Hope, the intent was to provide the media a place to file stories and hold numerous interviews (Colonel Glueck the 26th MEU commander, pilots flying bombing missions, Marines going ashore to provide security at the refugee camps, etc.). The number of journalists was kept to around 20 at a time in order to accommodate their needs. The beauty of the media plan was that there was so much going on that the media were extremely pleased with the access—the Marines were involved in the NATO bombing mission, were on TRAP (tactical recovery of personnel) alert, and were providing security at Camp Hope where refugees were arriving. This was where the good relationships between the 26th MEU and the media were established for the Kosovo operation.

By the time the Marines received word that the 26th MEU would participate as part of the initial U.S. force into Kosovo, they had already worked out who from the media should go in with them. Colonel Glueck supported the idea of embedding media within units, on a space available basis. It is important to note that embedding media is something that has traditionally made the Marine Corps famous—for

example, the photos taken by Louis Lowery and Joe Rosenthal of the Marines raising the flag at Mt Suribachi in WWII.

Days before disembarking at the Thessaloniki, Greece landing site, the journalists selected were flown to the ship and introduced to their units. Units were selected based on their place within the convoy. For example, reporters and journalists were assigned with units that would best suit their needs. One television crew traveled in the back of a five-ton truck and filmed the convoy as it traveled up the winding roads from Thessaloniki to the staging area at Brazda, Macedonia and then on to Gnjilane, Kosovo. Colonel Glueck allowed one TV satellite truck to be placed into the convoy. The TV satellite truck provided each of the networks an opportunity to cover events as they happened. Ground rules were established for the release of information. The media only stayed with the units for a few days after arriving in Kosovo. Requests to remain with the units could be made with the PAO once in country. On the day of the launch, the journalists mustered with their units as though they were members. CNN set up a live remote near the landing craft air cushion (LCAC) vehicles and the world was able to follow the 26th MEU amphibious landing in Greece and departure by road convoy for Kosovo. However, this was not the end of the media coordination. Colonel Glueck also allowed those who could not be accommodated for the deployment to be on the beach where the landing would take place. A public affairs rep was at the landing site the day before and established an area for media to meet. Those accredited were allowed closer access and opportunities to interview Marines and commanders.

The movement over the border into Kosovo was not fluid. Units were held up at the border for some time. Still, those media with units were fed and bedded down with the Marines. The embedding process was important because it gave the media a deeper (and often more appreciative) understanding of how Marines live and work. Because there was only one public affairs officer for the 26th MEU, a system of handling the overwhelming number of journalists already in country needed to be established. The plan was to inform all major news services that each day the 26th MEU would offer a situation update in the morning and then allowed opportunities to go out on patrol with some of the mechanized units. Others were shown where units were located within the sector. The key to handling the large number of journalists interested in covering the operation was to provide media-relations training for each member of the 26th MEU prior to its deployment.

Media training for the Marines began early in the work-ups and included a number of classroom type discussions and on camera interview sessions. Each small unit leader was aware of what tags media must wear to prove accreditation, ground rules for media embedding or visiting units, and the importance of allowing them open access on a not-to-interfere basis. For example, if one of the news networks happened to stumble upon a Marine checkpoint and wished to spend the night, a call was made to the PAO for confirmation. The PAO attempted to track where major media were located within the Marines sector. By embedding media, each unit became comfortable having them present. This positive relationship between the 26th MEU and media resulted in very positive coverage.

Media operations supporting the initial KFOR deployment were essentially independent even within the Task Force Falcon piece of the operation. The Marines setup their media operations in a field overlooking Gnjilane. Because there were limited communications capabilities at this stage of the operation, there was little to no contact with other PAOs. A Joint Information Bureau was not established at the outset. Communications and information systems supporting PAO were sparse. This was largely attributed to PAO not being a high priority for acquisition and modernization. On the other hand, the media with their state of the art satellite phones, cellular phones, mobile TV capabilities, and laptops were well equipped to receive and send information in an environment such as Kosovo. The Marines JTF Enabler communications package was available for use by the media to file stories/photos once they arrived in country. However, it was more likely that the military might need to use the media equipment. In fact, the Marines used the media satellite phones on a number of occasions during the deployment operations.

The 26th MEU was able to accommodate up to 300 journalists a day because the Marines were well trained in dealing with the press. Each acted as a spokesman for the MEU. The 26th MEU established relationships early on, had a good system of ground rules, and provided very open access. The media did not interfere with the operation. Instead, they were an integral part of the operational environment. There was no spin when dealing with the media. Colonel Glueck made himself available to media and answered questions in a direct, accurate way. Finally, besides accommodating media, a number of young Marines sent photos and stories through the U.S. Navy Chief of Information to AP, Reuters, and all major news networks. This offered yet another

opportunity to tell the Marine Corps story. For example, one of the Marines had taken a photograph of a firefight, and it appeared on the front page of Washington Post and New York Times the morning following the event. The PAO also created a Web site on the 26th MEU homepage to share information on the operation.

Task Force Falcon (U.S. Army) Public Affairs

The mission of the U.S. Army Reserve Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (MPAD) attached to the MNB(E) was to ensure free flow of information throughout the operation to external media and internal audiences to convey the Army experience. The Public Affairs team consisted of 18 soldiers who were print and broadcast journalists. As Sergeant Jack Eden, U.S. Army Reserve, put it, "I'm a photographer with a pencil. We tell stories both in pictures and words."

The MPAD had two aspects to its operation: the command support side and the public affairs side. They advised the commander and served as his spokesperson for releasing information on operations. The MPAD coordinated and facilitated media operations and produced unit internal information products. Major Debra Allen, U.S. Army Reserve, was the commander of the MPAD and also functioned as the Brigade Public Affairs Officer. The public affairs operations included press releases, media escorts, and interviews with MNB(E) leaders. They participated in the TFF Crisis Action Cell and integrated operations with the MNB(E) information operations efforts. The PAO needed to be able to make public disclosures of significant events with a minimum of delay. PA also provided G5-like task force command information coverage, such as base photographers. They monitored external media coverage but they could not reproduce and hand out copyright material (PSYOP and open source intelligence [OSINT] activities could do this).

In practice, the G3 battle captain alerts PA and other headquarters support elements such as PSYOP and combat camera of significant events for which coverage was appropriate. The PAO felt that there was a G3 problem in this regard since frequently the PAO was not alerted to cover significant events. While I was at Camp Bondsteel, I did observe a situation that should have had PA involvement but did not. A QRF was activated one evening to cover a rock-throwing incident in Kamenica. PSYOP and combat camera were called up to accompany the QRF but PA was not. The reason for this was unclear at the time but

upon reflection, a contributing factor to an apparent PAO-G3 disconnect may have been one of mode of operation of the MPAD and the PAO. Involvement needs to be a proactive two-way process and as such, both the G3 and PAO need to actively engage each other and this did not appear to be happening on either part. Up until June 2000, the MPAD media operations seemed to be more reactive than proactive in its interactions with elements of the task force. They produced press releases when directed by the MNB(E) leadership, escorted media representatives when notified, and tended to take a generally neutral stand when providing information to the media that entailed releasing only facts with no associated messages. The MPAD rotated in July 2000 and with the change in unit came a more proactive approach to media operations. The new MPAD initiated press releases to ensure the facts surrounding events that could impact the MNB(E) mission were released as quickly as possible to head off potential misinformation or propaganda. The MPAD coordinated with the information operations section to ensure that appropriate MNB(E) messages were released. The MPAD also coordinated with the information operations section on facts and messages to use in preparing senior MNB(E) leaders for press interviews and speeches.

The MPAD coordinated media coverage for all units in Task Force Falcon. In addition to the Camp Bondsteel operation, there were two journalists at Camp Montieth supporting the maneuver brigades and a TFF PA liaison officer located in Pristina at the KFOR Press and Information Center who worked with the media and the KFOR Public Information Office. The TFF PAO served as KFOR spokesperson in Gnjilane when KFOR PIO could not attend the weekly press conference. There was a difference in the pace of PA activities at Camps Montieth and Bondsteel. Montieth was much more active pace—they were closer to the sector action. It was suggested that Bondsteel was too spread out and this made it harder to find out where the stories were. The maneuver brigades liked to have PA come along with them to give visibility to their units and soldiers. The PA photographers and journalists went out with CA and PSYOP teams and covered significant operations (MEDCAPS and cordon and search operations). They covered hospital stories about the medical staff and victims. On visits into sector, the PA journalists were genuinely impressed by the gratitude from the Albanians for the U.S. being there to help, especially during the winter.

Unlike Bosnia, the TFF PAO did not have direct access to DoD PAO; they used the chain of command to send information unless it was a very special event requiring direct access. Normally, TFF PA reported to USAREUR PAO who reported to EUCOM PAO. Once a week a conference call was held with the U.S. PAO at SHAPE headquarters. OSCE/UNMIK held a press conference every Wednesday in MNB(E): one in Gnjilane covered by U.S. TF 1-63 Armor out of Camp Montieth and one in Urosevac covered by Greek units.

The MPAD worked with radio stations and did special interest and significant event videos. They had a video shelter with professional production equipment that could be used to produce commercial quality videos. Combat camera also used pictures and video to document events and activities for historical purposes and other special uses. Although they used professional photographic equipment, their production capability was of a lesser quality than the PA capabilities. The MPAD produced family support videos that were sent back to Germany. Scripts and commercial quality videos were provided to AFN radio news and AFN/USAREUR TV news as well.

DoD funded media visits for small town journalists who would not normally be able to make such a visit. There was a hometown news release program for newspapers. However, doctrinally and legally, PA could not target the public and decisionmaking community. They did not survey hometown newspapers to see where it might be appropriate to provide soldier stories. If asked, they would provide stories. The PA office facilitated coverage of the TFF by the local and international media. They invited and coordinated media coverage of special events. There was a Media Operations Center on Camp Bondsteel with briefing rooms and related visual aides and support capabilities. There was also a small media center at Camp Montieth. PA coordinated and facilitated media escorts into the sector and in their view, it was better to have PA accompany the media than to have the journalists show up unannounced and conduct interviews on their own. For significant events, the PA staff did a worst-case assessment of questions they and the commander were likely to be asked and crafted appropriate responses.

Support was provided to the information operations cell and PSYOP but there was concern about maintaining their objectivity and independence while still being a team player. A key concept of the PA information policy was to be transparent, rely on the truth and dispatch

complete, accurate and timely information to establish the task force and the PAO as a credible source of information and to gain and maintain public trust for KFOR and MNB(E) operations. Therefore, support was in the form of attending and participating in the TFF meetings (the MNB(E) information campaign was fundamentally truth projection aimed at helping gain international support). Since PSYOP did not deploy with its full complement of production capabilities, the MPAD did help do some specialized work for them. They contributed radio scripts and print stories and helped with some products in support of special events such as the Clergy for Peace Conference held on Camp Bondsteel.

KFOR PIO provided guidance for a wide range of subject areas such as mine awareness and clearing actions, special events, and cordon and search. There was an MPAD reference book kept on file that was used to structure media releases—it contained KFOR, TFF, and U.S. guidance on a range of subject areas. In response to the establishment of a TFF Crisis Action Cell (CAC) in the Tactical Operations Center to monitor and manage an unfolding crisis, the MPAD would put someone in the CAC area to take notes—there was a generic format for producing an initial public release for a special event. They provided print and video coverage of significant events. Many times PA found that the initial information provided to them for significant events needed to be updated before issuing a public release. The approval process for PA products consisted of using the G3 for facts, G2 for security, and chief of staff for final approval. Figure 2 is a sample TFF PA press release.

SHEPHERD'S BODY FOUND
Release # 38-00, June 27, 2000

CAMP BONDSTEEL, KOSOVO – At approximately
2:00 p.m. today, the body of a missing K-Serb shepherd
was found about one kilometer north of the town of
Susice in the Strpce Opstina.

The man had been missing since late Friday,
June 23, 2000. KFOR provided the community with
extensive assistance in the search over the past few days.

Brigadier General Randal Tieszen, the Commander of
MNB-East, extends his sympathy to the Markovcevic
family.

Evidence at the scene indicates that he died under
suspicious circumstances. UNMIK-P and KFOR are
investigating. Further information will be provided as
it becomes available.

Figure 2. Sample Task Force Falcon Public Affairs Press Release

Force protection measures were viewed as an impediment to MPAD operations. Missions off base required the presence of four shooters and two vehicles. There was a shortage of vehicles for use by CA and shooters to accompany the MPAD journalists, and this impacted their ability to effectively respond to events, especially for short notice requests for coverage. For example, when I accompanied PA on a preplanned trip to Metrovica we were delayed for over an hour trying to round up two shooters to accompany the group. The MPAD journalists felt their ability to freely move around sector was being hampered by the rules. There was also a photography-related force protection issue stemming from the fact that there was no official policy for on-base photography. Unofficially, we were told not to take pictures of the base camp gate access areas and panoramic views of remote outposts that showed military positions. The military was outraged when aerial photos of Camp Montieth appeared in the PA published Task Force Falcon newsletter, *Falcon Flier*. Aerial shots of Camp Bondsteel were published later but in this case, the gate areas were blurred. The Serbian newspaper even published aerial pictures of Camp Bondsteel. Since there was no

specific guidance on photography on base, one needed to be careful because cameras and film could be confiscated if inappropriate or compromising pictures were being taken. While accompanying civil affairs and combat camera teams, I was twice challenged about taking photographs on Camp Montieth.

There were other MPAD-related challenges for which at least one had a lasting negative impact on the military journalists I spoke with. This particular issue related to PA coverage of a riot in April 2000 in the Serbian enclave of Sevce. Heavily outnumbered American infantry, MPs, and Polish paratroopers fought and prevailed over coordinated assaults by a Serbian mob that attacked them with rocks and clubs. The PA story on the Sevce riots was not published in the *Falcon Flier,* even though the story had already made the *Stars and Stripes*. In spite of BG Sanchez's strong warning to the UNMIK administrator in Sevce that he would not tolerate his soldiers being attacked, the story was apparently withheld because the task force leadership did not want to risk further upsetting the Serbs. The PA journalists were displeased about this action since they viewed themselves as responsible for publishing the soldiers' side of the story. The decision to not publish the story was demoralizing for them. For the rest of the tour, they were more cautious about what they wrote.

KFOR Public Information

The KFOR Coalition Press Information Center was located in downtown Pristina next to the sports stadium. Each of the MNBs had public affairs LNOs at the CPIC. The CPIC was used for press briefings and as an information center that distributed KFOR and MNB information, as well as publications from UNMIK, UNHCR, OSCE, the World Health Organization, and others on activities related to their organizations. UNMIK, UNHCR, OSCE and EU also had their own public information operations. KFOR PIO held daily briefings in Pristina at 11:30 a.m. Because of the time difference between Kosovo and the continental U.S., this was too early for U.S. media to consider broadcasting live coverage. During the air war over Serbia, the NATO daily press briefings were conducted at 3 p.m., and this gave the event maximum global TV viewing time coverage.

KFOR PIO held an MNB PIO/PAO coordination meeting about once a month. The location would rotate among the KFOR and MNB

headquarters locations. The purpose of the coordination meeting was to provide an update of KFOR and MNB activities and to have discussions of cross-MNB issues related to PIO/PAO activities. The PAOs also shared information among themselves on journalist activities in their areas.

While in Kosovo, I attended the June 2000 KFOR PIO workshop held at MNB(N) headquarters in Metrovica. The KFOR PIO chief was a French LTC and he chaired the working group meeting that was held in the conference room of the French CIMIC Center—Maison de France. The main issue discussed at this meeting was coordination among and between KFOR and the MNBs and the need to improve. The chairman cited the case of a recent MNB(C) weapons cache find and the linking of the weapons to the former UCK—documents, videos, and pictures were found that provided evidence of the linkage. He commented that most of the nations did not put out supporting stories when KFOR made the linkage announcement. It was noted, however, by MNB(C) that the situation did create a lot of KFOR tourism—military from all sectors came by to have their pictures taken in front of the cave where the weapons were found and a Russian contingent even showed up unannounced by chopper one day. The chairman emphasized the importance of KFOR versus national views. He made a strong pitch that KFOR and the MNBs needed to support the Russian contingent, which was constantly being attacked by locals.

Following discussions on the main issues, the chairman then went around the table for selected MNB inputs on activities in their area. A wide range of subjects was covered including upcoming TOAs, registration activities, press activities in their sectors, police activities, and increased occurrences of mine strikes. There was plenty of material to cover. The KFOR Web site had about 130,000 visitors per month and KFOR was in the process of updating and enhancing its Web site. The UK suggested adding MNB press releases and Q&A chat rooms. MNB(C) made an announcement about a late breaking news story about three British soldiers who were accused of stopping cars and robbing the occupants. The PAO said it was true and an embarrassment to the UK government and was being handled as a UK matter. A UK newspaper ran the story and MNB(C) immediately brought the story to KFOR's attention.

CHAPTER XXIV

Communications Systems

Larry Wentz

Introduction

The Kosovo public telecommunications (PTK) infrastructure suffered from a lack of investments and old equipment. It had poor countrywide coverage and one of the lowest connected subscriber populations in Europe—about 6 lines per 100 persons. The PTK services were problematic before the air war, but Operation Allied Force surgically neutralized any functioning capabilities that may have existed then. The lack of a functional civil telecommunications infrastructure created some interesting challenges for the civil and military participants as they deployed into Kosovo. The military deployed with there own military tactical systems while the civil organizations had to be more creative in supporting early communications needs. Handheld radios, cell phones, and satellite phones were the norm at the outset until contractor provided services were implemented to fill their needs. There was a need to coordinate, collaborate, and share information between the civilian and military entities, but this was complicated by the lack of a civil telecommunications infrastructure.

System interoperability and information sharing between NATO, national militaries, international organizations, such as the U.N., and the NGOs in Kosovo were problematic. A variety of stovepiped secure and non-secure communications and information systems (CIS) populated the Kosovar landscape in support of the KFOR, UNMIK, information operations, and NGO operations. As a result, there were interoperability challenges and security disconnects to be addressed.

The U.N. extended its commercial services based global communication and information system into Kosovo to provide voice and information network services (including e-mail and Internet access) to all of its

deployed elements. The UNMIK network was a mixture of leased services and U.N. provided services. NATO contracted a commercial turnkey service for its KFOR voice and data network services. There was also a military tactical network overlay to support essential KFOR command and control needs. The CIS services that supported KFOR headquarters were extended to its five Multinational Brigade headquarters as well as KFOR support elements and NATO and SHAPE Headquarters elements. Each of the five Multinational Brigades deployed a mix of military tactical and commercial capabilities that served the needs of their respective sectors including support to the multinational units assigned to the lead nation of each sector. For example, the U.S., as the lead nation for MNB(E), extended telecommunication services to the Russian, Polish, and Greek elements assigned to it.

A wide variety of off-the-shelf commercial products and services offer so called military-unique features—rapid, globally deployable, self-sustaining communication capabilities with voice and data network encryption. NATO and Allied militaries moved towards more extensive use of a combination of commercial and military systems. In fact, private sector products and services have become a major source of communications and information systems support for peace operations. They support both fixed and deployable military command and control packages. The emerging strategy for sustained operations is to replace the military tactical capabilities as soon as possible with commercial capabilities. The intelligence community also uses commercial capabilities extensively to support forward deployed elements and to provide access to rear area intelligence centers and analysis teams.

This chapter introduces the reader to the challenges of deploying and interconnecting civil-military CIS systems in an environment void of a civil telecommunications infrastructure. The fixed and deployable systems used to support UNMIK, KFOR, IO, and NGO operations are discussed as well as the challenges of interoperability in a mixed environment of civil and military organizations and systems. The role of commercialization of military communications and information systems is also emphasized. Reconstruction of the PTK infrastructure, including limited commercial cellular service and emergence of Internet service providers and Internet cafés are discussed as well.

Firsthand Opportunities

I had the opportunity to visit many of the MNB(E) communications sites as well as KFOR and UNMIK communications operations. LTC Kokinda, U.S. Army, 121st Signal Battalion, arranged visits to the U.S. tactical and commercial communications facilities on Camps Bondsteel and Montieth, the U.S. tactical sites at the Russian, Polish, and Greek base camps, and the U.S. communications supporting the 1-187 Infantry base camp at Vitina.

MAJ Lin Crawford, U.S. Army, 7th Signal Brigade, organized a visit to the EAC POP, referred to as The Rock, on Camp Bondsteel and to a CONOPS package deployment at outpost Eagle's Nest. MAJ Lee, U.S. Army and TFF G6, organized a visit to the TFF operations center and provided an overview of the communications and information systems supporting the ops center. During the visits to the U.S. facilities, TFF signal personnel provided informative and detailed briefings on the equipment and capabilities. The soldiers I met were the most professional and certainly understood the systems they were responsible for operating and maintaining.

During a visit to KFOR, COL Muller, FR. Army, KFOR J6, provided a briefing on the KFOR communications and information systems and MAJ Irby, U.S. Army, MNB(E) LNO to KFOR, provided a tour of the new KFOR HQ operations center in Pristina. On a visit to UNMIK, Andy Fleming, UNMIK communications, provided an overview of the communications and information systems supporting UNMIK and the four pillars, including UNMIK police and the emergency services radio network. Paul Currion and his staff provided an overview of the Humanitarian Community Information Center in Pristina and its efforts to establish an information-sharing network using their Internet Web site and other collaboration tools.

The Challenge

No single civil or military organization was responsible for planning, implementing, and operating the communications and information systems that supported the civil and military players. There was little to no civil-military CIS coordination prior to deployment, and even within the military there was only limited sharing of CIS deployment

information among coalition partners. The Kosovar civil telecommunications infrastructure was essentially nonexistent and could not be relied upon as a viable source of service and connectivity for military use. There was little reconnaissance of likely military tactical communications sites and headquarters facilities to guide the planning and deployment. The timeline for contingency planning was short and end states and command relationships were not well defined. As a result, information needs were ill defined, adding additional challenges for configuring and dimensioning the communications and information networks deployed.

NATO and national military restrictive security policies generally prevent the interconnection of the NATO and national military classified networks. Funding and policy issues preclude the open interconnection of the unclassified civil and military networks.

A coalition CIS architecture did not exist to guide planning and deployment in support of the KFOR operation. However, NATO, SHAPE, and many of the same member nations had been working together since the IFOR operation so there was an extensive experience base that facilitated putting the pieces of the KFOR and MNB networks together to support the deployment into Kosovo. Within the European theater, U.S. organizations such as EUCOM, DISA-EUR, USAFE, NAVEUR, USAREUR, 5th Signal Command, and 7th Signal Brigade had established good working relationships. The successes of the NATO and U.S. efforts were, however, not without significant monetary and personal expense. Staff worked 18 hours a day, 7 days a week to make it happen. For the United States, organizations such as EUCOM required staff augmentation to get the job done.

The support of the Joint Staff to make contingency money available to acquire the communications capabilities to support the operation was key as well. A strictly enforced battle rhythm was also a key to success. The EUCOM J6 Joint Communications Coordination Center (JCCC) along with the J6 Crisis Action Team (CAT) was key to keeping the schedule. The EUCOM J6 also established a Future Plans Cell that hosted several meetings with the component representatives and DISA-EUR that led to the development of an Annex K for the U.S. operations plan.

In spite of the theater experience, coalition communications interoperability may have taken a step backwards in the Kosovo

operation. In Bosnia, at least a federated voice network existed to provide non-secure voice communications among the military and civil participants, but in Kosovo this was not the case. The KFOR voice network, the KPN, only had limited interconnectivity with some of the MNB military voice networks. For example, there was no direct KPN interconnection with the MNB(E) U.S. tactical (MSE) and fixed (*Dragon* package) network but there was a USAREUR operator interface with the KPN. There was a very limited KPN access to UNMIK and the PTK network in Pristina. KPN phones were placed in MNB command centers to provide access to KFOR headquarters and other elements. The KPN was interfaced with the NATO IVSN so this provided access to NATO organizations and nations having IVSN service. Extensive automated interfaces among the national tactical voice systems and the KFOR network were not as prevalent as in Bosnia—KFOR and the MNBs tended to operate stand-alone voice networks.

Frequency management coordination was a challenge in spite of the fact that there was already a structure in place. Contributing factors included a lack of information on deployed military units and civil agencies and NGOs, lack of information on available spectrum, lack of user awareness of frequency management coordination process, poor planning, late requests, and a lengthy approval process. There was an AFSOUTH Theater Frequency Management Cell (TFMC) that worked with the EUCOM Balkans Spectrum Management Cell (BSMC) to coordinate and manage the theater frequency requirements in Kosovo. There was a Regional Frequency Management Cell (RFMC) at KFOR (J6) that worked with the TFMC and the MNBs to coordinate requirements and perform any necessary host nation coordination. The KFOR frequency manager was also responsible for managing all commercial access as well. The U.S. Navy/Marines and Air Force did their own frequency management and coordination with EUCOM and the BSMC. For the Army, the MNB(E) TFF Frequency Manager (G6) worked with the BSMC and coordinated frequency requests with the KFOR RFMC. The TFF frequency manager used the NATO CRONOS and KFOR Secret Network to communicate frequency requirements to KFOR, who then deconflicted and assigned frequencies. The KFOR approval process could take 2 to 3 weeks. In order to provide some improvement in the process and provide the MNBs some flexibility, the KFOR frequency manager authorized the MNBs to manage their own VHF-FM spectrum (30-89 Mhz). This action improved the MNBs ability

to manage the range of frequencies more effectively and there was a desire on the part of the MNBs to be given added flexibility to manage more of the spectrum in their sectors.

The civil telecommunications infrastructure was extensively damaged and could not be used to support civil and military needs. Limited local calling was available in towns and cities, but the national network was undergoing reconstruction and so national and international connectivity was extremely limited. A NGO rep explained to me at a meeting at UNMIK in Pristina that it was easier to simply get into a car and drive to someone's office to meet face to face than to try to use the civil or military communication systems. There were multiple stovepiped military and civil systems. The root cause of this situation was not technical, but largely a political issue coupled with some continuing distrust between military and non-military organizations and outdated restrictive NATO and national policies on the interconnection of networks and sharing of so-called military information. The unwillingness to provide some limited secure connection for the respective data networks exacerbated the situation. There were some limited interconnections. For example, the military unclassified data networks, such as the U.S. NIPRNET and KFOR unclassified WAN, were interfaced with the Internet through firewalls. A NATO guard gateway interfaced its classified KFOR command and control network, CRONOS, with the Intel dissemination network, LOCE. KFOR classified data networks were not interfaced with MNB national military classified data networks.

Face-to-face, sneaker net, handheld commercial radios, GSM cellular, satellite phones, and the Internet became the coalition modes of communication in Kosovo. The Internet, in fact, became the Coalition Information Sharing Network among KFOR, national militaries, UNMIK, international organizations, NGOs, and local civilian organizations. Civil and military elements participating in Kosovo, as well as those supporting them, constructed Internet Web sites that were used to inform and share information. The issue quickly became one of finding the information they could use—more powerful information discovery tools were needed. The U.N.-sponsored Humanitarian Community Information Center in Pristina was a prime example of an organization using an Internet Web site as an effective means to inform and share information. There were also the Internet-related information assurance issues that needed accommodating and managing. NATO and national

COMSEC, INFOSEC, and virus detection capabilities were employed to protect their respective networks. There was, however, no common approach to protecting and monitoring the various data networks.

Information assurance was a constant challenge. The I Love You virus not only infected the unclassified networks, but also found its way into some of the classified systems as well. NATO and U.S. Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) were used to monitor their respective networks for intrusions, viruses, and other violations. Red teams were used to assess OPSEC, INFOSEC, TRANSEC, and COMSEC posture and identify vulnerabilities. For NATO, there were some national restrictions on TRANSEC monitoring that limited the breadth and depth of this activity across all command levels. NATO also needed to make improvements in its tools, policy, procedures, and training. They needed improved intrusion detection and protection tools—smurfing, spamming, and mail bomb attacks were experienced on the unclassified network that was connected to the Internet. Classified information was found attached to unclassified e-mails and classified information was found posted on unclassified bulletin boards. There were NATO-related information assurance organizational policy disconnects—competing NACOSA, NATO NOC, and NC3A roles. These were representative of some of the challenges facing NATO and national information assurance activities.

The successes of the HCIC and the IPKO Internet project will no doubt serve as models for future humanitarian emergencies. Building a shared Internet infrastructure allowed international organizations to benefit from more reliable communications at a much lower cost and enabled them to take advantage of shared access to databases and other Internet-based applications to improve their effectiveness. When the Kosovo crisis ends, the IPKO Internet infrastructure will no doubt be left in place and local people trained to maintain it—this, in fact, has already started to happen.

There were other factors that militated against building a civil-military (or even a military) federated network to support the multinational coalition peace operation. They include varied technical capacities among the participants, differing technical standards, security constraints, and funding constraints. Further complicating the situation was the fact that NATO and many of the non-U.S. nations had limited ability to deploy the CIS necessary to support the tactical headquarters elements. For example, NATO had not yet acquired an adequate CIS

capability to support its forward-deployed tactical headquarters in Kosovo, including the first responder elements, such as the ARRC, in its role as headquarters KFOR. NATO policies restricted the removal of CIS equipment procured for peace headquarters for use in support of tactically deployed headquarters elements. NATO common funding for acquiring CIS capabilities to support a deployment were not made available before the NATO activation order was issued, which further delayed development of the operational command and control capability. As a result, NATO had to rely on Allied national military tactical command and control systems to support initial NATO tactical headquarters deployments and fill the gap until commercial capabilities could be acquired and implemented.

Communications network vulnerabilities were not always manmade. For example, lightning struck the KFOR commercial satellite terminal in Pristina on a Saturday night and blew a number of the IDNX cards, taking down the KFOR headquarters communications and information network. It happened over a weekend when the contractors were unavailable and there was a problem finding the contractor personnel to conduct repairs. Also, there were no spare IDNX cards on hand at Pristina or in Europe and the contractor had to get replacements from the U.S. Some limited reconfiguration was possible by using the NATO mobile SHF military satellite communications capability and salvaging some IDNX capability. The temporary fix provided extremely limited CRONOS and Kosovo Secret Network service and only some of the Kosovo Private Network telephone numbers were working (with no connectivity to UNMIK and very limited local PTK access). It took a couple of weeks to get the KFOR system restored to its normal operational capability.

CIS equipment delivery delays to KFOR were a problem as well. NATO priorities for use of national military aircraft were low and frequently preempted by local and national priorities. Military aircraft flying to Pristina avoided the customs delays and the 7-hour drive from the Skopje, Macedonia airport. This became a particular operational problem when the ARRC transferred authority to LANDCENT who had no signal support element. NATO had taken an action to implement a contractor turnkey service, but delays in delivery of equipment contributed to NATO's inability to quickly replace the military communications capabilities being withdrawn by the ARRC departure. In the end, a

German signal unit had to be deployed to temporarily fill the gap until the NATO funded service came online.

Pervasive use of commercial handheld sports radios (e.g., the Motorola *TalkAbout*) for military operational purposes, although effective, created some OPSEC conflicts for KFOR and TFF. Internet Web sites were another challenge—soldiers posting personal photos taken of base camp layouts and military equipment such as helicopters unintentionally revealed potential force protection vulnerabilities. Unedited e-mail discussions of sensitive military incidents gave wide visibility to potential operational vulnerabilities. Cellular phones also allowed unedited reporting.

During the initial phase of the deployment, the Army's 82nd Airborne and Marine's 26th MEU had to fight dust, dirt, and water to keep their systems running in Kosovo, including the *Toughbook CF-45* portables—rugged or not, all automation suffered in the elements. For the longer haul, the TFF G6 had a continuous battle with dust and dirt getting into computer drives and keyboards—a fine dust, generated by heavy vehicle traffic on the dirt roads of Camp Bondsteel, filled the air and got into the offices where computers were located. In the field and on bases, special protective and backup measures were employed—waterproof keyboards, covering and cleaning servers and workstations, cleaning office areas daily, keeping spares in safe places, and daily backups of files on mass storage devices, such as CDs and ZIP disks.

Commercialization

As the in-country situation stabilized, commercial communications and information systems replaced a large part of the NATO and national military tactical networks. NATO contracted with SPACELINK to install a commercial voice and data network for KFOR. The U.N. extended its global commercially based voice and data network to support UNMIK and MNB nations introduced commercially based services as well. In MNB(E), the U.S. Army used its commercial Dragon package that supported command and control, base communications, and command support needs, including telemedicine for the MASH hospital on Camp Bondsteel. For sustained operations, the U.S. Army CONOPS package used a mix of military and commercial products to support CIS needs for contingency operations such as the deployment of U.S. forces to

Metrovica to support the French during riots. IRIDIUM saw some use and commercial SATCOM, INMARSAT, and GSM cellular were major players. In addition to the limited MOBTEL cellular capability, new cellular capabilities were introduced both commercially and by the military. Alcatel introduced a commercial GSM network. UNMIK, KFOR, and the MNBs installed cellular capabilities and the UAE provided its soldiers with cellular phones that allowed them to call home. The U.S. installed IFONE (with STU-Q44 sleeves for secure operations) on Camps Bondsteel and Montieth and UNMIK, KFOR, and the British installed the Nortel *TETRAPOL* cellular system. Sprint also provided MWR commercial telephone access (soldiers used calling cards) at Camps Bondsteel, Montieth and Able Sentry. The Orion commercial satellite was used to extend the commercial MWR service into Kosovo. The U.S. joint broadcast satellite system was used to support wide-band intelligence and other information and UAV video dissemination to MNB(E) and KFOR headquarters.

Figure 1. *TalkAbout* Radio

There were also some creative new uses of commercial products. In the U.S. sector, the Motorola *TalkAbout* recreational two-way radio was used extensively for dismounted, convoy, and base area communications purposes. It became a status symbol and nearly everyone had one clipped to his or her flack vest (Figure 1). There were also other types of commercially available hand held radios that were used by the NGO, UNMIK, and KFOR personnel. Use of these unprotected radios introduced OPSEC risks that needed to be carefully managed. A surprise entry was the extensive use of the 3Com *Palm Pilot* for taking notes and exchanging information. It was not unusual

to see U.S. military staff officers scratch notes on their *Palm Pilot* during a meeting and then use the infrared link to exchange notes or task another officer. Commercial remote sensing and Geographic Information Systems were used by the military for improved mission planning and by the non-military, such as the U.S. State Department and the U.N., for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction planning and assessments that included refugee returns and mine clearing actions. Once again, GPS played an important role supporting position location and navigation needs, especially in an environment where maps were not adequate to support operational movements in areas that bordered Serbia.

The civil-military use of commercial products and services overcame some of the interoperability short falls, but had special considerations and sometimes unintended consequences that need to be better understood and more appropriately factored into the planning, acquisition, implementation, and operation. For example, perceived lower costs and reduced acquisition times have risk factors that need to be considered. Availability and delivery of commercial products can be adversely driven by the fact that the military must compete with commercial customers and when demand exceeds supply, which can have cost and delivery implications. Leasing long haul services from PTTs takes time and service performance does not always meet military expectations and connectivity needs. The military is not the PTTs only customer and the PTTs do not provide maintenance services every hour of the week. Additionally, since the services are contracted, it takes time to work the provisioning though the government and PTT bureaucratic processes. Even with EUCOM J6s authority for exceptional provisioning in theater for U.S. forces, the process was still driven by the PTTs reaction time. Durability and maintainability of commercial systems and services in the tactical environment present contracting and contractor performance challenges as well. This is a major issue in terms of ability to meet assured service expectations in an operational environment—there are O/M, service restoration and recovery, and spares and repairs implications that need to be specified and contracted at the outset. Contract modifications can be very expensive.

Unexpected equipment modifications and contract changes can escalate costs quickly. Lead times for acquiring commercial products and services can still take months. Foreign military sales can take 6 to 9 months regardless of the urgency. Turnkey communications and

information service procurements can sometimes overcome the shortfalls of first buying the pieces and then building the network, especially where time constraints may preclude the necessary system engineering analysis, design, and specifications.

Contractor statements of work must define all requirements of the contractor and the government, including military support arrangements in the operational environment. Requirements need to be base lined before installation begins—unplanned site, unit, and office moves can have significant performance and cost impacts. Contractors somtimes make mistakes (delivery locations, customs, equipment certifications, security accreditation, satellite landing rights, etc). Spares and repairs concepts of the contractor need to meet military sparing concepts and system restoration and availability needs. Contractor response times need to be defined within the context of the operational environment. Using military transportation means in the AOR can save installation time and costs.

Commercial product modernization (18-month-or-less life cycle) can have impacts on interfaces with existing equipment that may need to be upgraded or replaced since backward compatibility cannot be assured. Often, the user asks for a solution that is based on his past experiences without understanding the longer-term impact of this technology choice. For example, NATO has been using 10BaseFL fiber LANs, but industry is moving to 100BaseFX, requiring NATO to replace both the fibers, interface cards, and switches already deployed. Commercial products and services can introduce OPSEC challenges that need managing. Using standard commercial products requires special consideration for protection against physical shocks, fluctuating power sources, dust, dirt, and water. Finally, commercial service support to military operations has yet to be stressed by hostile actions, so the contractors and systems performance and responsiveness under live fire is still an unknown.

In terms of unintended consequences, 1999 was the year of Y2K fixes, and NATO found themselves competing with major industries for commercial communications and information systems products. A last minute approach by some industries to solve their Y2K problem was to employ full-scale replacement of their information systems. This placed a heavy worldwide demand for commercial communications and information system products. When demand exceeded supply, the person with the most money got the products.

NATO contractor selection is based on lowest compliant bid, and so quality of support can vary. NATO used NAMSA for shipping to Kosovo with reasonable success. However, there was one incident where the delivery of some urgently needed spare parts to KFOR were delayed for several days because NAMSA closed its operation for the weekend at 1 p.m. on Fridays and the equipment could not be shipped until the following Monday. DHL was also used successfully to deliver to Skopje, Macedonia where military transport could then be used to deliver it to Kosovo.

Civil Communications and Information Systems

Kosovo was not an information rich environment before the air war. When KFOR entered the country, there was no functioning postal service, print media, radio, TV, or telecommunications. The commercial power and water was problematic as well. There was a very limited GSM cellular capability that continued to operate after the air war. The system was owned by MOBTEL Serbia and calls over this system were routed through Serbia. The extent of the civil telecommunications damage became visibly obvious in places like downtown Pristina where I could see, even a year later, the effects of a cruise missile attack that had destroyed the telecommunications center across the street from the building now being used for UNMIK headquarters (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Telecommunications Facility Pristina

In Kosovo, UNMIK deployed multiple fixed and mobile voice and data networks. The international media arrived with mobile satellite and TV capabilities, satellite phones, GSM cellular phones, and laptops. NGOs relied heavily on handheld commercial radios, the PTK (where it existed), GSM cellular phones and in many cases, simply face-to-face communications. The local factions, including organized crime, used cellular, the PTK where it existed, and in some cases, two-way and ham radios were used to pass information and to organize demonstrations.

Although international satellite TV antennas could be seen on apartment buildings in major cities, after a year of KFOR and UNMIK presence, national television was on the air only a few hours a day and a fully functional telecommunications and postal service did not exist in June of 2000. Newspapers were being published and radio stations, both Albanian and Serbian, were coming back on the air. A non-profit Internet service provider, IPKO, was created in Pristina and Internet cafés started to appear in the major cities. The Internet became a lifeline to the outside world for the civilian population. E-mail was not a mere luxury. For many people in Kosovo, it was the only mail. The Internet also became the de facto coalition information network that allowed civil and military organizations to exchange unclassified e-mails and attachments, post information on Web sites, and search the Web for information relevant to Kosovo.

UNMIK CIS Network

The initial UNMIK contingent arrived essentially without communications. They had some GSM cellular phones that could be used on the existing MOBTEL network that provided very limited coverage of Pristina and some other areas, such as the Serbian border. The ARRC provided the UNMIK contingent PTARMIGAN service until it could get its own network up and running.

A U.N. leased commercial C-band VSAT network and in country microwave network were used to extend the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations' (DPKO) global network into Kosovo and provide coverage to UNMIK headquarters operations and remote locations. The DPKO Field Administrative Logistics Division's Communications and Electronic Services Section was responsible for acquiring, implementing, and maintaining the network that supported

UNMIK operations. The U.N. network offered voice, data, and video services to the various pillars of the UNMIK organization and to the U.N. Support Services (Figure 3). There were 30 to 35 DAMA terminals planned to support the final network configuration. About one-third of the network connectivity was planned to be VSAT and two-thirds microwave (commercial E1 2 Mb/s links). The U.N. also leased a 2 Mb/s link from IPKO in Pristina that provided connectivity to U.N. headquarters in New York. Internet service was leased from IPKO as well. The UNMIK telephone switch was an Erickson *MD-110*. KFOR used the same type switch for its voice network, the KPN, and there were plans to interconnect the two switches.

Figure 3. U.N. Communication Satellite Terminal at Strpce Office

UNMIK-KFOR headquarters voice communications used operator assisted calling via the local PTK in Pristina. The U.N. data network was not interfaced with KFOR or the MNB networks, but unclassified e-mails and attachments could be interchanged via the Internet since the UNMIK, KFOR, and MNB unclassified data networks had Internet gateways. The plan was to have the UNMIK data network serve all headquarters and dial-up access would be provided for the major areas such as Gnjilane. UNMIK police stations were to be networked and connected to UNMIK police headquarters in Pristina.

As the U.N. presence grew and reconfigured, there was a lot of U.N. office movement that needed to be accommodated. This kept the

communications and information systems staff quite busy accommodating the changes. The U.N. also provided secure communications, both fax and phone, over the VSAT network. The SRSG, the police commissioner, and COMKFOR used the secure services. Eventually, KFOR and CIVPOL that were collocated at major sites would be given access to the UNMIK network as well. KFOR J3/J6 had VSAT links into the UNMIK network.

The U.N. used MOBTEL from the outset of the operation. The system provided international and local coverage in Pristina, the external borders, and in the north. Belgrade would periodically disconnect the international lines. Early into the operation, Motorola tried to get permission to install a countrywide cellular service, but was unable to do so because the international status of Kosovo was still unclear and Serbia held the international legal rights for Kosovo telecommunications.

Three U.N. radio nets were in various stages of implementation to support emergency services and UNMIK civil administration. The analog VHF/UHF emergency response network was the initial network and it would remain operational after the planned upgrade to a countrywide digital UHF network was implemented. All UNMIK police radios were cross-linked between VHF and UHF. The UNMIK fire and ambulance contact channels were programmed to be compatible on all UNMIK police handheld radios to facilitate direct police assistance at the scene of a fire or other emergency. Locations where KFOR MPs and UNMIK police were collocated, KFOR had access to the U.N. radio network. Agencies such as UNHCR and OSCE had HF radios (CODAN) that were difficult to use. NGOs under UNHCR bought their own radios and applied for and registered frequencies with UNMIK. Abuses of the U.N. radio network were managed by UNMIK.

The digital UHF network was planned to be two-thirds U.N. civilian and one-third UNMIK police. There were 78 UNMIK police locations and some 170 locations to be served in general. For short-range communications, the simplex channel was used. Fully linked regional radio sites were initially installed in Pristina, Prizren, Pec, Gnjilane, and Metrovica. A radiotelephone interconnection to the UNMIK telephone network was provided at Pristina. Each geographic coverage area had two collocated, overlapping radio cells, one 8-channel and one 4-channel, except for Pristina which had three 8-channel cells. The network was to be expanded over time by putting up repeater sites to improve

coverage and performance. In order to further extend the coverage, two IDR talk-group linked repeaters were proposed for areas such as Strpce, Kacanik, Kamenica, Novo Brdo, and other towns for wider coverage.

The U.N. peacekeeping budget was used for building communications to support U.N. operations and the systems acquired and installed to support these operations will be pulled out when the U.N. leaves Kosovo. There was also a UNMIK Kosovo budget that was based on customs taxes collected at the Macedonian, Albanian, and Montenegro borders that served as a source of funding for U.N. communications as well. The local Albanian and Serbian civil administration leaders did not have access to the U.N. system.

NGO CIS Capabilities

The NGOs tended to have simple communications and information systems. They used personal cellular phones (referred to as handies), handheld radios, and the local phone system where it existed—generally they found it easier to meet face to face than try to use local telecommunications. The Internet was also a favorite means of communicating (see the HCIC at http://www.reliefweb.int/hcic/index.html or Interaction at http://www.interaction.org/). Some NGOs had their own laptops and others with the larger NGOs had workstations with Internet access. Many used e-mail to share information regarding supply routes and meetings while others simply relied on manual means—note pads and pencils and face-to-face meetings.

PTK

The Kosovar telephone network was operated and managed by the Posts and Telecommunication Kosovo (PTK), a Serbian organization. With the deployment of KFOR and departure of the Serbs, the management and staffing was taken over by an inexperienced Albanian staff. The PTK consisted of a major transit center in Pristina that was connected to Belgrade, Nis (FRY), and Skopje (FYROM) for international access. A microwave and coaxial cable network interconnected the seven main switching centers located in Pristina, Metrovica, Gnjilane, Prizern, Urosevac, Pec, and Djakovica and a cable network supported the local distribution.

Before the conflict, Kosovo had the second lowest telephone penetration rate in Europe with about 6 lines per 100 persons. There were slightly more than 140,000 subscribers (about 6.5 percent of the population) on the national network. Very little investment had been made in the region through the 1990s and most of the network equipment was very old. UNMIK gave the PTK authority to continue to provide post and telecommunication services in Kosovo on an interim basis, using existing public postal and telecommunication assets.

The allied bombing took out the transit center and a 10,000-line subscriber switch in Pristina and a large portion of the transmission backbone and distribution networks. Although most local exchanges remained in service there were no spare parts and no test equipment, tools, or vehicles for maintenance. The current Albanian staff of the PTK had, in general, not worked in the telecommunications industry for the past 10 years and their technical skills needed to be upgraded. Management staff needed training in the use of new technologies such as digital switches, transmission technologies, and new local loop technologies, in customer service issues and in network strategic planning. Operational staff needed training to enable them to maintain modern equipment. Technical training was expected to cost DM 300,000. The commercial environment in which PTK operated also changed significantly in the past 10 years and senior managers in the organization needed training to develop their management and financial administration skills. Training for executives included both management seminars and courses in Kosovo and international visits to other telecommunications enterprises. The inability to replace Serbian technical staff and managers with qualified Albanian staff served to further complicate the early repair and reconstitution of the national telecommunication services. For example, while with the U.S. civil affairs team in Vitina, we visited the telephone office, which was trying to find more qualified technicians. A Serb who was employed by the PTK before the air war and was living in the Serbian enclave in Vitina refused to come back to work for the PTK or help fix problems with the Vitina telephone equipment.

By June 2000, the PTK had restored a minimal microwave network linking major cities that restored some long distance and international telephone services in major switching centers. However, the capacity of the system was still extremely limited and insufficient to handle the volume of traffic generated. It was estimated that 50 percent of the regional towns still had

not been reconnected to the national network, leaving them with only limited local calling service. Significant investment would be required over a period of time to expand and modernize telecommunications services in Kosovo to meet the economic development needs of the territory and restore national and international services. For example, the main transit center building in Pristina was so badly damaged that its offices had to be moved to other buildings (which were also damaged). The collection of telecommunication revenues was a significant problem as well. Only about 30 percent of the accounts were currently being collected, largely because of problems with customer identification and billing. The PTK urgently required an improved billing system to increase the proportion of revenues collected.

Good telecommunications services were essential for reconstruction and development in Kosovo. The international presence in Kosovo generated new business opportunities for the telecommunications sector, however, as noted, the telecommunications infrastructure urgently needed to be repaired and operations and management staff required training before further development of services could be considered. The Swiss government provided DM 400,000 worth of essential tools to enable PTK to resume operations. EU funding (DM 12 million) had been committed for essential repairs to the telecommunications network. Additional donor commitments of around DM 55.7 million were required to support repairs and planned modernization initiatives.

Commercial Cellular

MOBTEL Serbia provided GSM service to Pristina and some other areas of Kosovo and they had plans to significantly extend the coverage to the entire province of Kosovo before the war. MOBTEL, the first and the largest Serbian mobile telephone system operator in Yugoslavia, was founded on April 15, 1994, as a joint venture of BK Trade from Moscow and The Public Company for Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph Services (PTT) from Belgrade. MOBTEL operated as a limited liability company with 51 percent owned by the BK Trade and the remaining 49 percent controlled by the PTT. The service continued to work in Pristina after the war—the server was located in Nis (FRY). The limited coverage of Kosovo also extended into selected areas along the border with Serbia.

A new GSM network, *VALA 900*, a joint venture between Alcatel and Monaco Telecom, commenced operation in Pristina in February 2000 with plans to expand coverage to 7 major cities and the airport. The network was planned to be entirely self-funded and to provide essential communications pending full reinstatement of the fixed telecommunications network.

IPKO and Internet Cafés

The idea of creating an Internet service provider (ISP) that would put Kosovo in touch with the rest of the world through e-mail started with two young Americans who teamed up with Mr. Akan Ismaili, a Kosovar Albanian, to form Internet Project Kosovo (IPKO). Teresa Crawford was a graduate student at Syracuse University and a founder of the Advocacy Project, which used the Internet to advance human rights. While in the region, she had researched the possibility of setting up Internet service at Pristina University but it had turned out to be impractical. In Kosovo, she met another young American, Paul Meyer, who was working for the International Rescue Committee, a private volunteer organization. Through refugee contacts, he learned there was a 3.8-meter satellite dish stranded in a Macedonia refugee camp whose occupants were returning to Kosovo. A California company, Interpacket, had donated the dish. Mr. Meyer persuaded its owners and operators to donate the dish and satellite link to the cause of rebuilding Kosovo.

There was a slight initial glitch in the attempt to set up an ISP. The PTK managers installed by the United Nations to run the Kosovar phone system wanted to control Internet service providers in Kosovo, but Ms. Crawford and Mr. Meyer refused, not wanting IPKO to become part of the bureaucracy. Luckily, the PTK failed during the negotiations, and the U.N. approved an independent nonprofit service. A loan from the International Rescue Committee allowed them to move the dish and add microwave links in the city. IPKO received initial support from the UK Department for International Development, Interpacket Networks, and the Sudikoff Family Foundation as well. IPKO went online on September 20, 1999 at their headquarters in downtown Pristina. IPKO was spun off as a local NGO in March 2000.

IPKO was the leading Internet service provider (ISP) in Kosovo. A direct satellite link to the U.S. Internet backbone provided service in Pristina since September 1999. Users were connected through a network of wireless microwave antennas. An antenna and router was installed at each client site that allowed them to connect their entire network to the Internet 24 hours a day. For example, local Albanian newsrooms were plugged into the Internet via the IPKO and plans were being made to connect Radio 21, a popular independent station in Pristina, so that it could broadcast news 24 hours a day on its Web site. Internet service was provided to more than 120 organizations. There were both paying and non-paying customers. The paying customers included every U.N. agency, NATO, OSCE, World Bank, diplomatic offices, major NGOs, banks, companies, government offices, and Internet cafés. Free service was provided to key local civil institutions including the University of Pristina, hospitals, libraries, schools, local NGOs, and local Kosovar media. In August 2000, dial-up Internet service was offered that provided the opportunity for thousands of people across Kosovo to connect to the Internet from their homes and businesses if they had PTK service in their area.

IPKO planned to launch a technology training institute in Pristina to provide Kosovars with the technical skills they needed to prosper in the Internet age. Without a pool of well-trained technicians, Kosovo would not be able to benefit from the advantages of new information and communication technologies. The IPKO Institute was being designed to train the technicians who would wire Kosovo. The Institute would initially offer courses in networking, system design, and web development. The courses would primarily be taught remotely through the Internet with assistance from local tutors. The Institute entered into a partnership with the Noroff Institute in Norway to provide year-long distance learning courses. The Institute also planned to be a certified Cisco networking academy. The Institute would be a self-sustaining venture. While scholarships would be provided to some particularly needy students, most students would be expected to pay tuition to cover the running costs of the Institute. A number of major employers had also agreed to sponsor the education of their technical employees. The Institute was planned to be located on the top floor of the National Library of Kosovo. IPKO had already started the construction process as classes were scheduled to begin in October 2000.

Internet cafés also sprung up in the major cities. Just across the street from the shattered glass and concrete rubble of the bombed-out Pristina police station, people lined up. They were nervous, impatient, and anxious—not for food, or shelter, or handouts, they were waiting to get online. Last year there was not a single Internet café and now there were at least 9 in the city and about 20 in the Kosovo region. The EasyNet Café stayed open 24 hours a day, connecting people to the Internet at less than $2 an hour. At this price, going online was cheap enough for even hard-pressed Pristina residents to afford a short visit. Adding to the interest was the fact that many young ethnic Albanians were forced to spend years abroad and when they returned, they created a demand for Internet access. The price at the EasyNet Café dropped by half after midnight, when young people flock to the terminals to log on to chat groups so they could speak to relatives and friends in the United States and around the world. In the battle-scarred city, the Internet became a lifeline to the outside world.

The Military Communications and Information Systems

KFOR and its MNBs deployed independent and separately managed tactical and fixed voice, message, data and VTC networks. Even within the U.S. military where the objective was to offer integrated services to the deployed commander and his troops, there were multiple independent stovepiped C4ISR systems. Nations assigned to MNB(E) deployed their own national tactical capabilities with independent connectivity to their national capitols. The U.S., as the lead nation for MNB(E), provided limited voice and e-mail service to the multinational units assigned to it. Commercial and military SATCOM and leased E1 links were the major long-haul digital communication bearers. Both military and commercial satellite bandwidths were being pushed to their limits. Other commercial communications and information systems played important roles as well. There were INMARSAT and cellular phones. Iridium had some limited use.

Because of the inoperable Kosovar telecommunications and power infrastructures at the outset of Operation Joint Guardian, KFOR, and the MNB-led nation military elements had to deploy with their own tactical communications and information systems and electrical power

sources. Furthermore, unlike Bosnia where there was a functioning U.N. VSAT network that NATO used extensively during IFOR deployment, there was no U.N. network in Kosovo at the outset. The ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was the initial entry KFOR headquarters' element and the UK, as the ARRC host nation support element, used the UK PTARMIGAN tactical system to support the ARRC CIS needs and connectivity with the MNB headquarters. The NATO Mobile Communications Module (tactical SHF SATCOM) was deployed to support connectivity to Echelons above Corps (EAC). National tactical systems such as the U.S. TRI-TAC/MSE, French RITA, UK PTARMIGAN, Italian SOTRIN, and German AUTOKO were deployed to provide their respective MNB sector communications. The initial KFOR command and control net used UHF TACSAT, HF RATT, and secure VHF radios.

Secure voice and data communications for tactical headquarters were still lacking, in spite of this being an issue in Bosnia for the IFOR headquarters deployment—the ARRC was the initial entry headquarters element in this case as well. On the other hand, some of the lead nation tactical systems supporting the MNB elements were much more capable. For example, the U.S. deployed its MSE tactical systems (augmented with the USAREUR Fly Away and Data packages). A DISA POP was installed at Camp Able Sentry (location of TFF Rear) in Skopje as well and it was connected to Camp Bondsteel via a TACSAT link, and to Heidelberg and Vahingen, Germany via a SPACELINK commercial satellite link. The 26th MEU, who were part of the initial entry force, deployed their JTF Enabler package to extend a similar set of DISN secure voice, data, messaging, and VTC services including supporting JDISS and CRONOS/LOCE access as well. The JTF Enabler Package accessed the DISN via a TACSAT link to the Croughton, UK STEP. UHF TACSAT, VHF and HF radio nets, cellular, and INMARSAT were used to support the tactical command and control and intelligence needs with the VHF net being the primary net supporting command and control of units. There was a problem with VHF performance due to the mountainous terrain of the area. Retransmission sites were needed to improve reliability and coverage. However, because of force caps and force protection rules requiring such retransmission sites be physically protected, no fixed repeater sites were installed. Tactical retransmission sites were used by maneuver forces during contingency

operations. NATO used STU-IIs and the U.S. STU-IIIs for secure voice, but as was the case in Bosnia, interoperability problems.

Commercial turnkey services were leased by KFOR and its MNBs as replacements for the tactical networks. The military overlaid the commercial network with secure UHF, VHF, and HF radio networks and embedded appropriate MILSATCOM backbone connectivity to support assured connectivity for key command and control and intelligence needs.

Internet was not only used to share information with non-military elements but for the U.S., it was also a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) service that accommodated e-mails to and from home for the soldiers deployed to even some of the most remote sites in MNB(E). U.S. tactical data communications provided NIPRNET (with Internet access) access to almost every U.S. soldier deployed in Kosovo.

KFOR CIS Network

NATO employed a three-tier communications concept for the KFOR deployment where Tier I provided KFOR headquarters connectivity to EAC, Tier II supported KFOR headquarters and connectivity with the MNBs, and Tier III supported the MNBs. The NATO Mobile Communications Module (MCM), a deployable tactical SHF satellite capability, was deployed to provided the initial Tier I connectivity. The ARRC was the initial KFOR headquarters' element and the UK used the 1st UK Signal Brigade to provide the PTARMIGAN tactical network to support the Tier II connectivity. The MNB lead nations deployed their tactical communications capabilities to support the Tier III connectivity that included communications support to those nations assigned to their sectors (e.g., MNB(E) provided support to the Greek, Polish, and Russian base camps). At the outset of the operation, there were PTARMIGAN interfaces established with some of the national tactical systems of the MNBs such as the U.S. MSE and German AUTOKO, and with the NATO IVSN voice network. The IVSN provided voice services to NATO and military headquarters elements such as SHAPE, AFSOUTH, LANDCENT, and the CAOC. Secure VHF radios, UHF TACSAT, HF RATT, and INMARSAT supported the headquarters command and control network. Information systems such as CRONOS, LOCE, CTAPS, Interim CAOC Capability, and ADAMS supported KFOR (ARRC) command and control, intelligence, air operations, and combat

support needs. There were also secure fax, voice (STU-IIBs), and VTC capabilities to support headquarters operations.

NATO had a three-phase plan to commercialize the KFOR communications and information systems. The initial phase of commercialization was to replace the military tactical network supporting the KFOR headquarters elements before the ARRC transferred authority to LANDCENT in October of 1999. Phase Two extended the network to include connectivity to the MNB headquarters and Phase Three was commercialization of the VHF command network. The plan was to lease a VSAT and IDNX/PROMINA backbone network that the prime contractor would install, operate and maintain. Commercial SATCOM and PTK/PTT E1 connectivity would be added as they became available and needed. NATO contracted with SPACELINK to lease the commercial backbone network to replace the tactical systems and SPACELINK, Alcatel, NATO SATCOM, and PTT E1s provided the carrier connectivity. There were also a few line of sight radio links planned to support connectivity.

Phase One, the leased commercial digital backbone network based on commercial SATCOM and IDNX/PROMINA multi-service access platforms, was not fully completed before the transfer of authority to LANDCENT. As a result, it was necessary to deploy a German signal unit to replace PTARMIGAN with AUTOKO/AUTOFU until the commercial coverage could be implemented. Withdraw of the UK signal unit also removed the secure VHF command net and some of the tactical level interfaces with the MNB national systems such as the U.S. MSE. NATO's UHF TACSAT was used to support the command net until Phase Three of commercialization implemented a Kosovo-wide secure VHF radio command net. The VHF command net was to consist of 11 base stations, 10 mobile stations, and about 85 tactical handheld radios with implementation to be completed in the fall of 2000. The VHF repeater sites would cover major towns and supply routes. The radio equipment was to be collocated with KFOR units for power and force protection purposes. Commercialization Phase Two was completed before the April 2000 TOA to EUROCORPS. There were continuous reconfigurations as the KFOR headquarters grew to accommodate new missions such as the elections.

The NATO C3 Agency acquired the NATO CIS supporting KFOR. They also purchased Kosovo-related equipment used by SHAPE ACOS

CIS, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps G6, AFSOUTH G6, LANDCENT G6, KFOR CIS Control Center (CISCC), and NATO CIS Operating and Supporting Agency (NACOSA). NATO funded and provided CIS services to NATO organizations and KFOR (Main, Rear, COMMZ, APOD) and its multinational brigade headquarters. National Support Elements (NSE) provided their own CIS service; the NSEs were not NATO funded since they were viewed as national responsibilities.

Figure 4. KFOR HQ Pristina SATCOM

The communications systems supporting KFOR operations in June 2000 consisted of: a secure VTC network that connected SHAPE, KFOR Main and Rear, and COMMZ(W); a secure UHF TACSAT command and control command net that linked KFOR, GFSU, APOD, COMMZ, and the MNBs; a secure UHF TACSAT Close Air Support and Air Operations net that linked KFOR AOCC, MNB TACPs, AWACS, ABCCC, and CAOC; INMARSAT terminals with KFOR, GFSU, COMMZ, and the MNBs; and there were Motorola handheld radios and GSM cellular phones. The NATO MCM (Figure 4) supported military command and control connectivity with SHAPE. SPACELINK was managing the backbone digital network supporting the KFOR voice, data, and VTC services.

A voice network, referred to as the Kosovo Private Network (KPN), provided clear voice services to KFOR, the MNB headquarters, GFSU, APOD, COMMZ, CPIC, and other KFOR elements. STU-IIBs were used

to provide secure voice services but there were performance problems using them on the KPN. The KPN was not interfaced with the U.S. TRI-TAC/MSE and Dragon package supporting MNB(E) or the DSN but there was an operator interface with the USAREUR operator in Heidelberg. There were plans to interface Dragon and DSN in the near future. Connectivity to UNMIK was provided through PTK access and there were plans to link the UNMIK and KPN switches. The KPN was interfaced with the NATO IVSN voice network that provided access to NATO, SHAPE, and other users of the IVSN. Kosovo and Macedonian PTT access and international PTT calling were supported as well, including mobile phones and INMARSAT access. There were also limited interfaces with French, UK, and German national military systems.

KFOR was preparing for the implementation of its VHF command net (Phase Three of its commercialization initiative). KFOR was also working with the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) and the PTK to establish a UHF radio relay and PABX network for the KPC that would provide handheld and mobile radios and fixed and wireless telephones to link their regional and headquarters operations. The network would use Alcatel and Thomson systems.

There were three independent KFOR data networks. A NATO Secret network (CRONOS) that processed NATO classified data and e-mail and was only accessible by NATO Secret cleared personnel and primarily used by SHAPE, the KFOR command group, the KFOR J2/G2, GFSU, COMMZ(W), COMMZ(S), and MNB headquarters staff. A KFOR Secret Network (KSN) was the primary command data network and processed KFOR Secret data and e-mails. The network was accessible by KFOR personnel who were nationally cleared to the secret level (not all national elements supporting KFOR and the MNBs had direct access to the KSN). The primary users were J1/G1, J3/G3, J4/G4, J5, J6/G6, J8, and J9. There was a KFOR unclassified (Internet) network that provided limited Internet browsing privileges, but e-mail sites such as Hotmail.com were blocked. Network access was provided to SHAPE, KFOR, MNBs (except MNB(E) which provided its own Internet access via NIPRNET), GFSU, CPIC, and COMMZ(W). COMMZ(S) provided its own access to the Internet. As was the case for the ARRC, information systems such as CRONOS (PAIS and JOIIS), LOCE, CTAPS, Interim CAOC Capability, and ADAMS continued to be used to support KFOR OPS-INTEL needs. There was also U.S. Joint Broadcast System access for Hunter and Predator video and there were a number of national

intelligence cells (U.S., UK, GE, FR, IT, SP, BE, and Scandinavian) located at Pristina on the KFOR compound.

Turnover of military maintenance and administration personnel was a major challenge for the KFOR J6. There was a plan to use a mix of contractors and civilians to provide continuity for their O/M support activities.

MNB(E)/Task Force Falcon CIS Network

Bosnia experience was a major factor in the successful deployment of communications and information systems to support U.S. forces in Kosovo. The deployed units had CIS capabilities comparable to their home bases and in some cases, they exceeded home base capabilities. Even soldiers at remote hilltop sites had the ability to access voice and data networks, including the ability to exchange e-mails with home. The full range of Defense Information System Network services were available. The deployed units had access to the Defense Switched Network (DSN) voice services, Defense Red Switched Network (DRSN) Secure voice services, the secure and non-secure data networks SIPRNET and NIPRNET, and secure VTC. The MNB(E) tactical operations center had access to the U.S. Global Command and Control System (GCCS) and NATO provided MNB(E) with access to its KPN voice service, the secure data networks CRONOS and KSN, and the intelligence system LOCE.

The 5th Signal Command developed Deployable Automation Support Host (DASH) was used extensively in Kosovo. The DASH included NIPRNET and SIPRNET routers, LANs, modems, VTC, and other information system capabilities. It was used in combination with U.S. Army tactical communications equipment to create light, medium, and heavy deployable CIS packages. The light package supported 60 to 100 subscribers and could be deployed in 24 hours. An AN/TSC-93B TACSAT provided the long haul connectivity for the DASH. The medium and large packages supported a larger number of subscribers and could be deployed in 48 hours. The medium communications configuration consisted of an AN/TSC-85B TACSAT and an AN/TTC-48 tactical switch. The heavy package consisted of an AN/TSC-85B TACSAT, an AN/TTC-39D tactical digital switch, and a multipoint control unit (MCU). The services offered included tactical phones, long locals to a PBX, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and desktop VTC and a 64 Kb/s path to support

Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System access. An Echelon Above Corps (EAC) Point of Presence (POP) configuration was provided as well, and this package consisted of the DASH plus an AN/TSC-85B TACSAT, an AN/TTC-39D tactical digital switch, MCU, UHF, TROPO, cable, and other communications support capabilities.

The growing demand for tactical data and special capabilities such as real-time UAV video dissemination, VTC, and telemedicine exceeded the capabilities of the military tactical systems. In order to accommodate the growing demands, some innovative and non-standard packaging of mixed military and commercial capabilities became necessary to overcome the limitations of the current tactical systems. The tactical EAC systems suffered similar limitations. Quick response deployable commercial packages were developed. There were several versions of the USAREUR/CECOM commercial Fly Away package (FAP) that accommodated voice and data services. Both used Ku-band commercial satellite dishes (there were 2.4 and 3.7 meter dishes) and transmitters and receivers. The early version used FCC-100 multiplexers with KG-194 link encryption, FXO/FCS LDCLEP cards for STU-IIIs, a MITEL phone switch, cell phones with STU-Q44 sleeves, VTC, and CISCO routers to support NIPRNET and SIPRNET access. KIV-7HS was used to encrypt the SIPRNET links. An enhanced version of the FAP used IDNX 400 multiplexers with KIV-19 link encryption. There were also data packages that contained commercial routers, servers, multiplexers, VTC, and telephone switches. Commercial high-speed multiplexers (HS-MUX) were used to transmit 256Kbs over MSE. Transportable commercial satellite systems were employed and commercial Ku and C-band capacity was leased to provide connectivity. INMARSAT and international cellular capabilities were employed as well.

Figure 5. Communications Strategy

In order to free up the tactical assets for future deployments, the strategy (Figure 5) was to provide a commercial communications package with voice and data services down to the desktop. It was intended to gradually replace the tactical capabilities with a commercial service. USAREUR/5th Signal Command and CECOM developed the Dragon package for this purpose. The Dragon package consisted of a 3.7-meter commercial Ku-band dish and transmitter and receiver. A Promina multiplexer with KIV-19 link encryption was used to integrate the digital pipes supporting voice, data, and DRSN and VTC services. A Lucent Definity PBX provided voice services and CISCO routers, Cabletron smart switch and hubs, and Ethernet LANs were used for NIPRNET and SIPRNET with KIV-19 encryption for the SIPRNET links. The Dragon came in both shelter and rack mounted configurations. The contractor provided the IMO functions.

In addition to the 7th Signal Brigade tactical EAC POP, DISA also provided a POP for access to the DISN and Joint Broadcast System. Reach-back capabilities were also employed by the U.S. Army to provide access to a broader range of voice and information services in the Central Region and the DISA Standardized Tactical Entry Points (STEP) were used to access DISN voice, data, and VTC services. The U.S. Army also used a deployable contingency operations package (CONOPS) that employed a mix of commercial and military tactical capabilities to extend C2 services to a JTF commander. This capability was also used to extend MWR services to remote locations. Leased commercial SATCOM and DSCS were the major long haul carriers.

Echelons Corps and Below (ECB) relied on mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) and the tactical packet network (TPN) for secure voice and data services. Since the MSE/TPN operated at the Secret high level, the network encryption system was used to tunnel the unclassified network (NIPRNET and CUDIN) through the MSE/TPN to provide unclassified e-mail service and Internet access.

The U.S. enabling force that deployed into Kosovo used U.S. Army tactical communications and Fly Away packages (FAP). The Marine element deployed its JTF Enabler package that also used a mix of military tactical and commercial communications and information systems capabilities to support the command and control needs of the deployed commander. For the sustained phase of the operation, the US Army planned to employ its Dragon package, a commercial, contractor-maintained, and operated capability. The Dragon package was to support the communication and information needs of Camp Bondsteel and Camp Montieth, the major US support bases in Kosovo and Camp Able Sentry in Macedonia. While in Kosovo, there was a mix of both tactical systems (Figure 6) and the Dragon capability supporting the base camp needs.

Figure 6. Camp Montieth Communications

There was a tactical EAC POP package at Camp Bondsteel that was linked via the DSCS to the Landstuhl STEP site and to the Funari reach-back via a FAP and COMSAT link. A DISA POP was deployed at Camp Able Sentry and connected to Stuttgart and Heidelberg via the

SPACELINK commercial satellite system. A FAP and COMSAT link supported reach-back services from Camp Able Sentry to Funari. Camp Montieth was linked to the Landstuhl STEP via the DSCS. Commercial satellite connectivity linked the Dragon packages supporting Camps Bondsteel, Montieth, and Able Sentry. There was also a tactical TROPO link (TRC-170) between Bondsteel and Montieth (Figures 7 and 8).

Figure 7. TRC-170 Camp Bondsteel

Figure 8. TRC-170 Camp Montieth

There was a CONOPS package on Camp Bondsteel that could be deployed on notice and be up and running in 2 hours or less providing

DSN, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and VTC services. Because of the mountainous terrain in Kosovo, an AN/TSC-93 TACSAT was used for this capability and linked the deployed CONOPS package (Figure 9) with TFF at Camp Bondsteel. The CONOPS package also had a SHARC that provided single channel TACSAT and an INMARSAT and FM retransmission capability. The CONOPS package was used to support special deployments such as the U.S. forces sent to Metrovica during the riots and was used for MWR to extend voice, e-mail, and even VTC to soldiers at remote sites such as outpost Eagle's Nest on the Serbian border (Figure 10). Camp Bondsteel was wired with fiber optic cable, requiring careful coordination with the camp contractor Brown and Root and the military engineering units to avoid accidentally digging up the cables.

Figure 9. CONOPS Package

Figure 10. CONOPS Deployment at the Eagle's Nest

In Kosovo, the Dragon system was installed in fixed facilities (Figure 11). The implementation timeline provided for an initial operational capability at Camp Able Sentry and then Bondsteel, followed by Montieth. The tactical systems used to extend communications service to the Russian, Polish, and Greek base camps were to be replaced by extending commercial services to these camps as well. The contractors TAMSCO and EPS under a GSA contract administered by CECOM installed the Dragon and provided O/M for each site and the IMO functions. The 5th Signal Command contracted with ARTEL, Inc. to provide onsite technical representation to monitor the Dragon activities to ensure compliance with the statement of work. There was a 5th Signal Command LNO at Bondsteel to facilitate coordination and help resolve problems. This arrangement created some several challenges for the TFF G6 since the contractors did not report to him, but were under the direction of USAREUR/5th Signal Command and CECOM.

Figure 11. Dragon Package on Camp Bondsteel

A limited commercial cellular capability was also introduced. The IFONE system was installed at Camps Bondsteel and Montieth and the Vitina base camp. IFONE was connected to the Dragon so a cellular user at Bondsteel could call through the Dragon to a user at Montieth as well as talk to users on Bondsteel. The IFONE was not installed at Camp Able Sentry because the Macedonian government had not approved the frequency request. Camp Able Sentry users could, however, call IFONE users through the Dragon. The system covered a 7 to 8 kilometer radius around the base camps. It used a single cell with 32 transceivers and 150 AMPS (U.S. standard cell phones). The AMPS could use STU-Q44 sleeves for secure operation and sleeves were provided for operational use. The system had the option to incorporate a GSM capability as well. For cost reasons, full cell coverage of the MNB(E) sector was not possible. Like the Dragon, contractors maintained the IFONE system. In the final analysis, the conversion to commercial services essentially drove the Army to set up the equivalent of a commercial telephone company and ISP to run the fixed-base telecommunications and information services supporting MNB(E).

The DISN STEP access facilities used the DSCS satellite to accommodate connectivity with deployed tactical GMF terminals. At the outset of the air war, there were only three active STEP sites (Landstuhl and Ramstein, Germany and Croughton, England) and none were fully equipped with its pre-provisioned DISN services package. Hence, there was an urgent need to complete the upgrades to these sites. Furthermore, because of the increased demand for service, including possible deployment into Kosovo, there was an added demand to accelerate the activation of the STEP capability at Lago Di Patria, Italy as well—a significant challenge that the Joint Staff, EUCOM, DISA, and the Army successfully overcame. The Army Fly Away packages were used to accommodate an early reach-back capability to the central region. The DISA Commercial Satellite Communications Initiative (CSCI) provided INTELSAT 601 commercial transponders that supported the DISA POP, FAP, and Dragon connectivity needs. The Newsky and Orion commercial satellites were used as well to support FAP and MWR connectivity. AAFES contracted with Sprint to provide commercial pay telephone service to Camps Bondsteel, Montieth, and Able Sentry so that military personnel could use calling cards to make personal calls. Calling cards could be purchased from the PX. This service used the Orion satellite for connectivity to the PTT entry point.

Managing the mix of U.S. commercial and military systems was a challenge for the TFF G6 as well as the contractors and signal units supporting the deployment. Because of the number of different players and a lack of clear definitions of the relationships of the organization elements, the TFF signal unit command and control relationship was complicated and confusing. Not only were there challenges dealing with two major contractors maintaining the Dragon and IFONE networks which did not report directly to the TFF G6, the units supporting TFF came from a variety of signal units and the command relationships were never formally established with them. The two biggest signal units were the 121st Signal Battalion and the 7th Signal Brigade. The 121st Signal Battalion was the division signal battalion and as such was responsible for the U.S. ECB assets such as the MSE network, the TFF G6 and the general health of the overall communications and information networks supporting MNB(E)/TFF, including the multinational units assigned. The 7th Signal Brigade provided the signal units responsible for the systems supporting EAC services and the TACSAT assets and they tended to report to and take their tasking from higher headquarters

in the rear area. The TFF G6 also had to coordinate activities with the multinational units assigned to MNB(E) and with KFOR J6, including frequency management activities and the KFOR services at MNB(E) such as the data networks CRONOS and KSN. The TFF G6 also had to coordinate with DISA-EUR. A DISA-EUR LNO at TFF would have been helpful. The effectiveness of the TFF relationships among the various players became very personality dependent and there was a need to formalize the command relationships among the military and contractor elements.

Providing and managing communications and information systems support on a base camp environment such as Bondsteel was more similar to a DOIM operation than a tactical signal battalion's mission. Units needed to be supported down to the company level once the assets were in place and there were units such as the Red Cross and MWR that required support but did not have equipment or signal personnel. Additionally, TOEs did not provide units with an adequate number of SINCGARS radios. Units such as civil affairs and PSYOP showed up without desktop computers and the TFF G6 had to provide them. Rotation of commanders, units, and other support personnel resulted in constant changes in office configurations, requiring telephone and computer reconfigurations to accommodate the changes. These activities placed additional demands on an already overcommitted TFF G6 staff. It was felt that communications and information systems support similar to a garrison environment might have been appropriate for base camps such as Camps Bondsteel and Montieth.

The success of the communications support to TFF was a team effort on the part of the many dedicated and professional communications and information system participants in the European theater. COL Melita McCully, U.S. Army, commander 7th Signal Brigade, was responsible for U.S. EAC communications and information systems planning, implementation, and operations in Kosovo and the Former Republic of Macedonia. She and her team of dedicated and well-trained communicators, along with elements of the 121st Signal Battalion (supported by the 440th and 44th Signal Battalion) and 22nd Signal Brigade, served to provide secure, responsive, and reliable voice, message, data, and VTC services to the forward deployed forces, including multinational units assigned to MNB(E). There were numerous other organizations such as 1st ID G6, V Corps G6, 5th Signal Command, USAREUR, EUCOM J6, and DISA-EUR whose military,

civilian, and contractor personnel also made significant contributions to the success of the operation.

The tactical network was monitored and managed at multiple levels—system control forward at Camp Bondsteel, 7th Signal Brigade network control center, USAREUR/5th Signal Command network operations center, DISA-EUR network operations center, and EUCOM Joint Communications Operations Cell. DISA-EUR and the Computer Emergency Response Team (EURCERT) monitored and assessed all potential network intrusion attempts, outages, and degradations. EURCERT consolidated all theater incidents and assessments and provided daily and weekly reports to EUCOM and the component commands. USAREUR/5th Signal Command had a regional CERT that proactively monitored the networks for intrusion attempts and abuses. Joint Intrusion Detection Systems were installed at all STEP sites to monitor for possible intrusions. Assessment teams were also periodically sent into Kosovo to evaluate communications and information systems vulnerabilities.

In Kosovo, the 7th Signal Brigade, the 121st Signal Battalion, and 22nd Signal Brigade communicators set new performance standards for meeting the expectations for reliable, high quality telecommunications service. At the 7th Signal Brigade headquarters in Mannheim, Germany, the brigade established an outstanding training program, referred to as the Voice of Freedom University, that focused on developing leadership, technical and interpersonal skills. Courses covered a wide range of subjects from habits of highly effective people to technical skill development offered by the data, cable, DGM, TROPO, and TASAT university elements. This initiative has had tremendous benefits in the Kosovo operation—well trained, dedicated, and can-do soldiers, NCOs, and officers.

The 7th Signal Brigade's EAC communications aided the 121st Signal Battalion, commanded by LTC Kokinda, U.S. Army, and his team to establish a robust tactical communications network that provided communications and information services to Camps Bondsteel, Montieth, and Able Sentry. They extended connectivity and services to the Russian (Figure 12), Polish (Figure 13) and Greek base camps assigned to Task Force Falcon, as well as other U.S. forces deployed at base camps such as the 1-187 IN at Vitina (Figure 14).

Figure 12. U.S. Communications at Russian Compound in Kamenica

Figure 13. U.S. Communications at Polish Camp White Eagle

Figure 14. U.S. Communications at Vitina Base Camp

While on a visit to the U.S. communications facility supporting the Polish Camp White Eagle, I was able to visit a SOF and MI unit collocated with the 121st Signal Battalion team. The SOF and MI units had their own communications as well as DSN, SIPRNET, and NIPRNET access. I was given a tour of the SOF operations center that had a tactical communications to their safe house and units on patrol, including line of sight and satellite communications connectivity. The U.S. communications support to the Polish site and its connectivity to TFF consisted of a MSE single phone and NIPRNET access (without Internet access) for sending SITREPs and other command and control related messages. The U.S. MI team provided intelligence support to the Polish TOC. A MI team was collocated with the Russians and provided them intelligence support as well.

Figure 15. KFOR 1B Network

By June of 2000, the tactical capabilities that supported Camps Bondsteel, Montieth, and Able Sentry were converted to the commercial Dragon package, except for an overlay tactical network (Figure 15). The network continued to provide a command and control capability for the TFF commander that was owned and operated by the U.S. military. MAJ Lin Crawford, U.S. Army, 7th Signal Brigade, was responsible for the capability referred to as Charlie Rock, an EAC POP that provided 12 DTGs, 48 TAC phones, 21 DSN, NIPRNET, SIPRNET, and DRSN service. VTC was extended from the Dragon. The Rock was linked to the Landstuhl STEP and Heidelberg reach-back. There were also tactical links to Camps Montieth and Able Sentry, the Russian, Polish, and Greek base camps, and U.S. forces at Klokot and Vitina. Major Crawford's team also supported the CONOPS package deployments.

U.S. intelligence communications connectivity was handled through EUCOM J2, DISA-EUR, USAREUR DCSINT, 66th MI, and agencies (such as DIA for JWICS connectivity) of the National Intelligence Support Team that supported Task Force Falcon at Camp Bondsteel and the U.S. National Intelligence Cell that supported KFOR headquarters at Pristina. Satellite connectivity was provided by the military DSCS (IO/IOR) and the commercial satellite systems of INTELSAT, NEWSKY, and Orion. Commercial Ku-band was used

extensively in the Balkans supporting both Bosnia and Kosovo operations. Besides being expensive, the Ku-band was at its limits in terms of available capacity for military use. USAREUR/5th Signal Command planned to transition the Kosovo commercial SATCOM architecture to the less expensive C-band in order to save money and to free up the Ku-band for other military uses.

The mountainous terrain of Kosovo affected the performance of the line of sight FM radios such as SINCGARS. There were numerous dead spots throughout the sector, no fixed retransmission sites, and only had a few deployable retransmission capabilities, which took an hour or so to set up for contingency operations. TACSATs were some of the most reliable radios and they were used as backups when units deployed to FM dead spots but even here there were problems. INMARSAT was used as a backup capability for deployed units such as the tactical PSYOP teams. Interference problems were experienced while operating in the single channel mode. The 1st AD was planning to move to frequency hopping and a 5th Signal Command assessment team was starting to look at possible retransmission site options to improve coverage of secure communications throughout the sector.

From the outset of the operation, units purchased commercial handheld radios for the Kosovo mission. The task force never authorized use of these radios, but almost everyone had one and this created an OPSEC problem that had to be carefully managed. There were secure radios such as the PRC-127 and 139 that would have been a better solution. The *TalkAbout* radios were cheap, easy to use, and met most communications needs. The XTS-3000 secure handheld radio was being used by some elements and the TFF G6 recommended approval of their more general use.

Large volumes of information from many different sources fed the TFF operation daily. There was no one organizational element responsible for reviewing, cataloging, and posting information coming into TFF and this made it difficult for members of the task force and others to find the key elements needed to inform and support analysis and the command and control decisionmaking process. It was also difficult to find out what types of information were actually available and where. The large appetite for information from both those within and outside of TFF operations generated numerous RFIs and e-mails with large attachments that placed unnecessary demands on the data networks

and often contributed to slowing down the overall throughput, especially during crisis periods. There was also nobody responsible for managing the information process, including sharing information among multinational partners, KFOR, and non-military players, such as UNMIK and NGOs. A classified TFF Web site was established on SIPRNET to facilitate the sharing of critical information in a timely manner with authorized U.S.-only users, but sharing with KFOR, the other MNBs, UNMIK, and NGOs continued to be problematic. There was a need for a G-level information management office to address the needs of the task force operating in a multinational, multi-agency, and civil-military peace operations environment.

The MNB(E) LNO at KFOR headquarters needed better secure voice, data, and VTC communications connectivity with TFF. He did not have U.S. DSN or NIPRNET and SIPRNET access. He only had KFOR-provided voice and data services. The lack of U.S. secure connectivity required him to make weekly visits to TFF headquarters to put his U.S. briefing together for COMKFOR. He provided COMKFOR with a weekly update of TFF activities and status reports on TFF special events and operations when they occurred. As the TFF commander's representative on the ground at KFOR, there was a need to provide him better communications to keep him more adequately informed of TFF activities so that he could effectively respond to the needs of both COMKFOR and the commander of MNB(E).

Interoperability and communications with KFOR and non-military participants, such as UNMIK and NGOs, were problematic. The voice and data networks of MNB(E) were not interconnected with those of KFOR, the other MNBs, and UNMIK. KFOR extended voice and data services to MNB(E) headquarters by providing some KPN phones and CRONOS and KSN workstations in the TOC area. Secure voice interoperability between the NATO STU-IIB and U.S. STU-IIIA continued to be a problem—U.S. units needed to deploy with the NATO key. There was no voice network interface with UNMIK police, the PTK, or NGOs. The communications services extended to the multinational units supporting MNB(E) differed and were limited to voice (MSE) and unclassified data (NIPRNET—some had Internet access and others did not, but no Web surfing was allowed). At a minimum, the multinational units had voice and e-mail for sending SITREPS and other command and control information to TFF

headquarters elements. Collocated U.S. LNOs (intelligence support teams) were used to share appropriate RELKFOR classified information.

There were problems communicating in the secure mode (due to incompatible cryptography) with the radios of the multinational units assigned to MNB(E) and with those of other MNB units, especially those that shared the boundary with MNB(E). SINCGARS had to operate in the single frequency, plain text mode to communicate with other multinational units—another OPSEC challenge. For example, during cordon and search operations in the MNB(E) sector, radios were found that were tuned to KFOR and MNB(E) frequencies. The Russians were the only unit which MNB(E) was not able to communicate with at all. Unlike the other nations who participated in interoperability testing, the Russians would not provide TFF G6 with any information on their communications assets. The LCE(SOCCE) unit provided an RTO with a SINCGARS radio for the 13th Tactical Group operations center when operationally required.

A Dragon interface with the PTK was being considered by 5th Signal Command as a way to provided access to UNMIK, NGOs, and others having access to the PTK. The *Dragon* was being interfaced with the KPN to improve the ability to communicate with KFOR and the other MNB headquarters and remove the need for KPN phones in MNB(E) headquarters. The use of a common COMSEC key was also being discussed with SHAPE as a way to improve tactical communications.

Commercialization of U.S. communications encountered a number of challenges ranging from onsite coordination to delivery delays to base construction delays. There were issues related to coordination of trenching efforts that would allow signal cables to be buried without duplicating work efforts and avoid accidental cutting of buried cable, which did happen. There were delays in power installation and site preparation. Deployed forces were constantly moving personnel and office functions from building to building without proper coordination with the signal units, and this impacted the ability to establish a communications and information systems baseline that in turn delayed the signal units' ability to transition to sustained operations. The TFF G6 felt that many of the commercialization coordination and implementation issues could have been avoided by employing a full-time commercialization planning cell that deployed forward during the

commercialization implementation phase to facilitate coordination and timely resolution of issues.

26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) Communications

From April 28 through June 3, 1999, the 26th MEU was engaged in supporting JTF Shining Hope in Albania. On June 4, 1999, the MEU was ordered to turn over the refugee camp security mission to the U.S. Air Force and proceed to Macedonia to participate in the Kosovo operation. Participation began on June 10, 1999 with the offloading of the Marine ground combat elements at Thessaloniki, Greece and then traveled through Greece to Macedonia and the staging area on the border with Kosovo at Brazda. On June 14, they entered Kosovo from Macedonia as part of the U.S.-led enabling force and on June 15 they took over their tactical area of responsibility in Gnjilane, replacing French and British forces that had moved on to their respective sectors of MNB(N) and MNB(C). The 26th MEU set up their forward operating base (FOB) on a hilltop overlooking the main city of Gnjilane. The mission was to secure lines of communication, conduct security operations, and enforce the MTA. There were numerous gaps and ambiguities in the mission guidance and information provided the MEU, especially regarding exit criteria. Neither an end state nor a transition plan was ever provided to the MEU. The 26th MEU completed its mission and transferred authority to the U.S. Army 1-26 Infantry on July 10. 1999.

The JTF Enabler package, INMARSAT, GSM Cellular phones, and UHF TACSAT and VHF and HF radios provided communications support to the deployed 26th MEU commander and his forces. Convoy communications relied on UHF-TACSAT and tactical VHF and HF radios and GSM cell phones. Air operations communications with the helicopters and the FAC, NAEW, and ABCCC relied on UHF and VHF radio. The JTF Enabler was used to support the headquarters. Within 6 hours of arrival outside of Gnjilane SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and DSN access were operational and within 12 hours the installation was completed providing SIPRNET, NIPRNET, DSN, AUTODIN, DTG, CRONOS/LOCE, JDISS, and VTC services to the FOB. Access to the Defense Information Systems Network was provided by a TSC-93B link over the DSCS IOR

satellite to the Croughton, England STEP site. The tactical network consisted of a UHF net, six VHF nets, and two TACSAT nets. The primary command net was VHF and because of the mountainous terrain, performance was a problem and a retransmission site was needed to provide reliable coverage to deployed units. The retransmission site used an MRC-145 (two vehicle-mounted high-power VHF radios). In order to further ensure reliable communications performance, a contact team was sent out daily to units to closely supervise their communications assets, resupply batteries, and solve equipment and communications issues—the biggest threat to effective communications was the user.


Figure 16. JTF Enabler

The JTF Enabler package (Figure 16) combined commercial and military tactical capabilities to extend communications and information services to the MEU commander and his headquarter's operation. The package consisted of a TSC-93B tactical satellite terminal, FCC-100 multiplexer, KG-194 encryption, SB-3614 and SB-3865 tactical switchboards for DSN and commercial access, FXS card to accommodate STU-IIIs, CISCO Routers, SMC Hubs, classified (SIPRNET), and unclassified (NIPRNET) LANs running Banyan Vines 6.3, Compaq Proliant servers, VTC suite, Microsoft NT Toshiba laptops, Sun Spark 20s for GCCS and JDISS, CRONOS/LOCE with NIDTS access, AUTODIN, and TQG-803 generators. The 10BaseT network connected to the Compaq *Proliant* servers that were housed in reinforced cases running Windows NT Server 4.0. The network could accommodate access as far away as a

quarter mile from the headquarters. There was heavy reliance on other commercial services such as cell phones, INMARSAT, and IRIDIUM.

The 26th MEU deployment provided reliable communications to the commander and his forces, despite numerous obstacles. OPSEC violations on NIPRNET needed to be carefully managed. It was necessary to ensure SIPRNET availability in order to avoid improper use of NIPRNET during stress periods. Fans were needed at times to keep the notebooks cool. Dust and frequent movements took their toll on the notebooks as well. Power issues tended to pose big challenges during the 12 hours following a headquarters move. The UPS systems were key to helping during this period. Viruses from outside sources were a problem to be dealt with and virus protection updates were done weekly through the DISN anti-virus site license.

CHAPTER XXV

Kosovo Communications Commercialization: USAREUR Experiences

Danny Johnson and Paul Meaker

Senior signal leaders and planners from U.S. Army Europe's (USAREUR's), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Information Management (ODCSIM), V Corps' G-6, the 1st Infantry Division, 7th Signal Brigade, 5th Signal Command, 22nd Signal Brigade, and the 29th Area Support Group (ASG), participated in a series of planning meetings during the April and May 1999 timeframe to develop the overall KFOR communications architecture.

Communications planners and technical experts, many of whom had experience supporting the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H), applied that experience and the lessons learned to the challenges of Kosovo. Planning examined all aspects of Operation Joint Guardian (OJG) to include communications requirements:

- In the Central Region Sea Port of Embarkation (SPOE) at Bremerhaven, Aerial Port of Entry (APOE) at Ramstein, and DPC at Rhine Ordnance Barracks;

- In support of Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) operations in Thessalonike, Greece;

- For the initial entry force;

- Inside Kosovo in support of base camps, tactical units, and Task Force (TF) Falcon headquarters; and

- In Macedonia for the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) and TF Falcon (Rear) at Camp Able Sentry (CAS).

As a result of this detailed planning, there were no communications-related "show stoppers" during the transition from Operation Allied Force (OAF) and Task Force (TF) Hawk to OJG and TF Falcon.

Background

In early March 1999, Camp Commanche (B-H) was commercialized, freeing up a Fly Away Package (FAP), which had been deployed since early 1998 providing communication support to the USAREUR, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics (DCSLOG). On March 25th, 5th Signal Command was given direction to re-deploy the package to support CAS, Macedonia. It was shipped on 3 April, and was passing traffic by 5 April. The insertion of this package marked the first use of commercial communications to the Kosovo operation, by the U.S. military.

In conjunction with the FAP deployment, the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) deployed with its tactical satellite system, and the 7th Signal Brigade supported the U.S. Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) with a single channel tactical package (tactical satellite and small switch) as it had in previous operations. Meanwhile, the 29th ASG planned communications support for the SPOD operations at Thessalonike, Greece, which the 7th Signal Brigade was able to satisfy with a medium tactical communications package.

Within the next 45 days, a second Fly Away Package was assembled and shipped to Albania in support of OAF and TF Hawk. A third Fly Away Package was called forward by the U.S. Army Communications and Electronics Command (CECOM) to support the increased logistics requirement of both OAF and TF Hawk. Upon completion of OAF, both packages were deinstalled and moved forward to support TF Falcon at Camp Bondsteel augmenting both the tactical network and the infant Dragon program.

Still building from the lessons learned in B-H, communications support for the multinational base camps were examined. Kosovo did not pose the challenges experienced in B-H, where there was a requirement for a separate network for the specific purpose of allowing the multinational task forces in the U.S. sector to communicate with their higher headquarters, Task Force Eagle U.S. Commander. This Releasable Stabilization Forces (RELSFOR) network, or commonly known as the Mercury Network, allowed the U.S. Task Force Eagle Commander to

pass classified information to his multinational Commanders. This network consisted of a separate secure telephone system to include different telephone instruments and an enclosed separate secure data system. Initial plans for Kosovo called for a similar system, but to date it has not been implemented.

USAREUR supported KFOR Multinational Polish, Ukrainians, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) commands with Dragon Packages with the Greek and Russian commands programmed for future inclusion. The Ukrainians and UAE commands were co-located at Camp Bondsteel utilizing its Dragon Package. The Polish Command received services from a mini Dragon package, and the Greek Command was provided with a similar package. The Russian camp was scheduled for commercialization in early 2001. Commanders of the multinational forces received only a limited amount of communications services (e.g., no data or e-mail, just a non-secure telephone).

Transition to Commercial Communications

The decision to transition to commercial communications as quickly as possible was based on the lessons learned from SFOR and resulted in first class communications support to TF Falcon commanders and soldiers.

Early in the operation, before command of TF Falcon transitioned from BG Craddock to BG Petersen in August 1999, several key decisions were made that were related directly to the lessons learned in B-H and to the fundamental assumption that KFOR would be a 3- to 5-year operation.

One of those decisions was to think big with communications and to put in a network that could grow with the demand. This guidance recognized that the communication requirements would grow as KFOR's operations and base camps matured. This guidance also recognized that economically, an incremental approach would have to be followed for satellite bandwidth procurement, but a *think big* concept could be followed in the design of the actual communications facilities built. The Dragon systems were therefore engineered with such features as dynamic bandwidth management, redundancy in data processing capability, modular growth compatible voice switches, and rack mounted encryption devices for extending classified data services to the customer.

Commercial Communication Implementation Timeline

The commercialization of communications support suffered delays that stretched the original timeline. Requirements continued to grow beyond the original plan during the first 6 months of the operation, especially at Camp Bondsteel, although the architecture and systems were robust enough to handle the increase. The original design had sufficient bandwidth to accommodate long distance voice trunking for every major customer at Camp Bondsteel. Additionally, the design ensured sufficient capacity to support the Morale, Welfare and Recreation (MWR), Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) and hospital requirements, as well as all the other outside agencies that ultimately became both tenants at Bondsteel and bandwidth consumers with their own unique communications requirements. Eight months after starting the commercialization effort, virtually all communications had been moved to the Dragon packages with only a small tactical network remaining.

Fly Away Packages

Signal units with tactical communications deployed into Kosovo with the initial forces in June and July 1999. They deployed with their organic Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) capabilities and with FAPs designed to enhance those TO&E capabilities. In later months, as the base camps grew and the operating tempo stabilized, Dragon commercial communications packages were phased in and eventually replaced the tactical communications systems.

Figure 1. Medium Tactical Package

Figure 2. Heavy Tactical Package

The FAP package previously deployed to Albania was shifted to Camp Bondsteel in support of Task Force Falcon. The FAP at CAS had been in place since April 1999. Each FAP consisted of off-the-shelf commercial equipment designed to increase the throughput of the 7th Signal Brigade's tactical echelons above corps (EAC) communication systems providing reach back to the Central Region. The FAPs were uploaded and deployed in high mobility multipurpose-wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs), but once in the Area of Operation (AO) they were installed

and operated from inside available structures. The packages handle substantial amounts of both nonsecure Internet protocol router network (NIPRNET), secure Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) data, video teleconferencing, and DSN voice. Considered as augmentation to tactical communications, contractor personnel operate the packages.

Although the FAPs provided an immediate increase of approximately 200 percent in the capacity of the TO&E communications systems, TF Falcon's communications requirements soon outgrew even this capacity as the base camps matured into semi-permanent cities providing a wide range of services, most of which generated communications requirements.

Commercialization using Dragon packages was inevitable and had been planned for from the onset of the mission. When the Dragon packages were deployed and brought online, the TF Falcon FAPs were shut down and retrograded to the Central Region for refurbishing and preparation for the next contingency mission.

Dragon Packages

Dragon packages were designed by 5th Signal Command, and developed by CECOM. The packages are highly effective in providing reliable, high-capacity commercial communications, offering a full spectrum of capabilities including SIPRNET, NIPRNET, and voice, as well as special circuits for VTC, intelligence systems, etc. The Dragon packages should be considered sustainment communications support.

Each Dragon package contains various switches, routers, and servers to handle roughly 1,200 Defense Switched Network (DSN) telephone lines, 150 plus SIPRNET terminals, 1,500 plus NIPRNET terminals, and VTCs, etc. All equipment is rack-mounted and deployed in shelter vans. However, upon arrival in Kosovo and Macedonia, the packages were installed in fixed structures. Essentially, the packages are mobile commercial systems that provide communications capabilities similar to those found at military installations throughout the Central Region.

> 1200 DSN
> 150+ SIPR

CAPABILITIES

> 1500+ NIPR
> Special Circuits

Rack A
•KIV 7s
•Cisco Router
•UPSI UPS

Rack B
•3 HP Servers
•UPSI UPS

Rack C
•Ethernet Switch
•UPSI UPS

Rack D
•3 HP Servers
•UPSI UPS

Rack E
•Cache Engine
•Cisco Router
•Cisco Terminal
Server
•Ethernet Switch
•UPSI UPS

Rack F
•Psirgain
Chassis
•IES
•UPSI UPS

RackG
•IDNX Expansion Shelf
•UPSI UPS

**Rack H**
•Modem Switch
•KIV-19
•UPSI UPS

Figure 3. Rack-Mounted Dragon Package

Figure 4. Trailer-Mounted Antenna

Dragon packages were deployed to CAS, Camp Bondsteel, and Camp Montieth along with contractor personnel to operate and to maintain

them. In addition, the contractor teams provided additional user services such as:

- 24/7—customer help desk;

- E-mail administration;

- Network management;

- End-user network configuration;

- Voice switching;

- Engineering and integration; and

- Add/remove/relocate phones.

USAREUR now owns the Dragon packages. When the KFOR mission ends, the packages will re-deploy to the Central Region and be refurbished by contractors in preparation for the next contingency operation. This approach was taken to allow today's Dragon packages to become tomorrow's Fly Away packages.

Data Packages

Data packages are off-the-shelf commercial equipment components— routers, servers, etc.—used in support of NIPRNET and SIPRNET, e-mail, VTC, and long locals. Such packages enhance the capacity of tactical systems where switches are normally limited to 64 kilobits per second (kbps). Using data packages, communication signals are pulled directly from the satellite and bypass the switches. This effectively increases the throughput of the existing tactical network.

Based on experience acquired while supporting TF Hawk in Albania, the 7th Signal Brigade actively promoted the use of data packages as an effective means to boost the performance of the TF Falcon tactical network. As a result, the initial TF Falcon tactical network was able to handle more of the growing communications requirements (NIPRNET, SIPRNET, VTC, etc.). The 7th Signal Brigade initially fielded eight data packages. Later, it procured and fielded 20 more. Also, V Corps' 22nd Signal Brigade procured and installed an additional four packages.

Commercialization

Despite implementation delays, the commercialization of communications support for TF Falcon represented a tremendous achievement accomplished in record time. Commercial communications planning really did not begin until a few weeks before TF Falcon deployed in June 1999. Tactical communications were planned during OAF (April—May 1999), and commercial communications planning followed in May—June, just before the air war ended. ODCSIM and the 5th Signal Command led the planning for commercial communications and worked closely with CECOM, which would execute the program. As a result, when tactical communications deployed into Kosovo with TF Falcon in June, key decisions and plans for replacing those communications with commercial packages already were well underway.

Communications commercialization in Kosovo began in July and according to the plan, was to be completed by October. This was a highly ambitious plan and assumed no significant delays in facilities preparations, vendor deliveries to CECOM, deployment schedules, etc. There were, however, several delays, many of which were outside of the ODCSIM's and the 5th Signal Command's control. Accordingly, the estimated completion date shifted to November, then to Christmas, and finally, to February 2000, when the initial effort was completed. Although some equipment deliveries from CECOM fell behind schedule, many of the milestones slipped because they were dependent on construction work - power installation, site preparation, etc. In point of fact, construction requirements simply outpaced available capabilities, funds, and space, as Camp Bondsteel grew larger than anyone had anticipated.

The main factor in project slippage was the inability of the deployed forces to settle in the newly constructed camps. Personnel and office functions were moved from building to building, with no prior coordination being performed at the signal level. Work efforts such as trenching were not combined with the efforts for signal cable burying, which resulted in duplicate work efforts. The camp construction planners ignored coordination efforts by the signal community. Construction crews often destroyed work accomplished by signal installers. The inability to establish a baseline of communication services never allowed the Signal implementators to move into a sustainment operation.

Figure 5. Satellite Architecture in Support of Commercial Communications

Communications Support in Contingency Operations

Limitations in tactical communications made the rapid introduction of commercial communications essential for OJG. In general, tactical communications systems cannot handle a lot of today's data requirements. However, digital requirements for TF Falcon now represent 60 to 70 percent of the total system traffic. Tactical communications simply cannot put out the bandwidth, nor can tactical satellites handle the bandwidth. On the terminating end, the Standard Tactical Entry Point (STEP) sites that integrate all the signals into the mainstream communications system have limited capacity as well.

When TF Hawk deployed to Albania in April 1999, it deployed with tactical communications capabilities. In addition, the TF wanted every communications capability available in the Central Region (NIPRNET, SIPRNET, VTC, etc.). That also was the expectation with TF Falcon. Accordingly, USAREUR went into Kosovo knowing that the deploying units would expect the communications capabilities normally available to decisionmakers and staffs in a garrison environment. That then became the requirement, and it drove communications planners initially to use FAPs, and then full commercialization with the Dragon packages as soon as possible.

Based on USAREUR's experiences in the Balkans to date, the reality is that future contingency and low-intensity military operations likely will require communications support consistent to that found in a garrison environment.

Signal Corps Force Structure Implications

The Balkans represent an important testbed for many support concepts and functional areas, one of the most important being communications. In both B-H and Kosovo, USAREUR is using, adapting, and testing commercial communications solutions that could have significant implications on Force XXI initiatives.

Although Force XXI is focused on tactical communications systems, its concepts clearly will have to incorporate and leverage rapidly evolving commercial communications capabilities and solutions. Open questions are: how will tactical systems handle the growing data requirements; what are the best ways to leverage commercial communications in various operational environments (low- to high-intensity conflict); and if commercial communications solutions are applied, what is the prudent offset in military manpower?

Communication support concepts and solutions stemming from TF Falcon offer important lessons having force structure implications. Force XXI should incorporate those lessons, and should address fully how commercial communications capabilities can be best used, recognizing that they often will be a significant part of the solution.

Defense Information Systems Agency Support

DISA's processes and support are geared to fixed-base, garrison requirements, not to communications support for fast-paced contingency operations. SFOR and KFOR have demonstrated that, not only with regard to acquiring additional bandwidth, but also in the way in which the KU band is managed.

Consequently, USAREUR has invested in satellite dishes and equipment to use a commercial band, the C band, as an alternative to the DISA-managed KU band. Initially viewed as a backup system, USAREUR now is moving to make it TF Falcon's primary system.

Originally, USAREUR requested that DISA coordinate with a commercial vendor, but the proposed solution was unsatisfactory because it did not ensure that TF Falcon would have continuous communications support. For example, the required bandwidth would not be available during the 2000 Olympics in September 2000.

Also, DISA is constrained to only certain commercial alternatives. Consequently, the proposed solutions are not always optimal with regard to USAREUR's contingency needs. However, USAREUR is not so constrained. Of course, by going directly to satellite vendors, USAREUR does lose DISA's services which must be duplicated. Still, USAREUR is able to acquire the needed communications support both faster and at reduced prices.

Conclusion

Without question, the communications planning and execution for TF Falcon was highly successful during the first year of OJG. Based on this success, the ODCSIM should ensure that the planning steps and processes used in support of TF Hawk and TF Falcon are incorporated into the USAREUR and 5th Signal Command SOPs and are replicated during future contingency operations.

CHAPTER XXVI

Field Experience

Larry Wentz

The U.S. military were very accommodating during my visit to Kosovo and encouraged me to accompany them on a number of trips off Camp Bondsteel. These trips provided a unique opportunity to observe and gain insights into how our forces support peace operations. The following are excerpts from notes taken while on patrol with U.S. Civil Affairs and PSYOP teams in the MNB(E) sector of the operation.

Gnjilane

My first excursion outside of Camp Bondsteel was to a weekly UNMIK-sponsored meeting between KFOR/MNB(E) officers and UNMIK officials held in Gnjilane. At this particular meeting, the participants discussed regional and local issues and incidents, including UNMIK-KFOR communications, UNMIK police activities, and local construction of war memorials.

My first trip outside the wire, just a couple of days after having arrived at Camp Bondsteel, was with LTC Beard and First Sergeant Richard Woods, U.S. Army, to an UNMIK four-pillar meeting in Gnjilane. The meeting was my first encounter with UNMIK and was a most interesting and educating experience to kick off my stay in Kosovo. The UNMIK four-pillar meeting occurred every Monday at 7 p.m., lasted about an hour, and was held in the conference room of the UNMIK regional administrator in Gnjilane. We traveled from Camp Bondsteel to Gnjilane in two up-armor Humvees. It was necessary to wear a flack vest and helmet while riding in the Humvee. The drive took over an hour on a busy, potholed road known as Route Stag. The UNMIK offices were in an office building in the center of Gnjilane. Once inside the building, the military participants removed their flack vests and helmets, but wore sidearms. Everyone else was unarmed and in civilian clothes,

except for the UNMIK police officer. U.S. military guards were stationed outside the conference room and in front of the building. Some of the U.S. military attending the meeting had Motorola *TalkAbouts* that were used for communicating with soldiers outside the conference room and on the street in front of the UNMIK building.

The meeting attendees consisted of the UNMIK regional administrator and his deputy, KFOR (Legal), UNMIK police, Task Force Falcon (COL Anderson, LTC Beard, and a U.S. Army MP), OSCE, and UNHCR. The EU did not attend and had not provided a participant to any of the meetings thus far. The deputy administrator chaired the meeting since the regional administrator, Mr. Splite, was new and this was, in fact, his first meeting. There did not seem to be any specific agenda for the meeting. Instead, the meeting seemed to quickly center on a couple of concerns, the main one being related to the need for timely communication to the regional administrator of serious incidents in his area of responsibility.

The meeting opened with a long discussion about why it took 12 hours to inform the UNMIK regional administrator of a recent drive-by shooting that killed three and wounded two. The UNMIK administrator said he wanted Task Force Falcon to call them directly when an incident occurred. TFF suggested that this was an UNMIK police responsibility and noted also that there were no established procedures for doing this. In addition, there was no direct communications link between the MNB(E) TOC and the UNMIK control center in Gnjilane. UNMIK communications used the U.N. VSAT network and TFF was not a subscriber of this system nor was the U.S. military voice communications system connected to the U.N. system. Additionally, the local and regional telephone service was problematic and therefore could not be relied upon as a viable system to support emergency reporting between MNB(E) and UNMIK. If such a communications link was necessary for operational purposes, there was a possibility of using the KFOR voice network to call UNMIK in Gnjilane. There was an interface between the KFOR voice network and the U.N. VSAT voice network in Pristina that could be used for this purpose but it was a very limited operational capability. The MNB(E) TOC had access to KPN so there was a possibility for them to call UNMIK. It was noted by the UNMIK police representative that they had reported the incident under discussion to UNMIK headquarters in Pristina but had not called the Gnjilane control center. MNB(E) also noted that they reported the incident to KFOR

headquarters who reported it to UNMIK headquarters in Pristina. Apparently, UNMIK headquarters did not immediately contact the Gnjilane control center and since no one had directly contacted the regional control center this meant the regional administrator's bosses knew about the incident for some time before he did.

The UNMIK police representative stated that if the UNMIK regional administrator wanted the control center to be called, then they should be more specific about under what circumstances (murder, arson, etc.) and then appropriate procedures and communications capabilities could be set up to do so. It was noted that there were other possible means for MNB(E) and UNMIK police to communicate with the regional control center. The Task Force Falcon MPs and UNMIK police were now collocated at checkpoints and police stations. TFF MPs had access to UNMIK police radios so they could call each other for emergencies. This link could possibly be used as well to communicate with the UNMIK regional control center on critical incidents. The issue on the table was the proper procedure and means for alerting the UNMIK regional control center and who should be doing it, MNB(E) or UNMIK police.

A lengthy discussion followed on the confusion between facts and rumors surrounding incidents such as the shooting that had been discussed. There was a comment that delays in communication did not allow proper police work. Sometimes bodies were buried before an autopsy could be performed, so it was hard to build legal cases. The UNMIK police representative took exception to this statement by stating that they had professional police and did a proper job. It was noted once again that commercial communications in the region were poor and this added to the inability to inform. Finally, it was decided that the UNMIK regional administrator needed to think through his needs before any further action was taken on setting up a reporting structure.

The subject of the meeting shifted to the fact that war monuments would likely begin to be constructed throughout the region and some, in fact, had already been put up. The UNMIK policies on monuments, such as when and where they could be constructed, seemed a little fuzzy. Apparently there was a policy that stated that they needed to be kept a safe distance from the road. Many of those already constructed were, in fact, close to the road. In addition, UCK symbols were also being placed on the top of some of the monuments and this was in conflict with UNMIK policy on monuments.

Figure 1. Gnjilane Celebration Poster

In addition to monuments, there were celebrations being planned for the first anniversary as well. On Wednesday there was a local celebration of the liberation of Kosovo being planned for Gnjilane. When we arrived in Gnjilane, there were posters all over town depicting a young Bill Clinton with black hair, General Clark with three stars, and Ambassador Walker, the head of the Kosovo Verification Mission. A caption on the posters (Figure 1) stated that they had been invited along with other international dignitaries. The OSCE rep said he had been asked to speak but wasn't sure if he would, and wanted to know what KFOR and TFF were going to do. COL Anderson made it very clear that KFOR/TFF would not participate. They would only provide troops for security and protection.

There was a short discussion by the UNHCR rep and others about the U.N. desire to move IDPs and Croatian Serbs back into Strpce. There was an UNMIK initiative with OSCE assistance to move them, but not everyone agreed this was the right thing to do. Some believed that the Serbs in this area were being influenced from Belgrade.

The meeting adjourned and LTC Beard and I prepared to walk to Camp Montieth to have dinner before returning to Camp Bondsteel. As we left, we encountered a large crowd lining the main street of Gnjilane. Everyone was very well dressed. As we walked up the street, many shook hands with the soldiers, gave the V sign and said "thank you." It turned out the celebration was for an old man who taught school in people's homes during the Serbian reign and he had come back to set up an Albanian school. The town residents were out to honor his return.

Joint Security Commission Meeting

On one of my visits with Captain Barwikowski to the civil affairs office in Vitina, I attended one of the joint security commission meetings chaired by LTC Miles, U.S. Army. On the day I attended, the discussion addressed violence, protection for Serbs, refugees, and supplying food to the civilians.

The Vitina UNMIK administrator and the UNMIK Police Chief attended the meeting, along with OSCE, ICRC, ECMM, Albanian, and U.S. civil affairs representatives. Captain Barwikowski represented U.S. civil affairs. A Serbian representative was invited, but did not attend. It was not uncommon to have only one ethnic group attend such meetings. As a result, complaints and issues of an ethnic nature that were raised could not be immediately addressed because the other ethnic group was not present. Attempts were constantly made by KFOR to conduct joint meetings between neighboring Albanians and Serbs to work on issues face-to-face, but this was not easy to accomplish given the deep-rooted hatred each had for the other.

The UNMIK administrator was a few minutes late due to a protest in his office by some local Albanians who UNMIK hired to provide security for the building at night. With the recent increase in violence in Vitina, they wanted more money, radios to contact UNMIK police, and guns to protect themselves.

LTC Miles started the meeting with a discussion of various incidents over the past week and initiatives being pursued by KFOR. The other participants raised issues of interest that they thought KFOR might be able to help resolve or that would be of interest to KFOR. It was reported that a Serbian woman, whose husband had been shot and killed the week before by a neighbor, had returned to Serbia. UNMIK police had

arrested the neighbor so she fled fearing for her own safety. In response to a KFOR question on the location of Serbian families, one of the NGOs reported that there were three Serbian families living behind the bus station and five behind the hospital in Vitina. KFOR made the observation that Serbs were telling them where they would be working in the fields. There had been a number of recent driveby shootings, so they were seeking protection for the remaining few days that they would be working. The UNMIK Police Chief stated that he was increasing the presence of the Kosovo Police Service. There would be three shifts with more patrols in the evening. It was mentioned that there was a Serbian boycott in Gnjilane and they were not taking to internationals. A local Serb was reported to have gotten asbestos in his eyes and tried to get help at the Vitina hospital and Camp Montieth medical facility but could not, and had to go to a hospital in Serbia that had an eye clinic. It was noted that many of the NGOs were leaving the area since there was no further need for them. World Food had some seed left over and KFOR was going to store it for use during the next planting season. The meeting lasted roughly an hour.

Recruiting in Vitina

While on a visit with Captain Barwikowski and his Vitina civil affairs team, I had the opportunity to observe an UNMIK effort to recruit a Serb to work as a fireman on the all-Albanian Vitina fire department.

The Vitina UNMIK municipal representative, the UNMIK Fire Marshal, the Vitina Fire Chief, and U.S. civil affairs members met in a local school outside of Vitina to administer a test to Serbs wanting to try to qualify for the job of fireman at the Vitina fire department. As a side note, both Albanian and Serbian children used the school where the test was being held, one ethnic group in the morning and the other in the afternoon. The male Serbian candidates who passed the UNMIK administered written test would qualify to be given a physical before proceeding further with the selection process. UNMIK and the Vitina Fire Department were interested in males age 18 to 30. There were 14 men, mostly over 30, who showed up for the test. Three showed up in a Humvee escorted by MNB(E) soldiers.

When I arrived at the school with the civil affairs TST, we discovered UNMIK had not yet arrived. Since it was nearly 4 p.m., the scheduled

start time of the test, we decided to try to track down the UNMIK team. There was an OSCE registration center across the street from the school, and several UNMIK police cars and officers were sitting around outside the registration center talking. We asked one of the UNMIK policemen to call on his radio to see if he could track down the UNMIK person giving the test, but they were unsuccessful in their efforts to make contact. The Serbian candidates arrived by 4 p.m., but the UNMIK team did not arrive until 5 p.m.

Civil affairs SSGT Bowen, U.S. Army, had the lead to initiate the discussion through a translator with help from the UNMIK Fire Marshal and the Vitina Fire Chief. The whole effort appeared to be doomed for failure from the outset since UNMIK was only planning to hire one Serb to work at the all-Albanian Vitina Fire Department. The discussion in preparation for the test was held in one of the classrooms. The Serbian participants were very uneasy, and to some extent, hostile. The UNMIK team tried to reassure the Serbian men that they would be safe while working with the Albanians, but the Serbs were not convinced that this would be the case. The discussion got quite heated for a period of time. The Serbian men counteroffered to create a Serbian-manned fire department, but that was not part of the UNMIK plan to create a multiethnic fire department to work together for the betterment of Kosovo. UNMIK tried to convince the candidates that it was in their best interest to have a job and in Kosovo's best interest to work together to get the country back on its feet. The Vitina Fire Chief tried to reassure them, but nothing was working. The three Serbs who had been escorted by KFOR walked out early into the discussion and were followed later by several others. In spite of the valiant personal effort of SSGT Bowen, the UNMIK rep, the Fire Marshal, and the Vitina Fire Chief, the Serbs were not convinced that this would be a safe or a good employment opportunity. When the discussion was leading nowhere, the civil affairs team decided they had done the best they could under the circumstances and turned the rest of the discussion over to the UNMIK team. The UNMIK representative tried an alternative approach by suggesting there were other job opportunities, including paying them to play basketball. Basketball happened to be a national pastime and we saw hoops nailed to power poles and buildings everywhere. In the end, UNMIK failed in its effort to recruit any Serbian candidates.

Bilince and Lovce

I accompanied a PSYOP team to two Albanian villages (Bilince and Lovce) on the Serbian border. The Albanians contacted were afraid of renewed Serbian violence in their area. We met with several local leaders and were apprised of their concerns.

The PSYOP team met at 8:30 a.m. at the PSYOP SEAhut area for the morning operations briefing. Two team leaders, Staff Sergeants McCarthy and Langteau, U.S. Army, were leading the mission. We would be visiting two Albanian villages, Bilince and Lovce, which were located a few kilometers from the Serbian border. The mission was mainly to visit the towns to show an MNB(E) presence and to check on the local issues and concerns. There was also a growing concern that some troubles might occur after school let out for the summer and the team was asked to collect information that might indicate whether Serbs were planning to leave Kosovo during the summer months. The team was also reminded to advise Serbs that they could register at registration sites set up at the Serbian border.

Two Humvees were used for the mission. As we approached the exit from Camp Bondsteel, all weapons were locked and loaded and a radio check was made with the PSYOP CP as we left Camp Bondsteel and headed for Camp Montieth. We had to stop at the battalion TOC on Camp Montieth to let them know we would be in their area, the purpose of our visit, and to check the latest intelligence on activities in the area. Upon entering Camp Montieth, we had to stop and unload and clear all weapons before proceeding to the battalion TOC. Following the check-in with the battalion TOC, we left Camp Montieth for Bilince in two up-armor Humvees. Once again, before departing Camp Montieth, weapons were locked and loaded. Flack vests and Kevlar helmets were the uniform of the day.

It was a very hot day, but the Humvees were air-conditioned. Since it was very warm, an ice chest of cold water and drinks were essential for the trip. Our translator was a young Albanian man from Gnjilane who claimed he learned his English from watching American television and movies. He had a boom box hanging from the gun turret and for the duration of the trip, hard rock music blasted away—it reminded me of the movie "Good Morning Vietnam." The Humvee had a GPS, 2 SINCGARS radios, an INMARSAT phone, and handheld Motorola

radios. Because of the mountainous terrain we were traveling through, SINCGARS communications to Camp Bondsteel were problematic. As an alternative means of maintaining contact, the PSYOP team monitored the battalion engineer and infantry radio nets.

MNB(E) had recently conducted a cordon and search of the town of Bilince, so the team was not quite sure what sort of reception they might receive. On the road to Bilince, the asphalt road had been mined at one time but the mines had been removed and the holes filled in, leaving the previous locations quite visible. We did a radio check before entering town and then dropped one team off at the beginning of the small village. The team I was with drove to the square in the center of town. There were no Serbs in this Albanian town as they all left after the war. As usual, the streets of the town were empty when we arrived. The kids were the first to show up (Figure 2); they seemed to come out of the woodwork. A couple of men eventually showed up and Sergeant Langteau and the translator started to talk with them. They sat down in the shade of a wall. The local men said water and electricity were fine. They emphasized that they hoped that KFOR would not leave since they felt safe now, but they would leave if KFOR did. They were afraid of the Serbs who had committed atrocities in their town. When the Serbs that had lived in the village left, the local Albanians burned their homes. One of the young girls standing around listening took me by the hand and walked me down the street. She pointed to a burned home and said, "Serb." When the men were asked about plans for the kids for the summer and returning refugees, they said the kids got out of school at the end of the month and would be staying in the area. As far as returning refugees were concerned, they said this was only natural.

Figure 2. PSYOP with Albanian Kids

The kids were real hams for picture taking. They would constantly pester us to take their picture. On earlier visits, the PSYOP soldiers took pictures of the kids and brought copies back and gave the pictures to them. Several of the kids were running around showing copies to us. Cows seemed to roam the town freely—a number of them walked through the square while we were talking. After the kids and several men arrived, an old man showed up and sat down to talk (Figure 3). He rolled his own cigarettes and was quite talkative. Later, the mayor of the town showed up as well. During the discussions, they said they had access to radio and television and had heard the KFOR radio shows. It was noted that they didn't get newspapers and would like to get more reading material. The PSYOP soldiers asked them if they had seen the KFOR *Dialogue* publication. They had not, so the soldiers said they would bring some newspaper and magazine handouts the next time they stopped by. At one point a young man came out of a house next to where we were sitting and offered us tea. We accepted and he brought it out to where we were sitting. It was hot and had a pretty good flavor. At the end of the discussion we all shook hands and left. Once back in the Humvees, we cleaned our hands with Dial antibacterial hand sanitizer. Without proper sanitary precautions, one could develop some strange rashes.

Figure 3. Old Man Talking to Translator

We tried to use SINCGARS on our way to Lovce to contact the PSYOP CP at Camp Bondsteel but could not get through. Line of sight communications was pretty poor, especially in the valleys, villages, and towns. Lovce was a very small Albanian town. All of the villagers left the town during the war. We parked the Humvee at the top of the hill leading to the village and went into a small store and bought a Coke and some cookies. The countryside around the village was very beautiful, but as in other places, trash was dumped everywhere. Behind the Humvee was a mountain range and at the base was a known smuggling trail that could only be seen with binoculars. We ate lunch in the Humvee because if we ate outside the kids would have pestered us. As such, they still hung around the Humvees and looked in the windows at us eating.

An old man stopped by while we were eating and invited us to his home for tea. We accepted and, after our lunch of MREs, we walked down the hill to his home. When we arrived he shook our hands in the driveway and led us to the house. Since this was a Muslim home, we had to take our shoes off before entering. The scene was quite amusing—a half-dozen combat boots in a row outside the front door. I had to use the toilet and asked where it was. It was an outhouse on the edge of the patio near the front door to the house. As I walked into the outhouse, the smell was more than I could believe. The toilet

was simply a slit in the floor with two places to put your feet. The waste area was open on the backside and ran out into the area behind the outhouse that was next to the family garden. An interesting experience to say the least.

When we entered the house, one soldier stayed outside as our guard. The old man insisted that it was safe and wanted him to come in, but it was explained that he needed to be ready to go up the hill to the Humvee should we get a call. This seemed to be an acceptable explanation. The family gave the soldier on guard duty a cold drink, some walnuts, and tea. The front room had foam-covered seats on the floor that covered two sides of the room and this was where we sat. There was a bed in one corner of the room and this was where the old man sat. We took off our flack vests and helmets and placed them in the corner next to us, the soldiers kept their weapons next to them. A woman who was the mother of several of the children running around offered us a cold orange soda drink, obviously brought down from the store at the top of the hill just for this occasion. The children, being curious, came in and sat down next to the soldiers.

It was clear from the discussion with the locals that they had seen some terrible things. The mother still had reactions to gunfire and said the children had been traumatized. They were doing much better now that KFOR had arrived, and they were quite happy to see them. As the conversations with the old man went on, the kids got bored and left. The old man went into a long story about the VJ and Arkan's men. We were told by the Special Forces guys to be aware that over time stories take on a life of their own. The old man said that during the VJ/MUP reign of terror they went up into the mountains during the day and only stayed in the house at night. One day, he said, he stayed home and a VJ soldier saw him in his garden and pointed his rifle at him. He thought for sure he would be killed, but the soldier left him alone this time. Later, he said he ran into some VJ and then some of Arkan's men when he was trying to get to Gnjilane for medical treatment. When asked if there were UCK in his village, he said he told them yes, and that they were well armed. The soldiers then wanted names, but he said he did not know. They threatened to cut his throat if he did not tell. In order to get away, he said he would go back to town and get the names if they let him go. He said they let him go eventually.

More local men arrived, including the school principal, and joined the conversation that was being led by Sergeant McCarthy with the help of the translator. There seemed to be a pecking order. As various men arrived, they adjusted the seating arrangement. While the discussions were going on, one of the kids brought in a basket of walnuts. The mother came in somewhat embarrassed and said she was preparing them for us, but the little girl brought them in before she was finished. Several baskets were spread around for us to use, but there was only one nutcracker. The woman brought the tea to us in a small glass on small, individual silver trays. The kids brought in two big bowls of sugar. The first tea serving was already in the glass. There was one pot with strong tea and another pot with hot water for refills. The tea was pretty good. These were very poor people, but very gracious and hospitable.

At one point the town mayor showed up and became the focal point of the conversation that had been going on for well over an hour. He related an incident of a young child having his eye cut out and given to the father to eat as an example of the atrocities. Whole families were executed. The whole town left when the Serbs came in. The mayor said, "If this happened to your family, could you forgive?" One of the little girls in the room with us had lost her father during the fighting. The locals were afraid of the Serbs and what they might do if they returned. They liked KFOR and felt much safer now, but needed jobs, and asked for KFOR's help. They also mentioned that wild pigs (most likely were pigs that had belonged to Serbs that had once lived in the village) were eating their crops and wanted to know if it was okay to shoot them. They were told that as long as they were using weapons registered with UNMIK police, this should be okay. The local men were asked if they had seen any VJ/MUP activity recently and they said that they had seen soldiers in the woods. When asked if they were border guards—dressed in blue camouflage with baseball caps with a red rim—the PSYOP guys did not get a reaction. They told the men that these folks were not allowed in the area and that if they showed up, to report the sighting to KFOR. This was a small, isolated village, so they were very concerned about protection.

The young kids started running around and the father had to settle them down. When asked if they could ever live next to Serbs, the mayor said never, nor those who supported them. It was noted that maybe it was impossible to change the minds of the adults, but that the young children should be encouraged to look to a future of a multi-ethnic

society, for this was where the hope for Kosovo lies. The old man, along with the mayor and school principal, invited the KFOR soldiers back for further discussions. It was customary to shake hands when leaving the property, so we waited until we got outside. The trip back to Camp Bondsteel, except for the boom box music, was uneventful.

Clothing Distribution in Susice

I accompanied a PSYOP team to the Serbian village of Susice in the mountains near Strpce. The visit was to distribute clothing and toys to the locals. There was concern on the part of the locals that there were UCK in the mountains and this was a threat to their safety. Although attempts were made to keep the clothing distribution organized, it quickly got out of hand as the villagers tried to take as much as possible. Attempts to distribute candy and toys had similar results.

I met the PSYOP team at 8:30 a.m. at the PSYOP CP on Camp Bondsteel for the morning briefing before departure to the Serbian village of Susice to distribute clothes and toys that had been donated by organizations and people in the United States. Captain Davis, U.S. Army, led the team. A soldier from finance and combat camera went along as well. A Plugger GPS receiver was taken along because the town was located in the mountains above Strpce and the PSYOP team didn't want to make any mistakes since the maps of the area were not that good. The Humvees had SINCGARS radios, but these were essentially useless once leaving the Camp Bondsteel area. Motorola *SABER* and handheld radios for vehicle-to-vehicle and dismounted communications were taken along as well. The vehicles were loaded with 25 boxes that contained clothes, basic medical supplies, school supplies, candy, and toys. There were two boxes of MREs and water as well.

We stopped at the Polish Battalion (POLBAT) CP in Strpce and met with the commander. We told him our intentions and obtained a situation update for the area. He assigned a Polish platoon leader to escort us to Susice. It was interesting to note that the Serbian towns tended to be clean, whereas the Albanians tended to throw trash everywhere. The town of Susice was in a ski resort area in the middle of nowhere in the mountains. There was evidence of war damage along the road up to the village. The road was partially paved, narrow, and very steep at certain parts. It was a beautiful drive past fields of hay that were being harvested.

Upon our arrival in Susice, we were met by a number of the men from the town who began to tell the translator that they had seen UCK in uniform in the mountains shooting their weapons, and that they were afraid for their lives. As it turns out, Susice was the village where less than a week later, a shepherd disappeared and was subsequently found murdered about a kilometer from the village. The locals said no one shot at them directly, but they were still afraid to work in the fields and mountainside areas and wanted the Americans to send in some patrols. The men said that the U.S. had promised to come, but none had shown up. Captain Davis, through his translator, reminded them that this was an area patrolled by the Polish. In a discussion with the Polish platoon leader, he said that they patrolled the mountain area, but had not found anything. If UCK were really in the area, they probably would shoot a Serb, so one needed to take the accusations seriously.

The Serbian men were rather aggressive and less organized than normal. In order to do an orderly and fair distribution, the intent was to lay the clothes out in boxes and ask a member from each of the families to pick out some things they needed. This way, each family would get something. In principle this was a good idea, but it didn't work. When the first lady started to load up, the rest jumped in and control was quickly lost (Figure 4). People went a bit crazy and started digging into the boxes, taking everything they could get their hands on and arguing over who should get which items. It was a free-for-all. Some loaded up with so much that they were dropping things as they moved around. In the end, there were those who didn't get anything and disputes arose in the crowd. There were several arguments with a couple of ringleaders who seemed to cause most of the problems.

Figure 4. Clothing Distribution

For distributing the toys and candy, an attempt was made to try to get a little more organized and disciplined. The toys and candy were put on the roof of the Humvees and then the soldiers stood on the hood to try to organize the crowd. They tried to get them to line up, but this did not work. Next, they tried to get the kids up front and the adults in the back, but this did not work either. Finally, they just started to selectively hand out toys. Some adults were trying to position themselves so that they could get multiple toys. In the end, the situation became chaotic as well and once again there were those who did not get anything. There were even cases where adults were taking toys from little kids. Finally, the candy was passed out and again, the same situation happened.

The interpreter asked if the locals would like to hear a COMKFOR speech. They put a CD player on the hood of the Humvee and played the speech and some other stuff. The attention span of the locals was not long. It was noted without exception that information campaign products produced by the KFOR PSYOP support element in Pristina were dry and generated little to no interest among the local population. The general population wanted live radio shows with key figures involved in the peace process. Scripted products were an embarrassment to the soldier presenting them and an insult to the target audience. When the combat camera soldier started playing with some of the kids with a toy alligator, all started to watch and the CD player was put

away. There was some yo-yo demonstrations followed by show-and-tell picture taking. The combat camera soldier put on a Serb's hat and then the soldier put his vest on the Serb and took pictures. This went on for a while before it was decided it was time to leave. In the end, the visit was well received and distribution of clothes and toys were truly appreciated by most of the locals.

As we drove along the countryside to and from Strpce, we could see women and men harvesting the hay by hand. The hay was stacked on poles. There were carts drawn by horses and oxen in the fields and on the roads. There were tractors pulling carts. It was a contrast of both modern and somewhat primitive operations. There was also gravel mining out of the creek beds. The locals used makeshift sieves made out of wire mesh. We visited a beautiful church near Strpce that was being privately built by Dr. Aleksandrov using his own money, and we met the laborers building the church. They showed us around and explained what they were doing. On the way back, as we passed through a heavily mined area, we heard an explosion. It was not clear whether EOD was detonating or whether there was an animal that set it off. There were a lot of cows and sheep along the road. As we passed an area that had been flooded, there were several boys skinny-dipping in a mud hole. Kosovo was certainly a land of contrasts.

Abandoned Albanian Villages

While on mission with a PSYOP team, we visited the Albanian villages of Gornja Stubla, Vrnez, and Letnica. This was a destitute area, and some villages were essentially abandoned.

The Tactical PSYOP Team led by Staff Sergeant Trujillo, U.S. Army, stopped by Camp Montieth to check in with the 1-187 TOC and let them know we would be in their sector. As we drove out to the three Albanian towns, we drove though several Serbian towns. The kids and people were not very friendly in these towns. Albanians were much friendlier. The first town visited was Gornja Stubla, which was Albanian and quite a KFOR-friendly place. There were a number of kids walking around but they did not pester us. The PSYOP soldiers passed out some newsletters to the kids to take home to their parents. The TPT I was with went to the local school, which had been refurbished through the use of 80,000 DM provided by KFOR. The TPT team leader wanted to talk to the principal.

We gathered in the principal's office and the principal and several of the teachers came into the room as well. Everyone took off their vests and helmets and put their guns on the floor next to where they were sitting. The principal and his staff were smoking, so the translator and Sergeant Trujillo lit up a cigarette as well.

The purpose of the discussion was to collect information for a village assessment and to hand out newsletters and material on stray dogs. The TPT team leader asked a number of questions, such as where the nearest Serbian towns were located and how many Albanians lived in town. The principal said about 3,000 Albanians lived in town. When asked about their occupations, they said 90 percent were builders by trade, but there was no money to fund buildings. They said the money locals were spending came from family members living in Italy, Switzerland, and Germany. About 30 percent of the town had left to work in other countries, but would return soon. The school was for 5th grade and above and the kids were leaving for the day when we arrived. There were two other elementary schools for grades up to 4th.

Mother Theresa's picture hung on the wall of the principal's office, as well as an OXFAM calendar. The teachers said there were plenty of radio stations available and they heard KFOR programs. They also listened to VOA, RFE, BBC, and other stations. They said they needed a newspaper that gave them information on stations and broadcast schedules. They obviously listened to foreign broadcasts since they were disappointed that the UK lost a recent international football match. Newspapers seemed to be something they both needed and wanted. The locals said they heard about the KFOR *Dialogue* magazine and would like to get copies. The PSYOP team leader said they would bring some with them on their next visit.

The principal stated that in 1877 the first legal school was established, and the school we were visiting was the first Albanian school (founded in 1905) in Kosovo. The religion was mainly Catholic-Albanian. There was little crime in town, just some petty theft. Sometimes there would be people coming from other towns and stealing, but this was not considered a major problem. We were going to ask about clans, but our interpreter didn't understand what we meant. Sewage was still a problem and they needed about 7,500 DM to make some repairs. UNMIK said they would help with some funding. The residents were also concerned about cars speeding through town and wanted some speed bumps put

in. The speeders were usually Serbs who were drunk and trying to provoke a reaction. They did not feel safe without a KFOR presence. We ended the discussion and left some material to be handed out to the school kids.

The other TPT was out in the town walking around, meeting people, and going into the shops and talking to the owners and leaving material. We stopped by a shop and I bought everyone a drink. The shop had a variety of canned goods, sausages, pates, bread, and other staples. There were also hardware supplies such as nails, light bulbs, and even Turkish coffee pots. Although the inside of the shop was quite small it served as a local meeting place. There were several locals in the shop talking when we walked in. They were very friendly and we joked about speaking German, French, and Italian as well. In fact, about 120 local women and students had just returned from Italy. The locals were talking about folklore that said a treasure better than gold was in the local hills. The teachers at the school mentioned this too. It was never said what this really meant. The locals also claimed they found some interesting Serbian documents in the hills. We left the shop and headed towards the church in town where the other team had ended up. The team stopped and passed out some newsletters to some workers in the field. The owner of a shop invited us in for a free drink, but we told him we had to go and would return another day.

Next, we headed for the town of Vrnez. The turnoff was by the water bottling plant that the Marines had occupied when they were deployed in the Gnjilane Opstina. The road was pretty bad, very steep, and windy at times. We first came upon the town of Basici, which was uninhabited. We continued to drive towards Vrnez and saw abandoned homes along the way. Finally we came upon a man working in the field and stopped and talked to him but he did not give us much information. We continued up the hill until we came to the church in the center of Vrnez. Across the lane from the church there were two women who said this was a Croatian town. They said the people had left when the war started and had not returned. They had seen KFOR soldiers before, but we were the first to stop and talk. The Serbs occupied the town during the war, but there was no war damage. Most damage was from people stealing things after the village was abandoned. There were three or four families still in the town, but otherwise it was empty. We looked around at several buildings and it was clear from some that the people had left in a hurry. Clothes were still hanging on lines strung inside a house. Beds were

made and clothing was lying around. Utensils were still in some kitchens. Others had damage inside and there were animals living in the buildings. On the way out of town we even saw a cow come out the front door of one of the homes. Most homes had vandalism damage. A CARE vehicle passed us on our way out of the village.

Next we headed to the town of Letnica where we split into two teams and I went with one of the teams to the church of the Black Madonna and the other team started to walk around town. Several weeks earlier, I had been at the church with a civil affairs team and there had been a U.S. infantry platoon located there. In discussions with the locals we found out that they had left a couple of weeks ago, probably shortly after my visit. We went into the church, built in 1866, and asked whether the priest was there, but he was not. We talked to some ladies cleaning the church and then decided to take a walk around the area on the way back to the Humvees.

There were orchards in the area with pears, apples, and other fruit. We took the back way down to the square where our Humvee was parked and noticed the other team had been invited into a courtyard for a discussion with some local residents. A young girl went down to a shop on the square and brought back some soda for the group. We continued to walk and met four old men who had been consuming some of the local brew. One was the owner of a water mill we had seen at the base of the hill near the church and he offered to take us back to see it. Another man, who had obviously had plenty of the locally brewed brandy, insisted on shaking everyone's hand. We went to the mill and it was quite interesting. It was actually a functioning mill for grinding. The millstone came from Metrovica. We were given a demonstration of grinding corn. The mill was also hooked up to provide power as well. There were a lot of mill-related artifacts hanging around on the ceiling and walls. The owner said he also owned what used to be the Debrovnic hotel that was next to the mill. This was a rare opportunity to see a little of the local culture.

On the way back to Camp Bondsteel, we drove through some parts of the Vitina Serbian area that had received a lot of damage. We headed to Urosevac (Ferizaj) to drop off one of the translators at the bus station and then proceeded to the Greek compound to drop off some PSYOP material.

Demonstration in Zegra

I accompanied a combined PSYOP and combat camera team to Zegra to observe a manifestation for the 1-year anniversary of the UCK liberation of Kosovo. The event included a 5K run, soccer match, handball match, march by ex-UCK fighters, folk dancing, and speeches. There were some concerns that the demonstration could get out of hand if alcohol abuse became a problem, and PSYOP was there to help with crowd control. Luckily, there were no problems and the event was quite peaceful.

The combined PSYOP and combat camera team with an Albanian interpreter left Camp Bondsteel around 10:45 a.m. on a Sunday for Camp Montieth. Staff Sergeant McCarthy led the team. Since the manifestation was scheduled for the afternoon, it was decided we should have lunch at Camp Montieth and then get an intelligence update from the TOC before heading to Zegra. The mission was to provide loudspeaker operations to support crowd control and to photograph suspects of interest, such as ex-UCK members and other leaders that may attend the event.

Zegra was an Albanian town that had sustained heavy damage during the war. When we passed through town it was obvious it had come under heavy shelling during the war and parts of the town were leveled. The Serbs apparently lobbed shells over the mountains surrounding the town.

There was concern that drinking might lead to demonstrations, so the military was prepared, including non-lethal weapons for riot control. The military had gas masks—I did not have one. We parked our Humvees in the U.S. military ABU base camp on the outskirts of town. The Humvees were parked in the military compound since during earlier experiences with demonstrations, the military found themselves in situations where they could not drive out of the demonstration area because demonstrators blocked the roads. The plan was to walk to a school in the center of town where the PSYOP team would set up its operation. If we ran into problems, we would high tail it back to the ABU base for safety.

Zegra was in the Gnjilane Opstina. Since there were Serbian towns nearby, tactical control points (TCP) were set up at key access roads

and intersections to control the flow of traffic into and around the area. Typically, during such events, the Albanians got drunk and drove around wildly with the Albanian flag on a pole hanging out the car window. They would drive at high speeds through the Serbian neighborhoods trying to provoke an incident or sometimes executing a driveby shooting. The military was also concerned that the UCK would march with uniforms and patches, which they were not supposed to do, and this would start some celebrative actions or demonstrations if the military stopped the parade.

The walk from the ABU base, which was some 2 miles away to the center of town, was not tough for me, but for the PSYOP and combat camera soldiers it was more of a challenge. The TPT soldiers had to carry the loudspeaker system, INMARSAT phone, and other equipment. The combat camera team had two video cameras, digital still cameras, and other equipment. The job of the combat camera team was to film the event and suspicious individuals. It turns out that not only was combat camera filming the event, but many of the other soldiers were filming as well. Nearly every soldier on the ground had his own camera with him and everyone was taking pictures of the event.

The schoolhouse was three stories and we used the upper floor to set up the operation. The classrooms were pretty sparse with only a few desks. The floor in the classroom was wooden and had large cracks filled with trash. Some of the windows were broken as well. PSYOP set up shop and combat camera started filming out of the windows. The PSYOP team set up their speaker system and the INMARSAT phone in case they needed to use it. Sergeant McCarthy (Figure 5) made several calls to the PSYOP CP to report the status of the operation.

Figure 5. PSYOP Soldier on INMARSAT Phone

The 5K run was just coming to an end when we set up our operation in the school. The finish line was a small rope stretched across the road with a soda can tied to it in the middle. The runners did not wear sneakers or running shorts. Instead they were dressed in their street clothes. A lone runner appeared and crossed the finish line followed by several others. The crowd was small but began to grow as time passed. A few vendors set up stands to sell ice cream and drinks. The soccer match was played on an asphalt surface. Goals were placed at either end of the play area that was bordered on two sides by destroyed buildings. Kids sat on what was left of the roofs of the buildings to watch the match.

We decided to go down and walk around the area during the soccer match. There were a lot of young kids who came around asking our names, how old we were, or asking us to give them something. The soccer match ended without a problem and then there was a handball game. After the handball game, they played music and had some folk

dancing in anticipation of the ex-UCK marching into the area for the speeches and remainder of the program.

After quite some time we could see the line of ex-UCK soldiers in various camouflaged outfits marching up the road in the distance. The military strategically positioned the Humvees along the road and in an intersection in front of the school so that the marchers would be forced to march in a particular area. The combat camera team set up their operations on both sides of the road so they could film the UCK marchers as they passed. As the marchers got close to the ceremony area, the UCK marching song was cranked up on the public address system and the crowd began to clap, cheer, and sing to the marching song. The marchers did not have UCK patches on their uniforms nor did they mind having their photograph taken—normally they would have avoided having their pictures taken. The ex-UCK marchers lined up in the area where they had been playing soccer and the Kosovo and U.S. national anthems were played. Following this there were speeches, poetry readings by children, awards and certificates were handed out, and even Captain Bell, the ABU base commander, was invited up to receive a certificate. Speeches were intermixed with singers and dancers who started to perform just as we were getting ready to leave. Everyone seemed to behave quite well without any incidents.

Kamenica

On a visit with the Kamenica civil affairs team, I had the opportunity to observe a multi-ethnic open-air market in operation and participate in civil affairs team activities in a Serbian enclave including a meeting with Serbian religious leaders.

Kamenica was one of the few markets where Romas, Serbs, and Albanians could congregate together without any problems. We had a meeting scheduled with the local Serbian church board, but before meeting we walked around the Serbian enclave and then to the market area. In the Serbian area, there was a female doctor who ran a medical clinic for treating Serbs. She was part of the NGO "Pharmacies Sans Frontiers." In order to treat Serbs living in remote areas, KFOR frequently provided her with an escort service to remote Serbian villages. We passed a Serbian school that was being held in a storefront. Like the Albanians under Serbian rule, the Serbs under Albanian rule

now used private facilities to teach their children—it was too dangerous to go to some schools in Albanian areas. The street that provided access to the Serbian enclave was blocked with old pieces of car parts and rocks in order to block access to young Albanians who frequently would drive their cars through the streets at high speeds. Major Ricci, U.S. Army and the civil affairs team leader, was well liked. As we walked around town, people stopped him, talked to him, and invited him for tea and lunch.

The market area consisted of three sections: Roma, Serbian, and Albanian. The Roma section was the smallest with just a couple of vendors and the Albanian section was the largest and provided items such as food, clothing, toys, cigarettes, and hand tools. The meetings with the church leaders were held frequently. The purpose was to keep a dialogue going with the religious leadership by telling them things KFOR was doing for the community and asking them about issues that civil affairs might help them resolve. There was also a lot of disinformation and misperception of events. One of the values of the meetings was providing clarification of incidents, such as some recent Serbian shootings and arson at private residences. The church elders asked civil affairs to help stop the dumping of garbage in the streams as it was making the children sick. With the upcoming first anniversary of the liberation of Kosovo from Serbian rule, the Serbian community was concerned about security during Albanian-led celebrations and asked for additional KFOR security during this period. Major Ricci agreed to look into trying to help where he could. Kamenica was in the Russian sector of Multinational Brigade East and did not have a civil affairs unit, so a U.S. civil affairs team supported this requirement and set up an information center in the UNMIK municipal building. There were no Russian translators to directly support the civil affairs team, but there were Russian speaking U.S. soldiers supporting the SOF liaison teams and the U.S. intelligence support operation at the Russian base in Kamenica.

CHAPTER XXVII

A Continuous Learning Process

Larry Wentz

Lessons-Learned Activities

Numerous national, international, and NATO initiatives attempted to collect experiences and derive lessons from Operation Joint Guardian, but like past efforts, these initiatives were not coordinated and there was no one responsible for pulling together the civil-military story. There was no common process or set of goals driving the collection and analysis of military experiences. These initiatives varied in breadth and depth, as well as in feedback and the dissemination of findings. Open sharing of findings among the various participating organizations was limited at best and active sharing of military findings among civil and military organizations was essentially nonexistent. In particular, the official military reports tended to be classified, restricted access, or placed on classified Web sites with controlled access.

There was some limited open source publication of experiences and lessons. These reports ranged from official to unofficial and national to international documentation of personal and unit experiences from Kosovo. For example, the NATO *Review* and NATO's *Nations* publications presented summaries of successes and challenges in articles written by senior NATO and national military and civilian officials. Web sites for the UN, UNMIK, NATO, SHAPE, KFOR, UK MOD, U.S. DoD, and Task Force Falcon published some experiences, but open access to some these sites (the U.S. military ones in particular) became more restricted over time. There were special reports by international organizations such as the UNHCR, OSCE, and EU, and other humanitarian assistance organizations and multinational organizations, such as the International Crisis Group and International Management Group. The reports of these organizations were posted on their Web sites and contained some specific issues and

recommendations. Individual and unit experiences were also documented and published in professional journals, conference proceedings, and government publications, such as the U.S. Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) bulletin produced by the Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) at Joint Forces Command, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) newsletter and Web site.

Within the international military community, there was no leadership for compiling combined multinational military lessons learned. Unlike Bosnia, there was no in-country NATO Joint Analysis Team collecting Kosovo lessons. There were separate ARRC, KFOR, SHAPE, and national lessons-learned activities. Within the U.S. military elements, there were several uncoordinated activities. The commands, services, agencies, and intelligence organizations conducted separate lessons-learned activities and contributed joint lessons to the Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) for broader circulation and resolution actions. This was a bottom-up approach and heavily dependent upon decisions at the lowest levels to determine what constituted a joint lesson. U.S. EUCOM facilitated the collection of joint service and agency theater-level lessons. The USAREUR Lessons Learned Team under the Operations, Plans, and Training Analysis Branch (OPTAB) collected the Army experiences and lessons for the U.S. Army in Europe participation in Kosovo. Neither USAREUR nor CALL provided an in-country team to collect experiences and lessons from Kosovo and Task Force Falcon. CALL published some unofficial individual and unit experiences in their newsletters and on their Web site. The JWFC JCLL, whose mission is to share lessons with the joint community, solicited and published individual and unit lessons-learned articles in their publication, the JCLL bulletin.

The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Lessons Learned Unit conducts lessons-learned studies, but in 2000 none had been conducted yet since it was only the first year of what was anticipated to be a multiple year operation. The U.N. normally performs a mid-mission and end-of-mission assessment for all of its operations. Visits are made to mission areas, interviews are conducted with key personnel, open source material is reviewed, end of tour reports are collected and assessed, and seminars are conducted to capture and document lessons learned for a particular operation. This documentation and assessment approach may benefit future operations, however, it provides no living feedback during the course of an ongoing operation. There is hope

that live lesson learning may be introduced some day. In the U.N. *Brahimi Report* of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, dated August 21, 2000, it states that lessons learned should be thought of as information management that contributes daily to improving operations, and post-action reports should be only one part of the learning process.

Many ongoing lessons-learned efforts focused on either the civil or the military aspects with little emphasis on an integrated view of the military, political, humanitarian assistance, and civil reconstruction aspects. No single organization in the international civil-military community had the responsibility for coordinating the various efforts and pulling together a coherent big picture. The U.N. comes closest to fulfilling this role, but as noted earlier, their lessons-learned reports generally do not come out until after the mission has been completed. There was also no organization responsible for the dissemination of information to those who participated or were about to participate. Furthermore, the military lessons-learned reporting was incomplete, largely due to a reluctance to report failures. The success-oriented military incentive system did not positively reward the reporting of mission failure-related issues. These mission details were rarely forwarded for review and those that did get forwarded were usually edited until they no longer addressed the failure issue. There was also military pressure for lessons reflecting operational vulnerabilities to be either classified or never released. Unfortunately, this introduced the possibility of limiting feedback to those who needed the information to prevent future failures.

The process for collecting experiences and lessons ranged from highly structured real-time feedback to simple documentation and archiving. There were approaches, such as the process used by the ARRC, which focused on real-time learning. In this reporting process, failure-oriented issues that needed corrections were quickly assessed. Courses of action were then developed and implemented to ensure that they resulted in a lesson learned. The ARRC was proactive and established a lessons-learned branch as part of its deployed headquarters' staff. Its mission was to collect, analyze, validate, and implement lessons learned in order to improve the ARRC headquarter's ability to plan and conduct operations. The process was aimed at providing real-time feedback and follow-on action to ensure continuous learning, correction of mistakes, and recognition of success where appropriate. This process was, however, the exception and not the

rule—other lessons-learned activities were more reactive and reluctant to report on themselves by openly sharing failures. Most organization-sponsored lessons-learned activities were aimed at documenting their experiences and lessons at the end of each unit's rotation, and then assessing and integrating the findings over time. After extensive multilevel command reviews, they published the sanitized findings and then took remedial action. These processes lacked the honesty, timeliness, and dissemination necessary to ensure continuous learning and improvements. As a result, new units arriving in theater experienced many of the same problems as those that preceded them.

SHAPE established a Joint Analysis Team to collect and publish KFOR lessons learned. However, unlike the IFOR/SFOR JAT, there was no proactive in-country team of observers specifically tasked to collect insights for KFOR lessons. Inputs were generally received from the field and then analyzed and integrated into an overall KFOR lessons-learned package at SHAPE. U.S. EUCOM was the theater focal point for assembling the U.S. joint lessons learned inputs for JULLS, and this was done though coordination meetings with the service and agency representatives and the collection of inputs from the field. Kosovo lessons were published on the EUCOM classified Web site as well and could be viewed by those who had U.S. SIPRNET access.

At the Task Force Falcon level, the G3 Plans shop was responsible for pulling together the TFF After Action Review (AAR) for the 1st Infantry Division (1 ID) participation. There was no lessons-learned shop that collected and analyzed experiences and lessons over the duration of each 6-month tour rotation. The purpose of the AAR was to capture the lessons learned and general issues associated, for example, the TFF 1B operations. The 1B AAR that was being assembled when I arrived in Kosovo was an input to a larger structure that was aimed at capturing the key challenges faced by 1st ID participation in the first year of the Kosovo operation. The intent was to publish a unit history that provided an overall background, sequence of events, and summary of Army support to KFOR and MNB(E) activities and lessons. Additionally, the USAREUR OPTAB Lessons Learned Team collected the AARs that were produced by each unit and was tasked to put together a USAREUR lessons-learned story for the broader Army participation in the Kosovo operation.

In order to put the TFF 1B AAR together, they established a framework to capture strategic, operational, and tactical lessons for the patterns of operation that included building the team, training the team, deploying, employment, sustaining, redeploying and TOA, and reintegration. Major emphasis was placed on the employment portion of the AAR and the key operational components of maneuver, intelligence, engineer, fire support, air defense, signal, aviation-A2/C2, MP, information operations, CMO, signal, and command and control were the focus of documenting experiences and lessons learned. AARs from major events such as the Metrovica operation, the Sevce riot, and the Gornje Kusce cordon and search were included as well. A tight schedule was established and carefully managed in order to complete the AAR by June 19, 2000, the day before the transfer of authority to the 1st Armor Division.

The AAR process started with all units and staff assigned to TFF providing initial inputs to TFF G3 Plans by May 10, 2000. Additional inputs were submitted throughout the next several weeks of the AAR process. My arrival in Kosovo at the end of May coincided with the preparation of the first draft of the 1 B AAR. In support of the continuing AAR processes, I conducted interviews with each of the major command elements, visited facilities, and participated in selected operations as a means to help draw out additional insights and lessons to be used by the 1B AAR team. Two roundtable meetings were conducted as well. One was with the primary staff and the other was with the TFF commander and his staff, including the multinational commanders assigned to TFF. The inputs received by the G3 Plans AAR team varied in detail and format. The final draft of the 1B AAR was completed by June 19 and taken back to 1st ID headquarters for incorporation into its KFOR unit history and publication. As noted earlier, the 1B AAR was also made available to the USAREUR team, which was compiling a broader picture of Army experiences and lessons in support of the Kosovo operation.

A number of articles on experiences and lessons emerged since the beginning of Operation Joint Guardian. There have been high-level status reports and reflections of 1-year achievements and challenges published by senior leaders such as the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and others. Examples of KFOR and U.N. publications include:

- *Kosovo: One Year On,* by the NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/better.htm);

- *Reflections on KFOR's Contributions* by COMKFOR General Klaus Reinhardt (Summer-Autumn 2000 issue of the NATO Review);

- *Report to the Security Council on UNMIK,* by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annon (www.un.org/Depts/dhl/da/kosovo/kosovo3a.htm); and

- *UNMIK Status Report*, by the Senior Representative of the Secretary General Dr. Bernard Kouchner (www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo1.htm).

Other publications from the U.S. military and various international organizations include:

- International Crisis Group (ICG), *Kosovo Report Card*—success and failures of NATO and U.N. efforts and organizations, 8/00;

- International Management Group (IMG), *Kosovo Telecommunications Damage Assessment*—cost estimates to repair and modernize the country's communications—www.img.ba/kosovo/main/telecom/index.html, 10/99, 3/00, 5/00, 6/00;

- Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC), Humanitarian issues, municipal profiles, and civil reconstruction—www.reliefweb.int/hcic/;

- *ARMY*, the magazine of the Association of the U.S. Army, Experiences and lessons of the 82nd airborne, 505th parachute, and 1st ID (mechanized), 9/99;

- *Marine Corps Gazette*, Experiences and lessons of the 26th MEU, 11/99;

- Engineer Professional Bulletin, *The Engineer Regiment in Kosovo*, 4/00; and

- Military Police, *Military Police Functions in Kosovo*, 5/00.

The need to capture experiences and lessons learned is certainly widely accepted, but collaboration, coordination, and open sharing continue to be problematic and challenging for the civil-military community. The prospect of one organization taking on the role of facilitating collaboration, coordination, and sharing to create a coherent big picture for peace support operations is unlikely at this time. Improving the sharing of experiences and lessons is certainly more likely. The information networks today, such as the Internet, have demonstrated their utility as the means to communicate among those willing to share. The efforts of the HCIC to promote more open information sharing and use of its Web site to do this is an excellent example of what can be done today. In the end, coordination and open sharing will be a result of the political will of the nations and organizations involved. If nations and organizations want to share, then they will make it happen. The challenge for the civil-military community is to promote more open sharing by doing it during real operations, but this will not be achieved until someone attempts to organize and lead such an effort.

The civil-military lessons-learned system is dysfunctional and urgently needs improved. Both the civil and military processes need to reward the reporting of failures as well as successes and they need to be a real-time learning process with immediate feedback, and not simply a historical archiving process to fill bookshelves or classified databases and libraries.

The approach used by the ARRC to capture real-time experiences and turn them into lessons learned could serve as a model for other militaries and civil organizations for future peace support operations. Openly presenting current experiences and lessons on Web sites is also an approach to consider for improved sharing and to facilitate continuous learning.

Some Concluding Observations

HOOAH (pronounced Who-A) to the men and women of the U.S. military, to the civilian and contractor force, and to the allied partners that made the military mission in Task Force Falcon a success. Agility and accommodation continue to be keys to success, as well as some plain old good luck. In the final analysis, however, it was the professionalism, dedication, ingenuity, and personal sacrifices of the

men and women who were there (and those who supported them) that made it happen.

As noted at the outset of this chapter, the observations presented herein are not meant as a criticism, but simply intended to reflect the reality of the situation and attempt to help provide the reader with a better understanding and appreciation of the daily environment of a peace support operation. A lot has been and continues to be learned from Operation Joint Guardian. Some of the experiences will shape the nature of future military support to peace support operations and others will be revisited in future operations. The Center for Army Lessons Learned says, "a lesson is learned when behavior changes." The Kosovo observations presented herein contain both lessons learned and lessons yet to be learned.

There is no priority of importance implied by the sequence in which the following observations are presented, but the most important lesson that appeared in every AAR reviewed was "Kosovo is not Bosnia." Some realities of peace operations:

Operations Planning and Preparations

- Ill-defined and fuzzy political end states will be a given.

- A political-military strategic plan for the operation will be lacking.

- Multinational military planning will be fragmented with little collaboration and cooperation with non-military actors and between national military elements.

- In spite of good soldier training, there will be a need for additional training to prepare units for peace operations, including training once in country. Training will be needed to develop skills in policing, conducting town meetings, negotiating and resolving conflict, crowd control and use of non-lethal weapons, and urban combat techniques.

Multinational Operations and Relations

- Competing international and national political agendas will be the norm.

- Multinational command arrangements will be politically driven and complex.

- Parallel national chains of command will exist and need to be accommodated.

- Politically driven force caps, not troops-to-task analysis, will drive force composition planning and implementation.

- It will be necessary to manage the expectations of all participants—political, civil, military, and the public in general.

- In multinational operations, the best semblance of unity that can be achieved will be unity of effort.

- Stovepiped NATO and national C4ISR systems will continue to be deployed to support contingency operations, creating interoperability and security disconnects.

- The potential adversaries of NATO (and the U.S. in particular) will not overlook the weaknesses exposed in the NATO-led multinational operation.

- Coalition military doctrine, intelligence, and decisionmaking processes, and the performance of the C4ISR systems supporting the operation, have yet to be truly tested under live hostile fire. Doctrine and tactics based upon an assumed freedom to communicate and ability to achieve information dominance may not be sufficient in the future.

- Active counter measures against dependence on information may be needed in future operations, including peace operations. Virus attacks experienced by NATO and national military networks clearly demonstrated the vulnerabilities of these information networks and need to proactively protect against such intrusions. Intentional attacks against NATO information and information systems were experienced in both the air war over Serbia and the Kosovo operation.

Civil-Military Operations and Relations

- The key to military exit strategy will be the success of the international presence in civil reconstruction efforts.

- Civil organization (e.g., U.N.) activities in country will slow the military and need to be accommodated. The success of these organizations is key to military exit strategy.

- Non-governmental organizations will be in country before the military arrive, will continue to be there while the military is present, and will remain when the military leave. It will therefore be necessary to deal with these organizations as meaningful participants in the operation and leverage their strengths.

- Civil and military actors do not yet adequately understand one another's motivations or modes of operation. This lack of understanding and cooperation will be confusing, wasteful, and potentially dangerous, especially if these differences are ignored during the planning stages of military deployments.

- The Balkanized approach to civil-military operations reflects the lack of overall unity of effort for NATO forces. KFOR headquarters was a coordinating (rather than a command and control) headquarters. The MNBs were relatively independent and thus had approaches to CMO that were more indicative of national political priorities and military operating styles. The CMO activities were hampered by the absence of an overarching campaign plan and means for measuring the status and effectiveness of the CIMIC lines of operation at the municipal and maneuver unit level.

- The military can mobilize personnel and resources like no other institution. It can carry those resources great distances. The humanitarian assistance world is very different. It is primarily built on donations and well-intentioned individuals who are willing to place themselves at risk for little compensation. The military must be prepared to work with and assist organizations which are not well supplied, prepared, or equipped.

- The military must accept that there will be a fundamental difference between its training and attitudes and those of the

international organizations and non-governmental organizations engaged in relief and rehabilitation. The humanitarian community will focus its planning energies on the victims of tyranny, cruelty, and disorder. These civilian organizations will be committed to assisting all non-belligerents in need, without regard to ethnic group or political faction.

Military Flexibility

- Force protection, while not a mission itself, will be a high priority consuming manpower, resources, and time.

- One-size-fits-all models do not apply to peace support operations. No two operations will be the same.

- National military rotation policies generate continuous turnover of commanders and staff and this will create turbulence and pose leadership and continuity challenges.

- Trust and confidence will be essential elements of building new teams and integrating teams into ongoing operations. Trust must be earned, so it will be essential to start to build the team before deployment, including formal training as well as informal opportunities for the leaders and staff to socialize and to build confidence as a team.

- It will be feasible to use commercial communications and information systems, products, and services to satisfy military command and control needs. Such use is on the rise and is cost-effective, but there will be security risks that need to be addressed when using these products and services without appropriate security protection.

- The Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up system was created to respond to Cold War needs and may therefore be inappropriate for the continuing demands of peace operations that include units such as civil affairs, MPs, PSYOPS, and combat engineers.

- Civil affairs, PSYOP, combat camera, and information operations will be force multipliers in peace support operations.

- Peace operations require soldiers to confront dangerous and lethal environments as well as to maintain safe and secure environments. This requires mental and organizational flexibility that encompasses high-intensity training as well as the softer skills of humanitarian assistance, checkpoints, presence patrols, negotiations, and critical cultural understandings.

- Battle rhythm can be brutal, and so staff burn out can be a serious concern requiring continuous efforts to encourage staff to get adequate sleep and take time off to relax.

- It will be necessary to more effectively exploit information technology at the tactical level.

- Complacency must be avoided even as a return to normalcy occurs.

- Although soldiers faced threats of violence every day, the potential adversaries were largely compliant with the Military Technical Agreement and took few actions to interfere directly with KFOR activities. It was a policing and civil reconstruction effort. Many viewed the operation as a success because there were no major military casualties. This mindset is dangerous because it sets a precedent for expectations that peacekeeping missions are routine and will not involve failures or casualties. Political leaders, next generation commanders, and the general population may not be mentally prepared for the sort of reverses that can easily befall those involved in more hostile military operations.

Military Intelligence

- Military knowledge and understanding of the roots of conflict, religion, culture, traditions, economics, and politics of the region will be lacking.

- Intelligence needs to be able to conduct and collect traditional hard-targeting analysis supporting military courses of action to maintain a safe and secure environment and suppress terrorist activities. At the same time it also must be able to conduct soft analysis of political organization intents, economic needs, civil

unrest, disturbance intents, vigilante and rogue warrior capabilities and intents, refugee movements, international organization and NGO activities, civil infrastructure, and criminal activities.

- Traditionally, military intelligence is collected to provide information about an operation that the military has already decided to undertake, but for peace operations, intelligence and information will be collected in order to determine future military action.

- Establishment of effective communications capabilities and media policy will be important to the overall success of operations. The military public information team needs to be deployed early, in sufficient numbers, and with communications and information capabilities comparable to those used by the press.

- Military-media relationships need to be established and nurtured as early as possible. The press must be educated as much as possible on the policies, people, and equipment that comprise military operations.

- Interpreters (translators) are cultural liaison agents. Their allegiance will not necessarily be with the military organization supported. Additionally, many times translators interpret and add their own connotations, and this needs to be carefully managed.

- Information operations require an overarching strategic plan containing clear and measurable objectives and the commander's personal involvement and leadership.

- Current information and intelligence systems processes are inadequate to meet the needs of multinational, multi-agency, and civil-military operations. Complex humanitarian emergencies require a capacity to share information, promote cooperation, and, where appropriate, coordinate action among all relevant actors. Information sharing among the civil-military actors continues to be problematic.

- Continuity of situational awareness will be critical.

CHAPTER XXVIII

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